

CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Anita Abbott

Dr. Anita Abbott is the chair of APSI Forum committee, and adjunct professor at Charisma University. She was a research fellow at NATO Defence College. She regularly contributes to publications and is invited nationally and internationally for research projects and speaking engagements. Her research areas include strategic foresight analysis and future warfare. She has published more than 40 articles. Her first book develops the education sovereignty model in international negotiation. In her second book, published by Palgrave MacMillan, she uses Indonesia and several countries as examples of how negotiation works for maintaining sovereignty in education.

Lieutenant Colonel John W. Black, Regional Affairs Officer United States Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Black is an Infantry and Regional Affairs Officer in the United States Marine Corps. He has served in the Marine Corps for more than 24 years. As an Infantry Officer, he has commanded at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. He has served in many international operations.

General Paolo RUGGIERO, Italian Army, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation

General Paolo Ruggiero assumed duties as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation on July 19, 2019. He was born on September 26, 1957, in Naples. He is a graduate of the Italian Military Academy in Modena and was commissioned as a Field Artillery (FA) Officer on September 1, 1977.

Colonel Shigehiro Noshita, Defence Attaché to Papua New Guinea and the Army Attaché to Australia, Fiji and New Zealand in the Embassy of Japan in Canberra, Australia.

Colonel Shigehiro Noshita is currently the Defence Attaché to Papua New Guinea and the Army Attaché to Australia, Fiji and New Zealand in the Embassy of Japan in Canberra,

Australia. As a transport officer, he has held a variety of command, training and staff appointments at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

Colonel Noshita is a graduate of the National Defence Academy Japan, the United States Army Logistics Management College (2007), the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Command and Staff College (2009), the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping India (2011), the Australian Command Staff College (2015) and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (2018).

He holds a Bachelor's degree of Social Science and a Master of Military and Defence Studies from the Australian National University.

Anthony A. Spadaro Sergeant Major (Retired), USMC. Former Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, APSI Forum and Center of Excellence

Anthony Spadaro is a retired United States Marine Corps senior non-commissioned officer (Sergeant Major) who retired from the United States Marine Corps in 2020 after a distinguished 35-year military career. During his service, Anthony served at the most senior levels for the Marine Corps and Department of Defense. He culminated his service to our Nation as the Command Senior Enlisted Leader for the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, the largest geographic combatant command with 380,000 uniformed (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines), and civilian members along with 36 partner nations.

Major General (ret'd) John Hartley AO

John Hartley graduated from Duntroon in December 1965. Three months later, he deployed to South Vietnam as a platoon commander. He returned to Vietnam in 1970 as a senior adviser to a South Vietnamese infantry battalion. He was wounded three times, twice mentioned-in-dispatches, awarded the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry, the US Army Commendation Medal for Valour on two occasions and the US Air Force Air Medal for Valour.

As a General Officer, he headed Army's Training Command, was Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Deputy Chief of the Army and Head of Army's Land Command. He was appointed Institute Director and CEO of Future Directions International in September 2009.

Major General (Ret) Gert-Johannes Hagemann, APSI Forum and Center of Excellence

Major General Gert-Johannes Hagemann retired as an active military September 2020, after having served almost 43 years as a Paratrooper and Infantryman in the German Army. He joined the APSI Forum in 2020. Between 2016 and 2020 he was the Deputy Commander of Headquarters Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ RRC-FR) in Lille, France. Created in 2005, HQ RRC-FR is a French NATO certified headquarters able to command a national or multinational force of between 15,000 and 60,000 personnel. With around 450 military personnel coming from fifteen different nations, HQ RRC-FR is stationed within a 17th-century citadel also known as the Queen of the Citadels, designed by the famous French Field Marshal Vauban. Reactive, flexible and ‘open to the world’, HQ RRC-FR is a purpose-built organization, designed to handle the complexity of military operations of the early twenty-first century. Prior to his appointment as Deputy Commander of NATO’s HQ RRC-FR, Major General (Ret) Hagemann was Commander of the Infantry School and the Infantry Training Center in Hammelburg, Germany and the General and Director of the German Infantry, Paratrooper and Mountain Infantry. From 2011 to 2013 he was the twelfth Commander of the German-French Brigade in Müllheim, after having served as the German Regional Commander of NATO’s Training Mission Afghanistan 2010 to 2011. His operational experience and theatre expertise covers additionally the Balkans, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Djibouti, Chad, Central African Republic and Mali. Major General (Ret) Hagemann is decorated with various German, Belgian, U.S., French and NATO medals and was made a member of the French Légion d’Honneur. His fellowships include associations in Norway and Switzerland. His academic expertise stretches from university studies (graduation in macroeconomics and business management, summa cum laude) to post-graduate studies and courses in Germany and Belgium, covering a wide array of topics in Military Affairs, Defence and Security, Politics, History and Social Science.

Dr Jesus S. Domingo, Philippine Ambassador to New Zealand, Cook Islands, Fiji, Samoa & Tonga

Jesus “Gary” S. Domingo is a career Philippine Foreign Service Officer. His diplomatic assignments have included postings at the Philippine Missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva, and the Philippine Embassy in Saudi Arabia. He has also served as Philippine Focal Point for Multilateral Humanitarian Affairs and Disarmament and coordinated

international assistance for Super typhoon Yolanda in 2013 which was one of the biggest civilian and military humanitarian operations to date.

Guy Roberts (National Security and Non-Proliferation Senior Consultant)

Mr. Guy Roberts has over thirty-five years of experience in public policy, foreign affairs, international organizations, bi-lateral and multilateral negotiations on strategic issues and international legal matters.

Most recently, until May 2019, he was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. In that capacity he was the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters concerning nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs and ensuring the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, ready and effective.

Prior to that he was a National Security Consultant and an Adjunct Professor at Mary Washington University and Virginia Commonwealth University.

Hunter Stires, John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research, the U.S. Naval War College

Hunter Stires is a Fellow with the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research at the U.S. Naval War College and is a Strategy and Policy Professional at Cydecor supporting the OPNAV N522 Navy Warfare Group. His area of inquiry centers on strategy and logistics in the Western Pacific and maritime irregular warfare. Mr. Stires has been recognized twice in the U.S. Naval Institute's General Prize Essay Contest.

Major General Ravi Arora

Maj Gen Ravi Arora is the chief editor of Indian Military and CEO of IMR Media, which organises defence events and publishes military books. Gen Ravi Arora commanded 12 Infantry Division in India's desert sector and India's only amphibious brigade in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. He was Head of the Red Forces (Wargaming) Branch of the Army Training Command, before he took voluntary retirement.

Gen Arora has been a senior instructor at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington (India), Director in the Perspective Planning Directorate, Army HQ and Secretary Joint Operations Planning Committee in the Ministry of Defence.

Professor Sascha Dov Bachmann, University of Canberra

Professor in Law at Canberra Law School - University of Canberra

Extraordinary Reader (Docent) in War Studies – Swedish Defence University (FHS) Stockholm

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State Exam (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Germany), Ass Juris, LLM (Stell, RSA), LLD (UJ, RSA) Attorney (Munich High Court)

Fellow of The Higher Education Academy (UK)

Major General Karsten Stoye

Major General Karsten Stoye assumed his position as Chief of Staff at NATO's Headquarters Allied Air Command at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on 1 March 2019 after his previous assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff Operations at NATO's Headquarters Allied Air Command.

After studying economics and administrative science at the University of the German Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg, General Stoye has served in various operational and staff positions. As a senior operations officer and command pilot in the Tactical Reconnaissance Wing 51 'Immelmann', he contributed from 1995 to 1996 to the United Nations and NATO missions during the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. In 1998 he graduated from the Command and General Staff Officer Course at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College in Hamburg.

Nicholas Dynon, Line of Defence Magazine

Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of New Zealand defence security and safety publications Line of Defence Magazine, New Zealand Security Magazine and FireNZ Magazine. He also practices as a security consultant specialising in protective security documentation, culture and communication. Nicholas previously served 14 years with the Australian Government's Department of Immigration and Border Protection, which included diplomatic postings to Shanghai, Beijing and Suva. A graduate of the Royal Military College of Australia, he served part-time in the Australian Army as both a non-commissioned and commissioned officer.

Prof. Dwi Andreas Santosa

Professor Santosa is the Head of M.Sc. Program on Soil and Environmental Biotechnology at Bogor Agricultural University (IPB). He is also the Chairman Governing Board Indonesian Center for Biodiversity and Biotechnology, National Chairman Indonesian Farmer Technology and Seed Bank Association, and Associated Scholar Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia and Thamrin School. He holds a PhD in Life Sciences from Braunschweig University of Technology. He was awarded fellowships and postdoctoral fellowships from Yonsei University in South Korea, German Research Center for Biotechnology, German Federal Research Center for Nutrition and Food, and School of Pharmacy at Oregon State University. He has written numerous articles in food security, system and policy, bio politics, and the politics of global food security. He is also the holder of international patent (US Patent 9, 977, and 375; European Patent EP 1 791 823 AO) and national patent.

Dr Andrew Dowse, Edith Cowan University, Australia

Dr Dowse joined Edith Cowan University after a 37-year career with the Royal Australian Air Force. He joined the RAAF as an engineer cadet in 1981 and, after completing a degree in Communications and Electronics Engineering at RMIT, graduated as an electronics officer. His career included working in air defence and communications, as well as managing command and control systems and information technology. He has also had key leadership roles in electronic and information warfare, and broader capability planning.

Don Lord, Hagar New Zealand

Don previously worked for World Vision in New Zealand and Mongolia. Don has been involved in research on Trafficking in Cambodia and has worked in Mongolia on the formulation of an anti-trafficking project to be spearheaded by local project staff. He has also had extensive involvement in developing tools to work with trafficked women and children in Cambodia, National Child Protection standards and systems in Mongolia, and global Children in Crisis initiatives. Don established Hagar NZ in 2009.

Bill Keh-Ming Chen

He is the current Representative, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New Zealand. He has a degree in Business Administration at National Taiwan University and another in the Intensive

English Language Program at Leeds University, U.K. He has acted in various capacities; as the Director-General, Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Negotiator, Office of Trade Negotiations, Executive Yuan (the Cabinet) and Deputy Chief Negotiator, Office of Trade Negotiations, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Deputy Representative/Director of Public Affairs, Taipei Economic & Cultural Office in Canada), among others.

Simon O'Connor, National MP

Simon is currently the Member of Parliament for the Tamaki electorate in Auckland. He was appointed as the National Party's Spokesperson for Customs, and Arts, Culture & Heritage, as well as Associate Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs. In previous Parliaments, he was the Chair of the Health Committee and, more recently, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. Simon is also a part of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an international group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.

Gillian Somerville, GES Consulting, New Zealand

Gillian is a highly skilled Human Factors Engineer with 25 years' international experience integrating human factors through complex systems. Her qualifications include a BA Geography (NZ), CoP Marketing Management (NZ), Diploma in Environmental Management (NZ), and MSc Ergonomics (UK). She has also completed the Creating Living Buildings course and the Regenerative Practitioner.

Dr Barnaby Pace, APSI Center of Excellence

Dr Barnaby Pace is a trained human factors psychologist and cognitive scientist who holds Masters degrees from the University of Waikato and Massey University. He has 15 years' experience in risk management and behavioural analysis, having worked in both the public and private sectors. He is an experienced researcher with more than 40 publications and has been an invited speaker at many international conferences. Most recently Mr Pace presented a workshop at the Australian Enterprise Risk Management of Government Conference on the use of design thinking for risk management framework development.

Pamela Williamson MCTS, LL. B

Pamela Williamson practiced as a Barrister and Lawyer specialising in litigation and the resolution of family conflict from 1997-2015. Prior to that she was a psychotherapist for 14 years. As an Executive Coach she obtained a US Corporate Masters Pin in Goal-setting. She obtained a Masters in Conflict and Terrorism Studies in the inaugural MCTS programme at the University of Auckland (2017-2018). Her Dissertation was on Strategic Narratives: Effectiveness of Communication Strategies to Disarm Russian Information Warfare (IW) and Immunise Populations Against Influence Operations (IO).

PART I: Rethinking National Security in the Global Arena

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Dr Anita Abbot

In order to know when threats exist, we need to know the others' strategies globally, nationally, and individually where there are plans for survival, power and domination, and revenge. At sea, for instance, many players are arming themselves. What is this for? For survival? China's Blue economy indicates that China seeks to tap the economic potential of the ocean. Do states arm themselves at sea for protecting sea lanes, sea lines of communication, or securing trade and energy? 80-90% of China's total trade travels by sea. At sea, many players arm themselves with advanced weaponry and operational skills necessary for deploying and maintaining amphibious ships, submarines, and surface combatants. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) strategists certainly will not overlook the possibility that another state would launch a surprise attack on China.

To build a strategy, rethinking national strategy is a good starting point. On day 1, a retired general, Johannes Hagemann starts with remarks about the unprecedented challenges created by the corona pandemic in the year 2020; how several supposedly mighty nations have fallen; how human problem-solving capacity seems to have failed and the probability of the negative effects of the pandemic extending far into the future. How other security challenges have emerged are also discussed in the form of malicious attacks on data networks and command and control systems, cutting off and blocking of international trade routes and supply chains on which global prosperity and our welfare states depend. Our security environment has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic and is therefore increasingly unpredictable. Issues such as trans-national terrorism, challenges from the information and cyber domain, hybrid warfare, and global arms build-up and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also discussed on day 1.

On day 2, the discussion is about strengthening security resiliency through partnerships and alliances. Lieutenant Colonel John Black highlights some significant existing and emerging threats confronting nations. These threats have the capacity to render them insecure and vulnerable to external aggressors. Two major forms of threat are identified. There are threats coming from state-on-state warfare. There are also threats from what he called irregular warfare. Lieutenant Colonel Black discusses how these threats pose higher level threats to the rules-based order of the world. In offering solution to these threats, Lieutenant Colonel Black

makes two suggestions which are not mutually exclusive. There is internal and there is external. On the internal, a nation can fight against security threats by developing soft and /or hard powers. While he argues that both type of power are necessary, he gave reasons why the hard power has ultimate deterrent power. On the external, he talked about the importance of like-minded nations forming alliances and partnership to prevent or tackle threats from common bullying powers or aggressors and for strengthening their resources. However, he noticed three problems often standing in the way of the success of such alliances. These problems are lack of understanding, lack of or poor communication and absence of alignment of actions. Furthermore, on external forms of help to combat threats at national and international levels, Lieutenant Colonel Black discusses the importance and readiness of US to assist its allies and partners in the combat against these aggressive threats. He analyses one of the programs offered by US government which is called full spectrum capability development options. This is about how to develop both economic and security infrastructures of nations along its interests, cultural and philosophical ethos.

The forum presents some of the issues of global concern. The world has developed along a global ethos so what affects one nation can legitimately be said to affect all nations. Solutions then can be complex if practically impossible. Governments regularly fail in attempts to solve social issues. Though try we must. The forum provides a wide perspective on threats and on their solution from independent experts.

CHAPTER II

BUILDING COMMUNITY

Dr. Jesus Domingo

I start my presentation with the picture of the World Today. It is VUCA – volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. We can call it the Returns of Geopolitics. Is history repeating 2013 again? The frameworks and mechanisms are getting more obvious; Westphalian/post Westphalian world, multilateralism/bilateralism, rule of law, Rules based order, balance of power, deterrence., Architectures, OBOR, Indo-Pacific/Quad, et al. There are also several non-traditional security issues to contend with. Among these we have pandemics and climate change.

I set the bearing of my presentation with two historical quotations we can learn from. The first is from Dwight D. Eisenhower - "I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, only as one who has seen its brutality, its futility, its stupidity."

Here is another quotation from Lao Tzu - "Weapons are instruments of fear; they are not a wise man's tools. He uses them only when he has no choice. Peace and quiet are dear to his heart. And victory no cause for rejoicing. If you rejoice in victory, then you delight in killing; If you delight in killing, you cannot fulfil yourself."

These quotations are important in terms of how to set our priorities right when it comes to questions about instruments of statecraft and security. How do we set the priorities? The Diplomatic ought to serve as the first Line of Defence. The Military – Defence Establishment. The Intelligence – Eyes & Ears. Information – New Oil. Economic – \$ and Resources. Finally, the Cultural – Soft Power.

On the issue of instruments of statecraft and security, collaborative approaches are extremely essential. How does collaboration from withing work?

There is need to break "silos". Building bridges rather than fences.

There is need for WoG: Whole of Government Approach. In this case, all Govt Agencies must collaboratively work as One Team

There is need for OCTA: One Country Team Approach – Embassy / High Commission as One Team

The working model is C5i: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Collaboration and Intelligence Fusion.

A glimpse at Wellington Diplomatic Missions

All Diplomatic Missions - Embassies and High Commissions - accredited to New Zealand

Missions have Political-Security Officers (PSOs), many have Defence Attaches (DAs)

Many Missions / DAs in Canberra, elsewhere

New Zealand MoD works directly with DAs, but Heads of Missions (HoM) are not necessarily looped in

However, from my observation, there is need for better collaboration among New Zealand Diplomatic and Security Stakeholders.

Importance of New Zealand

Numerous points underscore the importance of New Zealand. Historically, it is the first Country to Grant Women Right to Vote. It has one of the best Indigenous Framework – Waitangi Treaty. It is known for its outstanding multiculturalism. It is also noted for its Independent Foreign Policy / Universal Acceptability. A country widely noted for having friendly and Inclusive People. It is well known for innovative policies and ideas – Peter Jackson, Taika Waititi. It is a testing Country for New Technologies. Arguably one of the best countries in terms of Response to COVID-19 & Terrorism.

Is NZ - “Switzerland” of Indo-Pac-Am? There are several points to make anyone answer this question in the affirmative. New Zealand serves as the Hub for a greater Indo-Asia-Pacific-Americas Super-Region. It serves as a notable Diplomatic, Cultural, Business Centre. It is

complementing OBOR & Indo-Pacific Geometries. It is “Between Bosphorus to Brazil, Baghdad and Buenos Aires”. It is the “Middle-Earth” / “Switzerland of the Pacific”. From these, I simply draw these equations: Wellington = Geneva, Auckland = Zurich, Queenstown = Davos.

I will conclude my presentation by highlighting the importance of APSI -in terms of Community Building. First, it is outstanding in the ways it uniquely & inclusively brings together the different Diplomatic-Security Stakeholders of New Zealand. I think this is awesome. Secondly, APSI leads in building the needed Diplomatic-Security Community for New Zealand / Indo-Pac-Am. Thirdly, its preoccupation with Synergizing Mission. This mission can be identified as follows. First, It supports transformative leadership that promotes cooperation in innovative security models, concepts, frameworks, and technologies in the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, it forms international expert networks through discussion on topics of security, innovation, and security-related civil science. Thirdly, it facilitates cooperation of issues of common interests, including human and social aspects of security.

CHAPTER THREE

Tour d'Horizon spring 2021

Gert-Johannes Hagemann Major General (Ret)

I. Introduction

Uncertainty is a common term for describing the future. However, year 2021 will give it a new meaning. The outbreak of the pandemic in year 2019 has spread a feeling of vulnerability across the planet. It has changed our daily lives with a speed and intensity that demonstrated to us the fragility of many things we thought were strong.

The pandemic has been a powerful reminder of the weaknesses of our warning systems and our lack of adequate preparedness for handling future crises.

2020 was a year of perplexity. The intensity of the shock and absence of recent precedents of similar magnitude resulted in confusion, doubt and total failure in problem-solving capacity. 2021 will be a year of action, of individual and collective decisions having impacts that will stretch far beyond the year itself.

Year 2021 will be a fork in the road, a critical juncture, a time of risks, but also full of opportunities that may or may not be utilized. When we reflect in ten years' time, it is most likely that we will look for their origins in the crisis of year 2020 and the decisions taken in year 2021.

News stories about treatments and vaccines raise hopes and produce signs of recovery sometimes in 2021. But will everyone benefit from it? What should be done with those left out of vaccination programmes, with individuals and territories suffering from crises other than health? This is what we must wait and see.

II. The International Order in Transition

This decade will bring increasingly rapid change in economic, environmental and technological terms.

Many of the security scenarios originally just anticipated have by now become a reality. Some scenarios, however, were beyond our expectations.

In many places, military capabilities are seen as the primary means for conflict resolution, again, as for examples, in Eastern Ukraine, in Syria, in Libya or most recently in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This is accompanied by rapidly evolving weapons technology such as drones, killer satellites, or hypersonic missiles, which make it infinitely more difficult to defend national borders, infrastructures or even our armed forces.

Every day, our data networks and command and control systems are hit by thousands of malicious attacks. Private companies, state authorities and security agencies are equally affected by these negative occurrences.

We are faced with attacks directed at us and our allies, borders, airspace, territorial waters, and cyberspace; - attacks on critical infrastructures, lines of communication and on our open society. We experience overt and covert attacks on the cohesion of our alliances and partnerships with like-minded nations.

The cutting off and blocking of international trade routes and supply chains on which global prosperity and our welfare states depend, have become a genuine risk.

Human rights, democracy and collaborative politics are attacked with increasing frequency and undermined systematically, in many regions of our planet.

Russia self-identifies as an antagonist to the West and exerts its growing influence as well in Asia as in Europe.

Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region are increasingly turning towards power rivalry and growing conflict.

Most important for the development in this hemisphere and world-wide is China. China has turned from an emerging economy to a powerful and, more often than not, openly outreaching, even greedy player. China is strategically seen as our key competitor and in many aspects already, as our adversary.

The recent discussion between U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, and his Chinese counterpart and the sequence of his and U.S. Secretary of Defence Austin's visits, illustrate the global significance and importance of the Indo-Pacific.

And it goes without saying that last week's sanctions against Chinese high-ranking individuals were overdue. However, to be significantly more effective, this kind of coordinated approach made by the EU, U.S. and UK can only be a starting point of a common position concerning Beijing.

In the past years, our security environment has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic and is therefore increasingly unpredictable.

The international order, which was established after World War II, is undergoing profound changes. The drivers and effects of these changes are manifold and numerous. The globalisation and digitization of recent decades have resulted in an interconnected world, cultures and orientations. More people around the world are gaining better access to information and technology.

These political, economic and technological networks are the cause of far-reaching social transformation processes. The cyber and information domain, which has increasingly come to dominate our activities and communication, is a manifestation of this global interconnectivity.

At the same time, globalisation is also promoting the interconnection and spread of risks as well as their repercussions. These include epidemics, the possibility of cyber-attacks, and trans-national terrorism.

Anti-globalisation movements are also on the rise: introverted and often radical nationalism, violent extremism as well as religious fanaticism, which often resulted from identity and legitimacy deficits and often from a decline in standard norms and values. These forces can intensify the disintegration of state and world orders.

Demographic transformations and urbanisation are further drivers of change. The growing world population is increasingly concentrated in urban coastal regions.

In many parts of the world, the state, as the central element of order, also faces other challenges to its legitimacy and competency. Such challenges include poor governance and informal economies, which are characterised by widespread nepotism and corruption. They are frequently associated with organised crimes, which are contributing factors to intra-state conflicts as well as regional and international crises.

III. Drivers of Change

Multi-polarity and the Diffusion of Power

Politically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving further on towards a multi-polar order. The global distribution of power is changing in the sense that power is shifting within the international community but also between states and non-state actors.

As a result of technological advances, trans-national non-state networks are becoming particularly important, and they are increasingly exerting influence on international security policy. The net giants continue to play roles that are not to be underestimated.

The growing economic, political and military influence of key states, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, will lead to increasing multi-polarity and shifts in geopolitical power. Dynamically growing societies are connecting their increasing wealth and participation in the global economy to an aspiration driven by the need to extend their influences in regional and global affairs. They are demonstrating this commitment through a significant increase in their defence spending and through an intensified coordination of their interests in new organisations and groups of states (e.g., BRICS).

It is estimated that China, for example, could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will account for approximately one sixth. It is likely that these two countries together will have an economy equal in size to that of the entire OECD area by the middle of the current century. When it comes to defence, China already spends approximately as much as all EU states combined.

In this multi-polar world, the United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy.

In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in Asia and especially in Europe (including my country), to take on more responsibility.

This trend is likely to continue in view of economic and political developments in the United States. Its Asian and European partners will likely be expected to show more commitment in pursuing common objectives and strategies.

Trans-national Terrorism

Trans-national terrorist organisations and networks benefit from failing states, which provide them with safe havens and, in some cases, even with territorial control.

They use social media and digital communication to generate resources, attract supporters, spread propaganda, and plan attacks. With access to cyber capabilities and NRBC means, their ability to attack targets has exponentially increased. They increasingly have the ability to attack targets with cyber capabilities and NRBC means. Terrorist organisations are using crime as a means of funding their activities and extending their reach to other regions.

Al-Qaeda, Islamic State (Daesh), Boko Haram, Ansar Dine or AQIM and all their regional affiliates are still launching terror attacks against the Western world in order to realise their archaic and intolerant “caliphate”. Their attacks are not limited geographically.

These terrorists regard our free, open and tolerant society as both an enemy and a target.

Effectively combating transnational terrorism will therefore require close national and international cooperation. It will be necessary to use political, legal, intelligence, police and military resources. Action against illegal money flow and laundering seems to be quite promising.

Beside the need to prevent these terrorist attacks, a wide range of additional measures will be necessary in order to successfully deal with the ideological, religious, social and socio-economic causes of radicalisation and terrorism.

Challenges from the Cyber and Information Domain

Increasing digitization in all walks of life and the increasing interconnectivity of individuals, organisations and states are contemporarily regarded as manifestations of state of the art.

However, the techniques and the speed of progress in the Cyber and Information Domain are by far not accompanied by an adequate level of protection and security. This development has made states, societies and the economy particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks.

The quantity and above all the type of threats have noticeably changed. Technological advances – from simple viruses to complex attacks – represent a dramatic change in the nature of the threat situation. And, even worse: Access to destructive malware is relatively easy and inexpensive.

As a result, the means to carry out cyber-attacks are not restricted to state actors. Terrorist groups, criminal organisations, and skilled individuals can potentially cause serious damage with minimal effort.

Attempts to establish internationally binding regulations or confidence- and security-building measures may therefore have only a limited effect.

The spectrum of threats in the cyber and information domain includes the theft and fraudulent use of personal data, industrial espionage, the damage of critical infrastructure with severe consequences for the civilian population, and the disruption or complete shutting down of government and military communications.

Cyber-attacks on states and critical infrastructure have been a recurring reality for some time. Numerous incidents have occurred in similarly advanced and digitized states and against their armed forces in recent years. Although it is sometimes possible to identify patterns of attack, most modern high-value attacks are specially tailored to fit the targeted system.

A special challenge for open and pluralistic societies is the use of digital communication to influence public opinion, for example through hidden attempts to sway discussions on social media, manipulate the results of democratic elections and sensitive information on news portals. This approach has already gained special significance as an element of hybrid warfare.

The effects of cyber-attacks can equal those of armed conflicts and may escalate into the non-virtual world. Although it is unlikely that a conflict between states will be carried out

exclusively in the cyber and information domain in the foreseeable future, operations in the cyber and information domain are already playing an increasingly significant role in military conflicts.

There are few areas where internal and external security are as closely intertwined as they are in cyber space.

The threat situation in cyber space necessitates a holistic approach in the framework of cyber security policy. Ensuring cyber security and defence is therefore a whole-of-government task that must be performed collectively. This includes the joint protection of critical economic, military and social infrastructure.

Hybrid Warfare

In addition, both non-state actors and state actors are resorting to methods of hybrid warfare. State actors in particular are noted for resorting to methods of hybrid warfare most especially in terms of using military means below the threshold of a conventional war. The aim is to undermine a state in a covert manner. This approach combines various civilian and military means and instruments in a way that does not reveal their actual aggressive and offensive intentions until all pieces of the puzzle have been brought together.

Hybrid threats call for an ability for hybrid analytical appraisal as well as corresponding defence readiness, decisive, timely and appropriate responses.

Hybrid attacks can target all areas of society through cyber-attacks and information operations (e.g., propaganda), economic and financial pressure, and attempts at political destabilisation.

At the same time, irregular elements, covert Special Forces, subversion, and regular armed forces can be used. Hybrid warfare can be conducted by state and non-state actors alike.

Hybrid tactics blur the boundaries between war and peace and can also constitute a breach of the general ban on the use of some specific use of force or materials. In hybrid warfare, the identity and roles of the aggressor and conflict party are deliberately made obscured.

I call the Hybrid domain including Cyber and Information the “new battle space”. In consequence, we must re-think the definition of war and peace. This has a significant impact on our understanding of national and collective defence in the 21st century.

Inter-state Conflict

Traditional power politics involved the use of military means to pursue national interests, and this entailed considerable armaments efforts. This “hard power” approach has been perceived as diminishing. Traditional power politics acquires undoubtedly a renaissance. Principal witnesses for this development are Russia and China.

This significant rebirth elevates the risk of violent interstate conflict – we saw it in Europe and its neighbourhood. It is also illustrated by the example of Russian actions in Ukraine.

The stability of the international system is being jeopardised by the increasing role of the military in the ambitions of emerging powers in combination with ongoing territorial conflicts and struggles for regional hegemony. This is happening world-wide.

Regional territorial disputes in connection with power projections are a source of concern in particular for the countries of Southeast and East Asia.

Fragile States and Poor Governance

Numerous states are characterised by weak legitimacy, poor governance, weak structures, an inadequate supply of basic goods and services, unequal access to social prosperity, corruption and mostly, at the same time – weak economies.

The erosion of state structures creates safe havens for para-state and terrorist organisations, encourages organised crimes, illicit trafficking, and thus creates spaces beyond the reach of the international order.

Political, ethnic, religious and conventional intra-state conflicts and civil wars are affecting the international security environment. The situation is exacerbated by rivalry between regional powers striving for hegemony, and inter-confessional disputes such as those between Sunni and Shi’a communities. There are also numerous cases of conflicts over the relationship between religion and the state.

These problems will become more intensified in the future as a result of high population growth rates and the depletion of natural resources.

Global Arms Build-Up and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Regional tensions and the claims to power of emerging economic actors are also leading to regional arms races.

Arms build-ups can undermine the stability of the international system. Build-ups of conventional armaments can change the military balance at the regional and global levels and increase the risk of violent interstate conflicts. This situation can be considerably exacerbated by the development of new technologies that are not yet part of current arms control regimes.

The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons entails unpredictable risks. These risks are compounded by the development and proliferation of delivery systems. With these problematic situations, terrorist networks could gain possession of weapons of mass destruction.

Effective arms control, transparency and confidence building as well as a restrictive arms export policy remain the precondition, the means and the basis for peaceful conflict resolution and disarmament. Technological advances and strategic developments make it necessary to continually adapt our approach in this field.

Threats to Information and Communication Systems, Supply Lines, Transportation and Trade Routes as well as to the Secure Supply of Raw Materials and Energy

During one of our recent APSI workshops, we spoke about the importance of the Indian Ocean and the risks posed by the narrow access areas like the Straits of Hormuz, Malakka or the Suez Channel.

Nobody ever expected the Suez Channel being blocked by accident as it is the case right now with the vessel “Ever Given”. But it happens and the consequences are not yet fully understood.

Our “just-in-time” approach, the last-minute logistics and the critical path policy make us highly vulnerable. Zero stocks, little or no reserves and spare parts paralyze parts of our societies, put industries at risk and make prices explode. So far continuity and stability.

It is obvious that the prosperity of our countries and the well-being of our citizens significantly depend on unhindered use of global information and communication systems, supply lines, transportation and trade routes as well as on a secure supply of raw materials and energy.

Besides terrorist attacks, other potential causes of worries include piracy, forced political, economic and military measures, as well as failing states and regional crises. Increasing investments by various states in capabilities that deny third countries access to specific areas (anti-access/area denial, A2AD) are particularly significant in this context.

Uncontrolled and Irregular Migration

Around the world, people are being driven from their homes by armed conflict, persecution and displacement, adverse economic, social and ecological conditions, as well as by poverty and hunger. Organised crime and terrorist networks in their countries of origin and transit are exploiting the desperation of migrants in order to generate income or to recruit new fighters.

Our well-developed societies are frequent destinations for migrants and refugees. The economic and social gap between, for example, Europe and its neighbouring regions, which is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, and above all the ongoing violent conflicts in many parts of the world, will lead to an increasing potential for migration in the coming decades.

Humanity is not put in question. However, in large numbers, uncontrolled and irregular migration can entail risks both for the immediately affected countries as well as for the wider region. The ability to absorb and integrate migrants can be overstretched, which can lead to social instability.

The causes of flight and irregular migration must be addressed in a joint effort by the international community and the countries of origin and transit. It is particularly important to provide support for internally displaced persons and for refugees who have fled to neighbouring countries

IV. Two significant Risks of 2021

North Korea manufactures crisis

When it comes to addressing the nuclear threat from North Korea, President Biden will inherit the diplomatic legacies of the past four presidents.

Despite President Trump's three meetings with Kim Jong-un, North Korea now boasts an even more capable nuclear-weapons arsenal, including some twenty to thirty bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles that may soon be able to reach even the U.S. mainland.

The pattern in the past has been for new American presidents to be greeted with a North Korean provocation in the form of either a missile or nuclear test. We expected one in the first quarter of Joe Biden's presidency.

Such a demonstration will prompt the media and Congress to pressure President Biden into doing something. It will raise tensions and likely lead to a pseudo-crisis that could spin out of control. It is instructive to recall the recent statement of Kim's sister in response to the very limited annual military exercise in South Korea: "If the new U.S. administration wants to sleep in peace for the next four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step" (38north.org).

However, Kim is not suicidal; U.S. deterrence still works with him, though it needs to be strengthened in the face of new and emerging North Korean capabilities. The Biden administration should pursue multilateral opprobrium and work with South Korea and Japan – and China, I like to underline – to enhance deterrence.

The United States and China clash over Taiwan

Taiwan may be where tensions in the U.S.-China relationship would reach a new dimension. A negative dynamic has escalated over the past year or so.

The United States' support of Taiwan—through arms sales, high-level official visits, and military exercises—has led China to ratchet up pressure on the country with near-daily air and sea intrusions.

Taiwan is an existential issue for the Chinese Communist Party. If the U.S.-China confrontation continues to worsen, then Chinese president Xi Jinping may feel compelled to move toward the unification of Taiwan with mainland China. This will not necessarily denote a Chinese military invasion, though inadvertent clashes are a risk.

It is more likely that China will implement a Sun Tzu-type, frog-in-boiling-water strategy and squeeze Taiwan's economy, and thus forcing the United States to react in a way that will escalate crisis. Any U.S. military intervention would trigger an outright conflict between the world's two superpowers.

This risk must not be underestimated, given the Chinese oppression of the Uigurs, in the recent political and violent repression of democracy and pluralism in Hong Kong and the incursion of Philippine waters. This is far more than just flexing muscles.

V. Pandemics, Climate Change and Some Consequences

Epidemics and Pandemics

I think this subject needs no further explanation in detail. We are all confronted with the consequences and directly concerned. World population growth and increasing global mobility continue to promote the spread of diseases and epidemics as well as outbreaks of pandemics. COVID-19 may quite well be just the beginning.

As we speak, this contagious disease still overwhelms many nations and precipitates far too often a collapse of their healthcare systems and public order. This poses systemic risks in addition to the immediate danger to human life.

These risks increase the stress on national and international healthcare systems, severe disruptions of transnational traffic and economic systems, as well as the de facto quarantining of affected regions. In addition, our societies are faced with considerable economic costs.

Major challenges include effecting rapid and appropriate deployment of material and specialist personnel into the hard-to-reach areas as well as disseminating educative information for effective prevention through local education and health protection measures.

The Coronavirus Crisis and the Vaccine Rollout

The rapidity of vaccine development is the product of artificial intelligence, big data, and accumulated research, all of which have allowed bioscience to move with an unprecedented speed to combat new viruses.

However, the health emergency has given rise to two contradictory responses. On the one hand, cooperative responses have been revived. Recalling that the pandemic is one of many challenges that can only be addressed globally, cooperation networks have been strengthened. On the other hand, there has been no shortage of protectionist and even nationalist reactions, and (re)emerging powers are showing renewed interest in expanding their areas of influence, adding healthcare to their diplomatic arsenal.

Now, vaccines are incorporated into these dynamics. Getting the vaccine to lower-income countries and conflict areas is an economic, political and logistical challenge that can only be achieved with improved international cooperation. Governments, international organisations and private foundations will all need to be involved.

Simultaneously, vaccine geopolitics will emerge. In 2021, China and Russia will use the supply of their vaccines in the same way they used the provision of basic medical supplies in 2020.

Climate Change

Climate change is a global phenomenon and affects already the lives of hundreds of millions of people.

Climate change has significant and existential implications for many states and their populations. Just recall the current situation in New South Wales, Australia.

The thawing of the Polar Icecaps, for example, results in numerous consequences of magnitude. When the level of our oceans rises, many areas, states and even regions will become uninhabitable. Biodiversity will be heavily affected. A new wave of migration will start with millions of people desperately trying to survive.

In addition, access to water and other limited basic resources is becoming an existential threat for an increasing number of states and regions.

In combination with scarcity of resources and rapid population growth, climate change is also destabilising structures and aggravating conflicts, particularly in fragile regions. States that are unable to take adequate countermeasures can be pulled into a downward spiral.

Climate change must become a permanent item on the security agenda of international organisations and forums. In the coming years, we must integrate climate issues even more systematically into our crisis prevention and stabilisation activities and help strengthen the resilience of potentially affected regions.

The worst Food Crisis in decades might ravage the world

The United Nations has warned that the world is on the brink of its worst food crisis in at least fifty years.

The pandemic has disrupted global food supply chains. And with more people falling into extreme poverty as a result of the economic damages inflicted by the coronavirus, rising food prices could not come at a worse time.

The UN forecasts that more people will die of coronavirus-related malnutrition and its associated diseases than from the coronavirus.

After all, childhood malnutrition has lifelong health and mental repercussions. Even in advanced economies, the poor are suffering from higher food prices at a time of high unemployment.

The Future of the Global Middle Class

Perhaps the world's top achievement over the past three decades was the rise of millions out of extreme poverty and the growth of a global middle class.

This may be jeopardized unless there is a strong recovery from the Coronavirus crisis in 2021 and beyond.

Experts believe that for the first time in half a century, the middle class has started to shrink—potentially by fifty-two million people in Latin America alone.

At the same time, the World Bank predicts that by the end of 2021, up to 150 million additional people will fall into extreme poverty, defined as those living on less than \$1.90 a day.

Lower than expected economic growth next year would increase that figure. Historically, the erosion of the middle class correlates with political instability, democratic backsliding, and greater conflict.

CHAPTER FOUR

Complexity, contradictions, and conundrums of the relationship with China

Sergeant Major (Ret) Anthony Spadaro.

Contradictions rest in the differences between the countries of the United States and China's strategic cultures and what I worry about are two incompatible visions of the future. While neither the United States nor China desires confrontation, both nations believe that they have an approach towards foreign and domestic policy that should be emulated and the other's behaviour is impetuous for tension.

China believes in a conceptual approach for strategy development and policy formulation. We see this by examining its extensive and diverse history as well as its cultural, political and geographical understanding of the initiatives they pursue. China's approach is a hybrid of Chinese Confucian culture and Leninist communism in a system of one party rule or what China calls socialism with Chinese characteristics. China's vision for the future is based on a sense of destiny they refer to as the China Dream. Otherwise known as national rejuvenation by 2049, the 100 year anniversary of the founding of the communist state. And a new type of great power relationship based on the five principles of a peaceful co-existence.

In Chinese doctrine, the Dream represents China's effort to return to great power status after experiencing a self-described "century of national humiliation" - one that began in the early 19th century with the first Opium War and lasted through the end of the Sino-Japanese War. According to China, their memory of this period recounts a time where it was attacked, bullied and plundered by imperialists. And this memory serves as the foundation for their current behaviour and their lack of trust for the West.

As China continues to accumulate wealth and power, principally through its economic sphere, nationalism pushes the country towards a more assertive posture in handling territorial and neighbour disputes. We hear often that the biggest problem China faces is the contradiction of addressing its people's immediate social needs while simultaneously promoting their rising

power throughout the world. China claims to be focused on peaceful economic development, but there is obvious incongruity between its commitment to peaceful economic development and the equally strong effort to unilaterally impose China's sovereignty and territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, for example.

This is a classic shell game of authoritarian dictators who push nationalistic fervour to overcome the lack of progress in meaningful domestic reform. In China, this trend is well documented, starting with the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and most recently with the consolidation of executive power within the party. Extensive anti-corruption campaigns as well as President Xi's 'President for Life' declaration. President Xi is very aware of the fact that a conflict with the United States will all but guarantee China's failure to realise the Dream by 2049. However, he can not appear to look weak domestically.

Conversely, the United States is a constitutional republic with an intense focus on representative government, human rights, and individual liberties. Inclusiveness for all is fundamental to the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States' aspiration is for a regional order of sovereign nations that defend their populations, respect human dignity, and competes fairly in the open marketplace that remains free from coercion... and I'm going to talk about that in a few minutes.

But it was this kind of inclusive effort over the last 70 years that has resulted in the remarkable regional economic development enjoyed today. One in which China and the other Asian economies have benefited from for some seven decades now. Senior Chinese officials now openly express dissatisfaction with the existing world order and our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, describing it as built and led by the United States, cemented in Western values, and operating to Washington's great benefit at the detriment of other nations.

However, Chinese leaders ignore the fact that the world order enabled their rise, helped to lift a billion people out of poverty, and earned them a permanent seat on the United Nations' Security Council.

I would think all in this room today have the same perspective, that alliances build mutual trust, understanding and respect. They help marshal a sense of the regional security landscape and its challenges and give nations - large and small - the ability to cooperate and contribute to regional and global security. Alliances also provide the building blocks for a security architecture that promotes interconnectivity and interoperability.

Now, while these contradictions of the US-China relationship provide the backdrop to the current tensions, the complexity in the relationship begins with the obvious areas of convergence: economics and trade. America's post-Cold War strategy for dealing with all nations, including China, was rooted in prevailing liberal values that linked trade, economic growth, good governance, and our belief in the universal human desire for freedom. Now, this strategy assumed [unclear 01.22] to liberal democratic values and economic growth that would be coupled as we integrated transitional economies into the rules-based international system.

Trade liberalisation played a significant role in China's post-1978 economic miracle, providing a double digit economic growth across half of the time period. For many years, the West underestimated the resilience of the Communist Party of China's ideology and their ability to retain and strengthen the authoritarian role of the state of China. Not only has China declined to adopt promised economic reforms, it has clearly embraced an economic model dependent on massive market barriers, heavy state subsidies, currency manipulation, product dumping, and has stolen intellectual property.

Now, while many of these issues are often cited as actions taken only by state-owned enterprises, it doesn't stop there. According to the World Economic Forum, China is home to 109 corporations on the Fortune Global 500 List. But only 50% of those are privately owned. A public example of this is Huawei, which provides a clear example. Huawei is the world's number one telecoms supplier and the number two phone manufacturer. In January 2019, the US Justice Department unsealed indictments, including 23 counts pertaining to theft of intellectual property, obstruction of justice, and fraud related to Huawei's alleged evasion of US sanctions against Iran. Huawei has long denied this wrongdoing and continues to maintain its innocence. The core issue with Huawei results from our concern about its cosy relationship with the Chinese government and the fear that Huawei's equipment could be used to gain unauthorised access to various networks on Beijing's order. This is why the US government has limited American companies from using Huawei's networking equipment beginning with

our 2020 National Defence Authorisation Act and now on our US Department of Congress Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List.

However ,the global markets of today are facing a different scenario as China is choosing to decouple from the major parts of the world economy both in terms of traditional security, free from coercion by other nations, and in terms of values and political systems. Folks, free societies respect individual rights and liberties. The promotion of good governance, and the adherence to the shared values of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Free also means nations do not have to choose with whom they partner and trade with out of fear of coercion. Instead they are free to exercise their sovereignty and their choice. All nations should enjoy unfettered open access to the seas and airways upon which our peoples and economies depend.

The concept of openness also applies to cyberspace and space domains which provides critical avenues for our future global prosperity. According to our shared vision, nations are able to have open investment environments, transparent agreements between one another, protection of intellectual property rights, and fair and reciprocal trade.

You've heard me say this before, and I have to say this again... my friends, seas are not borders. They are not boundaries. Oceans do not separate us, they bind us together, bringing mutual benefits, common growth, and shared opportunity. We believe allies and partners are critical to the prosperity of our region. All countries should have a voice in shaping the international system.

Now, despite these challenges I've described, the international system will benefit if we work together with the People's Republic of China in areas of mutual interest. I see three areas of military collaboration between the United States and China that could focus on improving these relations.

First, ship to ship transfers. The United States is part of a global effort to prevent ship to ship transfers between North Korea and other nations that are violating UN sanctions. China is a

permanent member of the UN Security Council. They remain on the side-lines as the US and our allies and our partners commit vast resources to enforcing sanctions levied by the international community. China, shifted control of the maritime militia to the People's Liberation Army in 2018. This sends all its maritime militia to the South China Sea with no presence in the East China Sea. China should use its maritime militia to patrol its own waters in the East China Sea to prevent ship to ship transfers and uphold UN sanctions to increase pressure on North Korea.

The second area is military to military communications. It may come as a surprise, but communication does occur daily at the tactical level. About 99% of the interactions between the US and Chinese naval ships and aircraft - they're conducted in a safe and professional manner. However, conversely, communication at the strategic level, the military suffers for two reasons. The US government's repeated attempts to get China to agree to routine communications methods in crisis... well, nothing currently exists. Right now military-military communications tend to work backwards. It's the first thing to be cut off when Beijing signals displeasure and the last thing to be re-established when tensions ease up, an area we really need to work on.

And third, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The Indo-Pacific remains the disaster prone region in the world. I know the United States Indo-Pacific command has been heavily invested in training and educating and supporting humanitarian assistance in disaster relief operations. And this includes combined efforts with our allies and partners. Now, the People's Liberation Army of China... they do similar engagements. But I see this as a great opportunity for cooperation between the US and China. In fact, each year both countries participate in bilateral exercises designed to improve coordination in response to such crises in the region. And as the General alluded to and spoke about a lot, climate change will continue to affect these humanitarian assistance operations. What better way to start mutual cooperation. You know, folks, we even conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in close proximity. For example, in Nepal a few years ago. It can be done.

But in closing, as China continues its rise and the United States seeks to maintain influence and expand opportunities throughout the region, I could tell you the United States Indo-Pacific command, it will remain committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, despite the unique and evolving challenges presented by China. This is what I believe. I believe we can and we will. We're going to compete, we're going to deter, and we're going to win in a great competition with China because of our values, our interests, and our mutual security concerns shared with allies and partners.

Folks, if the international community bands together to maintain the established international order and a free and open Indo-Pacific, we will win before fighting, and that is our goal. We will cooperate where we can but make no bones about it. We're going to vigorously compete where we must to preserve the established rules based international order.

Again, it was a privilege to be able to talk with you all today. I truly look forward to the questions and the dynamics that this room will have. I'm sure there's many - and I'm hoping again that I wasn't newsworthy, hopefully noteworthy, and my teammates there... I'm going to need your back up, cos there's a lot of smart people here and this dumb marine... I don't know if I can handle it! But thank you all.

CHAPTER FIVE

Security Challenges and Strategic Arms Reduction

Guy Roberts

I have been asked to talk about how nuclear deterrence theory applies to the WMD proliferation in the Middle East. I will start with basic definitions of key concepts such as deterrence and then proceed to discuss some peculiar situations in the Middle East.

So, for those of you who are not familiar with nuclear deterrence theory, I will lay out a few basic tenets - most of you probably know this already. Nuclear weapons - of course, after WWII when we had the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, those happened without nuclear weapons really being integrated into all kinds of defence and strategic thinking. They were incredible developments that took place in a crash programme during the war. People after the war started to think about what is the actual use of the weapons, what kinds of strategies are used, and how can they be useful? And so, in that period into the 50s and 60s - and most notably in Tom Schelling's book in the early 1960s - we developed some of the basics of nuclear deterrence theory.

And nuclear weapons are unlike any other weapon. Other weapons are built for the purpose of using them. Whether the weapon is a helicopter or a tank. Nuclear weapons are not about using them. Nuclear weapons are strictly for deterrence. Ideally, you do not want to use them at all. If you have used them, in a sense, the purpose of building them has been defeated. It is a failure of deterrence or compellence. What you really interested to do with nuclear weapons is you influence people and to influence your adversary. So, it is strategically an act of coercion, intimidation and deterrence against possible aggression. Or, as Schelling put it in *Arms and Influence*, so-called the power to hurt.

Now, what is deterrence? Deterrence is basically leveraging nuclear weapons to convince other states not to take adversarial actions against one's own state. Essentially pushing someone away.

Compellence, on the other hand, is leveraging nuclear weapons to convince other states to take some action that you want them to take for fear of the consequence. And they can only cease if the other state responds in the way that you want them to. So, this is kind of like the old mafia threats. You know, "If you don't do this, something may end up at the bottom of a river somewhere..." So, that's kind of compellence.

Assured destruction is the capability to absorb a first nuclear strike from an adversary and then be able to respond sufficiently with a second nuclear strike that can effectively destroy the adversary or enough of the adversary's capability so that, you know, war can be terminated. Strategic stability in a nuclear age has generally been viewed as mutually assured destruction, which you always see referred to as MAD, which in the US-Soviet case, was basically both countries having the ability to conduct assured destruction - to conduct a second nuclear strike that could destroy the other country. So, that's kind of the nuclear deterrence theory that you might apply to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

The question, of course, is does it apply? Of course, nuclear deterrence theory, as I said, was developed during the US-Soviet Cold War and used in that context. It also serves as a pretty good guide for some other bilateral relationships. For instance, in US-China and India-Pakistan relationships, where you have two declared nuclear powers, coercive diplomacy engenders strategic stability.

However, in the Middle East, there are no declared nuclear weapons states. Israel is only one country that has nuclear weapons - even if it does not admit it publicly. And Israel has its policy of opacity where it does not even acknowledge the weapons publicly. So, that limits its abilities to use its nuclear weapons for deterrence or compellence. It is really a weapon of last resort,

and so, the Israelis cannot say, “If you don’t do this, we’re going to attack you with nuclear weapons” when the nuclear weapons are not public.

Also in the Middle East, Iran is another country that you could consider a latent nuclear state. It is close enough to a nuclear weapons capability that countries in the region - particularly Israel and others and Saudi Arabia - must treat Iran almost as if it has nuclear weapons. Not quite, but some of the considerations and how fast Iran could sprint to use nuclear weapons. Of course, one of them must be factored into a regional state’s calculations.

In addition, there are other two states that, particularly in recent years, one could see moving into this latent stage. But right now, they are very far from it. These are Saudi Arabia and Turkey. And the other nuclear dimension in the Middle East was that Turkey does host US tactical nuclear weapons - B61 gravity bombs. But unlike in the past where the Turkish air force trained for missions with those weapons, it has not done so in years and isn’t certified to deliver them. So, basically the US is capable of being able to use the weapons that are in Turkey. So, it is not a regional state that has that kind of access to it.

Now, there are several external nuclear weapons states that have interest in the region, including the United States, Russia and China, to a certain extent, Pakistan, with Saudi Arabia. However, it is notable that none of them have weapons deployed in the region, which is important.

So, does nuclear deterrence theory apply in the Middle East? Well, one could argue that it is not the case. Under current circumstances, as I have analysed, the traditional nuclear deterrence has limited applicability to the Middle East, even to those countries that do have nuclear weapons like Israel and those with latent capability like Iran.

For instance, Israel, even under some very dire circumstances such as the time of the Yom Kippur War in the 70s where Egypt and Syria had made significant incursions into the Israeli territory - one could argue the existence of Israel might even be in jeopardy - or when Sudan

threatened to use chemical weapons in the Persian Gulf War and some other weapons that could have carried chemical warhead on it, still Israel has not brandished its nuclear sword or tried to use nuclear deterrence. And even in the first case, it is not clear if the Arab states knew Israel had nuclear weapons at that point. And the fact is that right now Israel has such conventional superiority to its neighbours along, it seems to be more comfortable with growing peace with several of them - Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain and the UAE. The suggestion is that it does not really need its nuclear weapons in many ways. It really is a last resort. Still, it is unlikely to change its policy to this so-called bomb in the basement deterrent approach.

The US, in the region, has shown what some could consider nuclear deterrence. In fact, even today, there was some overflight of the B52s in the Persian Gulf, which are nuclear capable bombers, to deter Iran. So, we are kind of showing our nuclear sword there. And it could be either deterrence or compellence in the Iranian case. There have been some nuclear subs that have surfaced in the Persian Gulf and the US has made a point of publicising that. But again, ultimately, we have such conventional superiority over Iran that the likelihood that we would use nuclear weapons in any conflict with them is very small.

Iran, on the other hand, with its latent capability, does provide some deterrent capability. However, there is a possibility with several other asymmetric actions that Iran could take, some of which they have deployed much more commonly, – In the act of terrorism and other asymmetric actions.

And finally, nuclear deterrence would not block suicidal non-state actors, such as terrorists - from carrying out nuclear strikes, should they have it.

Now, on the flipside, one can argue, well, maybe there is some application of deterrence theory. There certainly is a proliferation impact of some of the developments in the Middle East, particularly Iran's latent capability is pushing proliferation in the region. It is pushing the Saudis to attain a similar capability to achieve some kind of strategic stability should Iran get the weapons. It is also making Israel undertake some more visible actions, including some

surfacing of nuclear capable subs that are capable of launching missiles. Some more intelligence cooperation and so on with the Arab states, especially after the recent agreements, are also noticeable.

In addition, Turkey, indirectly is being pushed by these trends, as indicated in some of its stand offs with the US. There have been calls by President Erdogan for Turkey to have nuclear weapons. A lot of this is probably campaign rhetoric and political rhetoric, but it is notable as the first time that such rhetorics are coming from Turkey.

Arguably, one can say that nuclear deterrence has played a role in Syria in limiting potential US-Russian conflicts on the ground there and encouraging deconfliction because of the risks of escalation to a nuclear conflict should US and Russian forces get engaged seriously.

And proliferation in the region is moving beyond nuclear and even the WMD silos. In the non-nuclear area, Syria has long had chemical weapons. Obviously, it has been using that domestically in recent years, but it retains that capability for external use should the situation changes. Egypt has not signed onto the Chemical Weapons Convention for a number of reasons, but that still remains a concern.

And there is a massive missile race being undertaken in the region as a lot of countries are getting longer range missiles that can threaten each other. Examples of such long range are the Cruise and ballistic. One threat, for instance, is that as states like the UAE develop nuclear power or plants or research reactors that these could be targets for these missiles, essentially become massive dirty bombs. And other critical infrastructure - energy sites as we see in Saudi Arabia, for instance, with the Iranian attacks - could be attacked with some of the same disruption and destruction as nuclear weapons. That capability - the missile capability - does provide a significant deterrent, especially given the small distances within the region and the small size of many of the regional states. There is not a lot of strategic depth in the region, particularly with somewhere like Israel.

However, the situation could change. If there is another nuclear weapons state in the Middle East or Israeli or US conventional superiority slips, nuclear deterrence will be far more applicable. Again, it is kind of complicated - it will still even be complicated in the region, given the size of the region, the religious sites, and the shared water sources and so on. In a situation where a state hits its neighbour, both states will be affected in a lot of cases. Besides, how do you exercise nuclear deterrence in that kind of region where you are not that far apart from those countries with continental power like the United States or Russia or China?

Now, Israel has for a long time what it has called the Begin Doctrine which is to use force to block other nuclear weapons programmes before their operation - really before they could spread any radioactive activity if operated. So, we had the Osiraq attacks in Iraq, we had the Syria reactor blocked and then there are continued efforts against Iran's nuclear programme today, including the recent assassination on the head of its nuclear programme.

But there is no guarantee that this will be successful in the future. And should that occur, Israel is pretty clear that it would end its opacity in that region. The long-standing Israeli phrase is, "We won't be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but we won't be the second." So, should anyone else be declared a nuclear weapons state, Israel will start brandishing that sword at that point.

Ken Waltz famously argued in 2012 that Iran should get nuclear weapons and that an Iran nuclear deterrent would lead to strategic stability in the region. There is little evidence that this is the case. For one thing, as I indicated earlier, Israel's nuclear weapons are not key to regional security dynamics. Rather, it is a matter of conventional superiority and US conventional superiority. On the whole, this superiority has been stabilizing. Israel is the regional hegemon, and the US is the global hegemon. Both have helped stabilise the region and one could argue that Israel's conventional superiority has helped lead peace with some of its Arab neighbours.

Iran, essentially, is a revisionist power without capacity for a direct conventional confrontation with Israel. A nuclear arsenal would likely only lead to Saudi and other nuclear proliferation

and acceleration of lower-level instability. The kinds of things you have seen in Yemen and in [unclear 41.26] and others which jives with the long-standing stability-instability paradox that is strategic stability at the nuclear level and higher instability at lower levels.

And again, it is very useful thinking about some what-if situations. Let us imagine the Abraham Accords were extended to Saudi Arabia. How would Israel react if the Saudis then went forward with a nuclear weapons programme.? Would they be sympathetic? Would they be opposed? How would they deal with that issue?

Another experimental thinking is this. There has been a lot of suspicion that the Saudis bankrolled a lot of the Pakistani nuclear programme, - If this is true, the question is: what kind of guarantees did they get in return from the Pakistanis about a nuclear umbrella or nuclear cooperation? China, obviously, has some economic interests in the region and could be looking to displace US leadership. So, what if China or Pakistan cooperated with the Saudis or offered nuclear guarantees? China, for one thing, is already engaged in Iranian mining in Saudi Arabia and has also provided Saudi Arabia with medium range missiles that conceivably could be nuclear capable.

And what if the US withdraws its B61 - its nuclear weapons, its gravity bombs - from Turkey as some have advocated, including me at times, and Turkey embarks on nuclear arsenal?

So, some recommendations. The US and Iran need to return to something like the JCPOA strengthened with regional agreements on missiles and other measures. There really needs to be a regional security dialogue, along with the bilateral US-Iran focus, because the other countries were not happy with what with JCPOA and the other elements being left out.

Confidence building and regional security processes and arms control measures need to be undertaken both beyond Israel-Arab reconciliation. – It needs to be taken to another level to integrate - to deal with some of the security issues underlying it. Things like incidents at sea and other measures. But also, between GCC-Iran, Israel-Iran and in Syria... and I am actually working on a project to deal with the arms control and security process of the 1990s and dealing

with the history. Some of those measures could see a second life, I think, particularly between the Israelis and the Arabs.

More generally, confidence building, and arms control building should be taken particularly when it comes to missiles. And nuclear weapon states should ensure that the current state of no external permanent (that is, land based) deployments in the region continues.

CHAPTER SIX

Non-traditional security threats and their impacts

MGen Ravi Arora

China is in occupation of Indian territory in the region of Ladakh. It also claims the whole of the Indian state of Arunachal, which is in the north-east. The size of Arunachal is the same as the size of Austria. In 1962, China invaded India both in the north in Ladakh and in the north-east. Because the Indian Army had undergone massive demobilisation after WWII, at that time it was weak. China defeated India comprehensively and 3000 Indian soldiers died and 4000 were taken prisoner.

Since then, several confrontations have taken place between India and China. Some of them have been bloody. One such clash took place last year after the pandemic in June in an area called Galwan, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. In retaliation, Indian troops killed more than 40 Chinese soldiers. Not a bullet was fired on either side.

This brings me to the topic of my talk - Chinese aggressive moves in the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir. I want to show a few maps to explain the basics. Let me see if I can share my screen. Okay. I do not seem to be able to share my screen. I will include in my talk basic information regarding the territorial disputes between India and China, the violent clashes that have taken place, the great betrayal from China in the view of what India has done for China in the past, and an analysis of why China went on the offensive against India, their strategy, and what we can do to counter China.

Since I am unable to share my screen and show you on the map, just imagine - I want to explain the northern region of Ladakh, which is part of Jammu and Kashmir by the Strait of India. The eastern portion of that is called Aksai Chin, which has been the subject of dispute with China since the 1950s after the PRC was born and they invaded Tibet. Next, they constructed a road right through Aksai Chin and it has been a matter of dispute. Aksai Chin covers about 37,000 square kilometres. That is more than the size of Belgium, but smaller than Poland. It is a part

of the Jammu and Kashmir province whose status was changed by the Indian central government in 2019 from a state to a union territory. That is to say, centrally governed from an elite governor.

The average altitude in Aksai Chin or Ladakh is 16,000 feet. That is 4000 feet higher than Mt Cook in New Zealand. The average height of riverbeds there is 14,000 feet. The highest mountain is 23,000 feet. That shows the degree of difficulty of operating in those areas. The boundaries are unmarked. It was a frontier region. That means that populations kept shifting for grazing or for other purposes. There was no border for many centuries. The line that separates the Chinese and the Indian troops is called the Line of Actual Control by mutual agreement.

Now, in the Aksai Chin, there are two lines. One is called the Johnson Line and the other is called the McCartney-McDonald Line. The Johnson Line is the one which is shown on Indian maps as the border. That is up to the place that India claims the territory of Ladakh. The British proposed the Johnson Line in 1865. They were more worried about Russian expansionism at that time. The Chinese power was weak. That line was never presented to the Chinese. But the area was under the control of Kashmir at the time. The second line is the McCartney-McDonald Line, which is closer to the Indian positions. This was drawn much later in 1899. This revised boundary was proposed by the British to the Chinese. The Karakoram Mountain range forms a natural boundary. This line is just beyond the Karakoram Ranges. But the government in China did not respond to the British proposal. But it is believed that the Chinese also accepted the McCartney-McDonald Line as the territory. So, when they constructed the road through Aksai Chin, they made it between the Johnson Line and the McCartney-McDonald Line. This shows how difficult the problem is when it comes to negotiations between the Indians and the Chinese.

The Chinese would like to provide security for the highway that they have constructed through the Aksai Chin. That is one of the reasons that they have been nibbling at Indian territory over the years - what they call salami slicing tactics or three steps forward and two steps backwards. But last year, things have come to a head.

There is also an area in the north of Ladakh called the Shaksgam Valley - an area of over 7000km, which Pakistan by agreement has given to the Chinese, although Pakistan was never in occupation of that area. That is also an area of contention.

Now, I want you to take your mind to the north-east side of India. We have a state called [unclear 3.36.40] which was earlier called the North-East Frontier and where in 1962 the Chinese invaded Indian territory. There, the border is called the McMahon Line which, again, the British did propose. After the British annexed the neighbouring state of Assam, they then went on to annex Myanmar. Having done that, they had a direct boundary with the Chinese. To settle the international boundary, a conference took place in India between the representatives of China, Tibet and India where a draft agreement was issued by all three. But later the Chinese refused to sign the final agreement with a more detailed map. The Tibetan representatives signed it. The Chinese say that Tibet was not an independent country at that time, and they had no authority to go into any pact with India. They do not accept the McMahon Line, which follows the watershed principle in that state. That is where the dispute lies.

But the Chinese approach to solving disputes is either to keep them open on the pretext that these disputes should not come in the way of our trade and other relations, and they can be solved later, or their approach is to grab as much territory as possible. Some nations have stood up to China, others have not. But after invading Tibet, China has militarised the whole region and the infrastructure development that the Chinese are doing in Tibet is with a view to invade India in the next - it was believed that it would be before 2035 that they would try to occupy the whole of Ladakh. Because the whole of the claim was that Tibet was suddenly part of China and they have laid claim to it. Chinese claims are based on documents which are acceptable only to the Chinese. Nobody else accepts the authenticity of those claims. It is based on the perception that earlier Chinese dynasties had control over that region.

There have been 22 meetings so far between the Chinese special representatives and the Indian special representatives, as they are called, to resolve the dispute. But imagine after 22 meetings, not even mutually acceptable maps have been exchanged, so that when one talks of a particular place, the other side knows exactly what we are talking about. That is that state of affairs when it comes to talks between the two countries.

Now, I come to the clashes which have taken place. Just to give you an idea of what does not make it in the news. Every year, almost 600 violations take place on the Land of Actual Control. Violations meaning Chinese patrols coming over to our side leaving tell-tale signs of their presence. Even pushing Indian troops and Indian troops pushing them out from those areas. There are certain areas which are agreed upon between the two sides as limits of patrol or no-

go areas. But depending on the season and what is happening on the international stage, the Chinese try to send a message and enter those areas intentionally and create a ruckus.

After the 1962 War, there have been several clashes, some of them were bloody. Particularly in October 1967, the Indians were attacked in the north-east. But last year, what happened was that after every winter when the snow starts melting, both sides go up to the border, look up their defences, clean them up, and improve the roads and tracks. Last year because of the coronavirus pandemic, the Indians were a little late. By April 15, the Chinese had come in and occupied some of the places where they had never occupied in the past. Starting from April 15, the standoff occurred. In the middle of June, the Chinese agreed to vacate some areas. Indian Commanding Officers of the Battalion went to verify that the Chinese had vacated. The Chinese ambushed them and killed 20 soldiers, including the Battalion Commander. The Indians retaliated. And although China has accepted only four casualties, all intelligence reports - particularly Russian - have indicated that 45 Chinese soldiers died. They are very sensitive to making this public. They announced in public only a few weeks ago that four Chinese soldiers had died. They were given some appreciation. It is by law - in Chinese media it is an offense to talk about Chinese casualties.

After this incident, in a place in Ladakh called the Pangong Lake, which is 180km long lake, much of it on the Chinese side. Notice that south of this lake, the Chinese again occupied some areas in August. But they were surprised when the Indian Army quickly - in almost 24 hours - deployed tanks in those areas approximately 15,000 feet above sea level. The Chinese were also quick to deploy their tanks. The Chinese tanks were already in the area, but about 20km away. We had, for the first time perhaps anywhere, at 15 and 16,000 feet, tanks facing each other with barrels facing backwards because there is an agreement that neither side will resort to fighting. This continued until January. In January this year after several meetings in Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi and on the border, the Chinese expressed their willingness to disengage and take back the tanks. The Indians were quite distrustful of the Chinese and made it a condition that first the Chinese would withdraw. Then only would the Indian troops withdraw. That has happened, but it has happened only in the area of the Pangong Lake. Now, it is believed that the Chinese want to discuss tactical withdrawal to a certain distance in other areas that they have occupied.

Why do I call it the great betrayal? Look back and you will find in 1950, India was the first non-socialist country to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. It is believed that India was also offered in August 1950 a seat in the UN Security Council by the Americans, followed by the Russians. Our prime minister at the time declined in favour of China, saying that they had a better right to place in the UN Security Council. Now when India is canvassing for a place in the permanent UN Security Council, China has vetoed India's entry. It had also refused to say yes to India's bid for the nuclear suppliers' group, saying that India had not signed. But that hurdle has been crossed. China also vehemently opposes proposals for resolutions in the United Nations declaring some of the Pakistanis as international terrorists in support of Pakistan. China has also worked against India and undermined our efforts to develop an alternative trade route to the Central Asian Republics through Iran. India is developing the Chabahar Port in Iran, but the Chinese have come up with proposals and have agreements with Iran, who they now consider a very close strategic partner by bagging some of the contracts which have worked against India.

More recently, there have been more than 16 bilateral meetings between our prime minister and China's Xi Jinping. In 2014, the Modi government came to power in India. A few months later, Xi Jinping visited India. He was hosted very well. But during his visit, the Chinese created a problem on the border and much of the time was spent between the two discussing the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. A year later in May, Modi went to China and raised the border question, but he did not get a good response. The Chinese response was that this is a complex issue left over from history and that solving it requires patience. This was 2015. Come 2017, the Chinese created a problem on the India-Bhutan-China border. They started constructing roads right up to the border. The Bhutanese also objected. We have a treaty with Bhutan that the defence of Bhutan will be looked after by India. Bhutan requisitioned Indian troops, and they had to prevent the Chinese from any further activity. Then again in 2018, Modi went to Wuhan to have an informal meeting with Xi Jinping.

Little did he know that even next year in 2019, when he would invite Xi Jinping to Chennai again, what would happen in 2020 was the great betrayal. Like many other countries, it is inexplicable as to why China would do this not only to India but to so many areas, particularly the South China Sea. Remember when many years ago they started raising and building artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Chinese said that freedom of navigation would not be affected - it would be free and open. These islands are being made so that fishermen can have safe haven during disasters and cyclones. But that was only a smoke screen.

Why did China go on the offensive? There have been 22 rounds of territory dispute negotiations between both countries. There are 50 dialogue mechanisms between China and India for exchanging views on various subjects. Out of the 5 top smartphones in India, the market share of four is enjoyed by China. Trade between China and India is to the value of \$100 billion a year with a deficit of \$50 billion in China's favour. More than 1000 Chinese companies have invested in India. Their cumulative investment is more than \$8 billion. Indian companies are also active in China with an investment of about \$1 billion. Together, India and China have 2.7 billion people and contribute to 20% of the world's total GDP. The potential is huge. Why would they risk it? That is anybody's guess. Even on the defence side, we have had a series of military exercises - at least eight joint exercises have been held. We have other India-China defence mechanisms for maintaining peace and tranquillity on the border. Nine rounds of meetings have been made. There are 134 flights linking China and India, most of them are Chinese. Ninety-four out of the 134 flights are Chinese. India had only 40 flights to China. There were 2000 Chinese students in India and more than 20,000 Indian students studying in China. Again, it begs the question: Why now?

The answer probably lies in Chinese strategies. They have long term strategies and short-term strategies. But some assessments say that it could be because of domestic problems that China is facing. Xi Jinping has assumed full power in all aspects of decision making. He has purged the senior ranks of all disloyal senior members. There is an undercurrent of mistrust against Xi. Despite the propaganda and not revealing statistics about the virus from Wuhan, there has been an undercurrent of feeling against the Chinese government. It has caused economic misery, unemployment, and the Chinese policy of empowering state-owned enterprises has impacted the private sector. The state enterprises were the ones that were creating jobs and jobs have gone down. Manufacturing is moving out of China. The workforce is shrinking. And all these actions as a result of the pandemic are infringing on China's economic activities.

What could the Chinese have done against India from Taiwan? Or to paint India as a villain? China believes that India was radicalising resentment against Beijing over the poor handling of the pandemic. It also coincided with the Indian health minister taking over the Chairman of the WHO in May last year and thinking that he could influence the ongoing probe against China about the origins of the pandemic. China could also have taken offence to India's notification of Jammu and Kashmir of special status, particularly because China claims part of that state and, on the other side, on the highways coming from Kashmir going down to Pakistan, goes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Altering the status has changed the dynamics.

Now, the Indian government has also taken some steps after the pandemic broke out in the Chinese occupied territory. The Indian government has taken some economic measures. Firstly, they announced that any contract of less than \$30 million would not be given to Chinese companies. It would be given to domestic companies. India also banned over 220 Chinese apps. India also said that foreign-directed investment in India from any of the countries that shares land borders with India would require government approval - it would not be automatic. This is to prevent Chinese companies taking over Indian companies. That has not gone down well. India is encouraging other major manufacturing countries who had plants in China to relocate to India. Another reason could be that India has opposed the Belt and Road Initiative, mainly because the China-Pakistan economic corridor passes through the state of Jammu and Kashmir, although through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The next reason is that for several years, infrastructure improvement was going on in Ladakh and in the north-east. We have a plan to develop 60 strategic routes through the Line of Actual Control. It is in response to Chinese development. Tibet has such a sparse population and if you look at the extent of highways and road coverage and the classifications and logistics of those roads and bases that have been developed close to the Indian borders, it only gives you a military assessment that these are going to serve as concentration areas for subsequent offensive operations against India.

Where does all this come from? The Chinese action? They have probably come from Chinese strategies. China has had successive grand strategies. They are now going through the strategy of rejuvenation under Xi Jinping. That is to bring glory to China - the Chinese dream. Xi Jinping has laid down the priorities at the Communist Party National Congress in October 2017, where he talked of the Chinese nation growing rich and strong. He articulated the historic mission to realise the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation. And for its implementation, he laid down three major target objectives. By 2021, China should finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects. By 2035, China should be much stronger economically and technologically - have become a global leader in innovation and completed its military modernisation. And before I come to the third, this is why we thought it would not be before 2035 that China would embark upon military expansionism, but it has started a little too early. And the third is that by the PRC's centenary in 2049, China should have resolved the Taiwan question and be a strong country with world class forces.

There are some key considerations which have shaped China's basic approach. The first is that China has a long border of more than 70,000km to defend, against local and distant threats. Since WWII, the military strong states like Russia, Japan and the US have posed new security threats. China's domestic political system has always been marked by a personality-based rule in which ultimate authority comes from the power and beliefs of individual leaders. That perhaps is the reason that Xi Jinping has all the decision-making powers.

I will now end with the last observation on Chinese strategy for creating a secure security environment. This is from the RAND Corporation study. It believes in the four concentric circles. The first ring covers China itself, and Taiwan, because domestic instability is a constant threat. The second ring contains the territory and bodies of water directly adjacent to China's own land and maritime borders. The third ring includes China's entire Asia-Pacific, South-East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, and all of Oceania. The fourth includes everything beyond Asia.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Addressing contemporary threats to national security

Lt Col John Black

I have been a Marine Corps over twenty-four years. I have spent over eight years of my life living with, partnering with and training foreign security forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines, Northeast Asia, Australia. And I was blessed to be in New Zealand for three years.

The reason I did not put mutually beneficial objectives is because we actually really focus on trying to make sure that we bend over backwards to help host nations get what they need. This is to ensure that they can meet the outcomes and objectives that their government needs. And to an extent, it is literally, almost always mutually beneficial. Before starting our discussion, let us define the problems we are addressing. Same problem as yesterday: every single country is facing multiple threats that kind of surpass their abilities to deal with at individual national level. This challenge has resulted in a situation where a lot among nation states are incapable of addressing the existing and emerging threats. This failure is undermining national interest.

It is a fact that when you take a step back you can sense and feel the stress on the existing rules-based international order. Consequently, we need to figure out how we can reinforce that system and make it better. And that is where we come to the issue of solution. I contend that this solution we need is different from the solutions that we dealt with at the level of national security. This is because I really think that at the base root of the solution, we really need to focus on understanding, communicating and aligning our disparate actions. In a best-case scenario, disparate actions converge. However, when they do not converge, they diverge.

I think we just need to be very clear and candid with everybody. Going back to this, to understand the strategic environment, we must consistently talk about the threats. I think what has been really great so far throughout all the briefs that we have had, is that we have been

exposed to a lot of conceptions about threats and we have seen how a lot of them overlap. So, we need to go ahead and discuss a few more.

Finally, I think we need to go ahead and talk about full spectrum capability development options. It is notable that we do not often advertise this. However, when the US goes out and helps partners and allies build capabilities, what we really want to do is to develop the capabilities and capacities that these countries need to develop so that it can meet its national interest. And we also do not want to work ourselves out on the job. Consequently, we actually do not have to be there because we have other responsibilities elsewhere. For instance, we might need to go elsewhere where our presence is more required to assist allies and deter aggression.

So, we will hit up the aiming point, the starting point, and we will talk about it. So, for the aiming points, this is the first one I want to show you. And this is a super simple four step planning methodology. I was introduced to it when I went to the Naval War College, but I have been using this for about ten years and it is absolutely genius. You can use this in the military world. You can use this in the civilian world. If you use this methodology, you are going to be able to get closer to your objective. So, number one, we go ahead, and we look into the future, we create a vision, and we think about what we want our objectives to be or our end state. From there, we literally back plan from that ideal future and then we sequence activities. And after we sequence the activities, we turn around, we say, hey, now we need to resource them. How do we do that? We will throw people at it, time at it, money at it, and you name it. And then the last but not the least, we will step back and we will take a look at it and we will try to mitigate risk, especially when you are dealing with national security. You must accept risk, especially in state-on-state warfare and or conflict. People unavoidably die.

So, I think our goal as planners is to come up with these plans that are suitable, acceptable, distinguishable and feasible within an acceptable level of risk. And we want to harness blood and treasure and we want to save lives and save money, because every single time somebody dies, it is a horrible feeling to be asked to go and tell a husband, a wife, a mother, a father about the bad news. So as planners, it is our job to take care of every single person that we are

responsible for. So, if we forecast into the future and we say, hey, that sounds great you know, so step one, let us look into the future and try to create an objective or a vision of what we want. What exactly does that look like? And what I want you to be aware of here is dependent upon who you are, where you sit geographically, your current time - it is going to affect what you want your end state or objective to be. But I have read just about every single strategic document that is publicly available online throughout Asia, but I have really focused on New Zealand, Australia, Japan, South Korea and India. And for the most part, you are going to see these four things that are over on the right consistently coming up. They might be in different words, but they really focus on these four objectives. You could call these things P2S2 or peace, prosperity, security and stability.

So, as we try to help nations develop capabilities to help them achieve what their government wants them to do, most governments would agree with these four lines of effort. But the thing we must consider is that every government is unique, and no government likes to be told what to do from an outside nation. So, if you have another line of effort or another objective, go ahead and jot it down. We can work with it. But these are four pretty good baselines. Even China and Russia like these things. I am not saying they are universal, but they are pretty consistent across the international spectrum.

However, where we start running into differences is as we work left from the lines of effort. And that is in that big circle. So, this is a model that we came up with and called the Cultural Congruence Framework. Most of the time, countries do not achieve their lines of effort with themselves and with our allies and partners. You can trace it to these three things. Generally, it is because there is lack of understanding, lack of communication and lack of alignment. When you move further left on the model, that's generally because we are coming from different cultures. We have different experiences. Our countries have different interests, and we perceive threats differently.

So, case in point, the threat in Northeast Asia is different from the threat in South Asia. The threat in Southeast Asia is different from the threat in Oceania. And we just must understand that and take those things into consideration. And then last but not least, each government has

varying levels of abilities to resource things appropriately. Also, where do we start? So, we have looked into the future. We have an aim, a point. We want peace, prosperity, security, stability. Where do we start? And I would argue that we have to start just like at step one in a 12-step program. And step one is that we are helpless to solve every issue. So, in this case in point, we are helpless and cannot solve the issue of instability. So bottom line, just like the general said, we cannot do everything alone. We need others, we are stronger together. So, that is the first step. But I love my buddy Al Einstein. My wife, she works for NASA. This is one of our heroes. So, we are briefly going to look at the problem a little bit more before we delve into capability development. So, Einstein said, hey, look, if I had an hour to save the world, I would spend the first fifty-five minutes focusing on the problem. And then would spend about five minutes thinking on the solution. And like every single one of us, as a security cooperation and security assistance practitioner, we really need to understand the problem more. But I figured since you are in New Zealand, you should probably take a Kiwi model. So, I have got a nice picture of Al, just like he is finishing up the Haka. All I want you to do is open it up and take this approach and utilize that unique Kiwi nature to help solve these problems.

So, with that, as we try to delve into understanding the problem, what is the big strategic or the environmental context that causes the potential cause of misunderstanding, miscommunication, misalignment? If we could just be aware of these things, it is going to help us out as we start leaning forward and developing these capabilities that our governments need. Nobody likes to talk about this, but right now, every single one of your countries is being engaged in warfare below the level of armed conflict. What is this called? This is called unrestricted or irregular warfare. Sinologists hate it when I talk about this book or this white paper, because it is not an official publication, but it was written by two PRC colonels in 1999. And for the most part, it tells the world how they propose defeating the US and the Western world. The sinologist will yell and cry: "this is not an official doctrine", but both colonels are promoted to a senior rank. And if you read the lovely two hundred and eighty-eight pages of this white paper, you will see that, literally, every single recommendation that they had is being used globally to increase a certain nation's power and to erode the Western world. So, be just aware of this because we have to understand that this exists.

So, what is this really mean for us? It means that after the Gulf War 1990-1991, several nations realized that if they went into state-on-state conflict with the US and US allies, it would probably not turn out well for them. So, this directly led to several countries to start developing what has become known as anti-access area denial capabilities. And they are pretty good capabilities. Although they could still be defeated, but they can impose a lot of cost. So just to understand, this realization led to other countries thinking: how can we asymmetrically defeat bigger, faster, stronger opponents? And that is where we are. And at the end of the day, the first rule of this form of warfare known as unrestricted warfare is, there are no rules. So, they might shake their head, they might sign agreements, they might say nice things publicly. But at the end of the day, certain countries are trying to erode what are in various nations' best interests. So, be aware of that.

The second form of warfare that we are facing is called irregular warfare. I am an irregular warfare specialist. All irregular warfare is a kind of struggle among state-non-state actors for the legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. So right now, as we speak, in your country and globally, certain nations are attempting to influence their diaspora in your country to influence certain politicians, so that certain politicians can vote in certain ways. This is to make those politicians get into offices, so they can vote in favourable ways that support other nations interests. Be aware of that.

This is what it looks like graphically. So, we used to fight on the left where it says traditional warfare, where the focus is about the government and the military doing the big pulling. But what they realize is against the United States and its allies, that is not going to turn out well for them. So, this shift towards irregular warfare that focuses on government and the population while trying to avoid a military conflict with the U.S. and its allies. And from a strategic perspective, that is a pretty good idea because wars are costly, wars are stupid, wars are bloody. Nobody likes them. And they are horrible. I would not wish war on anybody. However, it should be noted the realization of this fact has led other governments to adopt this form of warfare in order to achieve their political interests.

Down on the bottom, what are the key concepts? Black? The key concepts of this new form of warfare are subversive activities, coercive activities and these are generally disruptive activities. So, if you can take a look at that and think back about what is going on in your country. Just ask yourself, hey, are foreign countries doing activities in my country to coerce us or make us to be subversive and or to disrupt what we want to do? If it quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, swims like a duck, it is probably a duck.

Now, we are going to discuss some threats that you may or may not be aware of. But I just want to make sure that you are tracking some different aspects of them. So, case in point, down in Aotearoa, you really do not worry about nuclear weapons that much because you have a nice nuclear free zone down there. But what I will tell you that a large nation state in Northeast Asia, has proliferated nuclear weapons technology to numerous countries, including Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. With the help of this large nation-state, North Korea has been able to go ahead and develop an hydrogen bomb pictured there on the left with Kim Jong-un. And they have actually been able to develop a very capable intercontinental ballistic missile known as a Hwasong 15, which can reach everywhere on the globe. However, right now, they do not have the ability to have an effective re-entry vehicle. But once they do develop that and they pair these two things, the world is going to be in danger. What is this mean for you? It means that right now, as we speak, if North Korea launches a missile anywhere in the globe, 40 minutes later, somewhere, it is blowing up. So, is this going to happen in New Zealand or Australia? No, probably not. But just know that this country will soon, if not already, have the capability to nuclear blackmail. So, despite our efforts to have a large nation-state in Northeast Asia, to help us coerce North Korea into abandon its nuclear weapons program, they still have them. The problem here is that North Korea believes that having nuclear weapons is vital and essential to its survival.

What next? Some nation states have killed people with poison that are banned by chemical biological conventions. This Kim Jong-un's brother was killed in Singapore with VX. And there is Alexei Navalny who suffered an assassination attempt with Novichok but managed to survive. Right now, he is locked up in a penal colony, about a hundred miles east of Moscow.

Why do I bring these cases up? I bring those up because both cases confirm these things that I have already mentioned that there are nuclear weapons technology, and chemical proliferation. And these have been smuggled via various transnational criminal organizations' smuggling routes. Now these routes are global, they are negatively impacting every country. But in Southeast Asia and Oceania, they are negatively affecting governments interests, but in different ways. We have heard a little bit about human security, all about the dignity of the individual. But I just want you to be aware these smuggling routes can be used for multiple nefarious and horrible activities, starting with people. Now, this is a picture of a Laotian woman and her daughter that was stolen. I have two daughters. That picture caught me and took me off guard. But moving on, these smuggling routes are being used for drugs and weapons smuggling and you name it. And this is costing a lot of countries a lot of time, effort, money in order to stop this. And that money could be more effectively used for basic essential activities and other things. So, we do need to address this.

However, the secondary effects of this drug smuggling is equally negative. There is secondary and tertiary effects of injectable drugs, such as heroin, opium and all that. You know, this has led to an increase in HIV throughout Southeast Asia and in some Oceanic states. And it has also led to an increase in hepatitis C. This does not really sound like a serious or big kind of a security threat, but it is a threat because it is causing an additional strain on each of your governments as they try to take care of their population.

This leads us to governance, which I think is really one of the baseline elements of instability throughout the globe. This is just a picture over North Korea at night and it just demonstrates the complete lack of governments and the ability to take care of the population in North Korea. As we take a step back and we go, hey, look, you know what? We saw some wonderful briefs yesterday from Nick and Simon. They talked about this. So as governments, it is our responsibility to provide a safe place for our people and to help provide a way for them to pursue a life and have a family and have kids without fear of coercion.

So how do we, as governments and nation states, try to help meet the needs of these people in our countries and throughout the region to raise the quality of life? Because generally, if people

are happy, if they are working, if they have a desire and a vision to live in the future, it is going to reduce conflict. But when we cannot meet the needs of the people, when we cannot give them the basic services, when they do not feel loved, they will turn to other means, which generally leads to conflicts.

Up there in the far right, you might see SWEATMIRS - that's just an acronym that we use: safety, water, electricity, depending upon what country you are in, and man or other services, trash, infrastructure, reconnaissance, you name it. And then this leads to, hey, look, if a government fails to provide basic services, what else is probably going on? Chances are they are probably environmental polluters messing up the air, messing up the water. And what is this doing? This is leading to climate change, which is leading to natural disasters and many more natural disasters. And we have not even included pandemics. There are also stupid-ism, racism and extremism that we need to work on and or the proliferation of dual use technology.

And what I mean by dual use is robots that kill? Some nations have already weaponized space, and some countries are working on creating robots to kill people. And that is crazy. And there are some serious ethical, moral implications that we need to deal. But what are other types of heat besides these things that most of us already know? And what I have heard is most people are aware of the other types of heat that are going on. And that is this thing that is being called great power competition or international relations. I think people trying to label this, I get it, there are a lot of academics out there, but I actually think this is a mislabelling of just the way the world is. Countries are always going to do what is in their best interest. Some countries say we have an independent foreign policy. I would argue what country does not have an independent foreign policy. But some people will try to divert attention that they are helping their government pursue their governments interest and deflect everything towards a larger power competition.

I would argue that that is wrong. It is a fact that every single nation has a voice. Every single nation needs to have access. They need to be seen, heard, valued, you name it. But right now, these are the three countries that a lot of people like to talk about, especially the US and the PRC, regarding great power competition. I would argue that competition is just a way of life.

It is inevitable. It is always going to occur. But how do we make it manageable? Yesterday, we talked about anarchy and how there is no 911 force or no governing body to come to the help of countries when they need help. And that the three approaches are realism, which likes to have a rich nation and a strong military and balance with other nations to address threats, liberal internationalism and then constructivism or idealism. With these approaches, you can look at all three approaches and other approaches out there, but it all kind of stems down to power and with power, depending upon how you assess it.

We know, generally, that think tanks say, hey, look, what are these countries' resources and how do they use those resources to influence other countries? I really like the Lowy Institute in Australia. This is just a snapshot of their power assessment in 2020. I would say this may have been a snapshot in time. It is not right. It is not wrong. But it is a good way to get a neutral, unbiased outside view of how they think different nation states in Asia rank out across the board. Within this, there are two different aspects of power. These are your soft power and your hard power. A couple of new terms have been thrown around, such as smart power or sharp power. I am just going to address soft power and hard power. When you take a look at soft power, this is just how can you be yourself? How can you use your own special things inside your country to co-opt other nations and to help influence them?

Now, one of the things I love about New Zealand, Australia, absolutely wonderful places, full of amazing people, full of amazing cultures, multiple cultures in each nation. So, both of you have a lot of soft power. And I would say lead with soft power. This is just a snapshot from 2021 about a month or two ago. So, what we see is you take a look across the board within the top 10 countries that have been ranked and assessed for smart power. Two of them are neutral, there are Switzerland and Sweden. And then one is China and then everybody else is the US and or US ally. So, I think we are sitting pretty good on soft power, but we can always get better. I think the reason you saw the United States go down was because our former president and his use of tweets and his language really did not resonate well, both domestically or internationally. But when we trace the roots of soft power and later on hard power, really, it comes down to the dollar, because the economy is the wellspring of power.

So, the question that I consistently see here is: how can we benefit economically from everybody while still protecting our interests? So, it is all about the money. So, when we take a look at the money, this is actually from 2020 or I think late 2019, early 2020. Yes, the United States and its allies and partners have a very significant amount of GDP globally. So, I think what you will see is the PRC trying to enter into bilateral relationships so that it can be the big brother in a relationship. But what I would argue is that we should probably try to facilitate and encourage countries to do bilateral trades but more importantly, to steer the angle towards multilateral trades, because that will prevent countries from getting isolated and forced or coerced to do something from a bigger nation.

And with that said, as you step back, if you look at every other country that has likeminded values and wants a rules-based international order or similar principles, you are going to see that they are actually sitting pretty well on the globe. But as you go down a level and say, hey, look, GDP really does not matter, but rather more about purchasing power parity. What you see here is the US and its likeminded friends and allies still have a large portion of the globe. So, you should not feel isolated. You should not feel coerced because you can work with likeminded nations to ease up on you.

One of the things that are not often talked about is due to things that are occurring. Within the PRC in the next 10, 15 years, populations are going to drop, a lot of old people are going to start dying, and this is going to mess up the economy. And by 2050, India is forecast to have the largest GDP in the world. So just understand these things are evolving, but when all comes down to it, dollars do matter. So how do we get those dollars? It is all about the big take. The first time I heard about this concept was when Bill Clinton was in office in the early 90s and they were getting ready to throw on a whole bunch of economic sanctions because of the Beijing massacre at Tiananmen Square. PRC representatives came over. They talk to the United States like, hey, look, we understand we had some differences a couple of years ago, but at the end of the day, both countries need to develop. The Chinese economy is a big cake. Come over and get some, because if you come early, you will get a big piece. If you come late, you will get a small piece. This message has been used by PRC diplomats globally, and they are using it effectively because everybody wants to get a piece of the pie. Everybody wants to get a big piece of cake but be aware that this dragon cake does bite at times.

And this is just a quick slide. Hey, look, lots of imports going on around the world. Got it. Lots of exports going on around the world. Got it. Nothing new. And then the framework, there are multiple frameworks out there. I almost cried when President Trump decided to pull out of the TPP because we worked so hard to get that up. So, what I would encourage nation states here to do is get access to all the regional trade frameworks you can, because the more money you can get, the more you are going to be able to produce for your citizens. You are going to be able to raise quality life, you are going to be able to get better influence, etc. etc. But more importantly than that, it is going to give you a voice in the system, in the structural framework that is going to help guide the future of the world's economy.

And what we would like to try to do from a personal perspective is that we really need to try to get 60 to 80 plus percent of the world's nations to agree to some form of rules to help guide us, because if we don't, bigger nations, i.e., the PRC, are going to be able to steer how they want things done. And it is not going to be able to help us out. As far as the CPTPP, which Japan and other countries saved after the U.S. pulled out, thank you New Zealand, thank you, Australia, thank you everybody else on there. At some point in time, the US will probably entertain going back in. But based upon the domestic policies and the domestic politics that occur within the US, I do not foresee that happening any time soon within the next two years, because right now the current administration is very focused internally on the economy right now and its focus on foreign policy externally. So that just means we might be a little slow with international economics. But here is the question. The key question that is affecting every nation state is up on top. And that is how can states benefit from the PRC's economic ascendancy or rise while still protecting each state's interests? And I think it is really important for us to go back and tell our counterparts, including the PRC, hey, look, we don't care how you run your government. Yes. We would like you to treat your people better. Yes. We do not want you to have concentration camps. Yes. We do not want you to beat your people in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia. But what we can agree with is that we need each other economically so that we can grow our economies and take care of our people.

As China's economy and India's economy grow, as all of our economies grow, we want all help each other out. And I think we can all agree on that. But this becomes a problem when you go down a couple of levels. Most especially you start looking at different resource and territorial disputes. For China, the resources really are not even that important here. They just

state their legitimacy on their ability to protect and defend every single ounce of China, even if it is not based on historically accurate claims. But this leads into a problem because what you have is what you have and here is a very long-term thinking government using every single element of national power to influence it.

So, this is a picture of President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama meeting in 2014. Everybody should know this. If you do not, you do so now. Now, China, in effect, tried to carve the world in half, kind of like how Spain and Portugal got it way back in the 1500's. You know, hey, look, let us create a new form of great power relations or basis on mutual respect, non-interference and things that benefit us mutually. So, what this was, in essence, was a ploy to get the U.S. to turn its back on its allies, partners, like minded nations and form a G-2. From a US perspective, that might not really be that bad, right? Yeah, it really would not, you know. The reason is that it could turn out really well, but from a cultural value point of view, hell no.

However, the idea of US turning back on allies is bad for us and it is bad for the world, bad for our allies, and it is bad for every single one of you. So, what do we do? Hey, you know what? Let us go and take a look at this. So, you are proposing this G-2, great power relations, but we have a couple of differences. And you are saying these are your core interests, but we actually have some issues with how you are treating people in Hong Kong, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. You know, we really have a problem with you trying to claim all these areas which are beyond the scope of a map that the Republic of China, not the PRC, published in 1949. And oh yeah, Taiwan's initial map was 11 lines. And the PRC subsequent map, which is historically accurate, was based on 9. That is a crock of crap. They are literally claiming every single ounce in the South China Sea to include the wonderful nation of Taiwan.

And this is really complicated because Taiwan is a wonderful place, you know, but I go into history offline, but I am not. I am just going to hit it up. I am going to say, hey, this is a very complex issue because this is a photo of a Taiwanese flag at its- it is not a consulate, but it is at its unofficial location in Fiji. This cake caused a fight because a PRC representative found out that they were going to have this beautiful cake that looks really yummy. And so, they got into a fight over it. And that is really unacceptable because one nation is trying to impose its view on this very complex issue.

What I want to do is this. I want to make sure everybody in the room understands or leaves with a better understanding of it. And now the US has a one-China policy, just like the PRC

has a one-China policy. But they are absolutely different, just like most of your governments probably have one China-policy. This is what ours is based on. It is based on those three things in yellow. That is Taiwanese Relations Act, through joint communiques and six assurances. What the Taiwan Relations Act says is, if the PRC tries to forcibly unify Taiwan, that would be crossing the red line. There are issues. And as such, we will go ahead and armed Taiwan. And we take a very strategic, ambiguous, uncertain approach that is intended to say if somebody attempts to force the unification of Taiwan, there could be bloodshed. And what this very ambiguous policy attempts to do is to serve as a dual deterrence policy to keep the status quo until some form of peaceful solution can occur.

You take a look at what happens in Taiwan right now. Very interesting. But what I would say is that my recommendation is from a personal level. I suggest we should help them expand their influence in areas where they can expand their influence. Case in point, they have responded to COVID better than any other nation in the world with nine deaths. Absolutely amazing. So, I personally would like to see the Lovers' Bridge here in Taiwan continue to be a place where people can visit, where they are free from coercion.

And additionally, these views that we have had, just revolve around what each nation can or cannot do. So, somebody go out and say, I support the Dalai Lama or I support Taiwan and see what happens. When Lady Gaga did this and when she met with the Dalai Lama in Indianapolis, in the United States, all our Chinese fans crushed her because she was interfering in the internal Chinese affairs. No, she was not. She just went to meet with somebody who is really cool, who is the religious leader.

And troubling the CCP is as [inaudible] said they are going to choose the next Dalai Lama, even though Marxist Leninism is atheistic, just a point to think about. So, what do you think? Should there be a G-2? Could this be a good deal for the US or not? Could be a good deal. But I think it should not be considered. So, what is causing all of this? Barack Obama said, hey, look, we reject this idea. President Trump and Biden have said we reject this idea, which is still being espoused. But when you take a look at it, you could argue that it actually stems from arrogance or overconfidence and what they perceive to be a US decline after 2008 or insecurity linked to what's occurring inside the PRC due to numerous issues, or is it both? I would argue

it is both. So even though they may look like the wizard on the left, just pull the curtain back and try to be realistic.

So how do we start thinking about this? And when we start thinking about this, we are starting to think, you know what? Let us go ahead and help develop some capabilities, because I know that The Wizard of Oz is not big and isn't fiery. Yeah, he might look big, but behind the curtain, I have a better idea of what is going on. So, we are going ahead and empty our mind and we are going to become the environment that exists right now. What I want you to do is this. I literally want you to think about this Bruce Lee quote - "we need to adapt, and we need to become the water". And what is that water? The water is really the hard power because soft power will not work if hard power cannot back it up. This is the index. No biggie. We have the strongest military. Yeah, whatever. But if you kill American citizens or if you attempt to kill its allies, there is going to be a problem and there is probably going to be use of force. And if you harm us, it does not matter. If it is 10, 20, 30 years later, we will get you down. We will track you down, we will find you and you will go away.

So, what has this done? Ever since 1992, after that Gulf War, when China, Russia realized that they were lagging behind, they started to spend a lot of money. But you see here yeah, we spent a lot of money but the PRC in red, they have actually developed a lot of very good capabilities that they hope to be able to defeat U.S. in the first island chain. This slide just shows the difference between 1999 and 2019. I would argue when you take a look at the twenty nineteen numbers, those numbers are significant, and those numbers can probably defeat most nations in isolation in the Asia Pacific. But the good news for you is there is a hub and spoke system. It is based off US Hub and spoke alliance system in Asia. And the intent of that is to keep the peace through the allies, deter war and rapidly respond to crises, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations.

What I want to alert you to is that hard power is great. However, by 2030, we are going to be overmatched at least one on one. So, does this mean? It means we really need to work by, with and through partners to develop more capabilities so that we can have enough collective defense to deter aggression from happening because we do not want war. We absolutely,

positively do not want war. But if we do have war, we need to be able to kick somebody's teeth in and knock them out as fast as possible and secure the region and make it as peaceful and as rapidly as possible.

So, these growths have caused significant insecurity throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific. And this slide just shows you that a lot of countries have spent a lot of money. China, Japan, South Korea and India. Those are the four biggest ones. Do not worry about that. We are still spending a lot of money. But once again, you know, the two large revisionist nations are spending a lot. But when you take a look in total, the US and its allies are spending a lot of money. But we can always do more. We can develop better capabilities to help deter war. But what we need to be aware of and what has already been talked about several times is this concept, the Gray zone coercion. So other nations know exactly what the U.S. red lines are. And they are operating just below those red lines, so they do not trigger conflict. They do not want to initiate conflict because it will be bad for them and for the region. But just be aware that this is resulted in them doing other things that are causing some pain throughout the region, including island building, including grey zone coercion, ramming and sinking ships.

And what is supercool about this PRC or PLAN ship? It is instructive to take a look at the design where that flag is up on the hull, the sides are actually modified and are different from most ships. So, these ships are being designed specifically to pull right up against other ships so you can pinch two ships in and steer that ship where you want it to go and or so you so you can sink it. So, there are some serious thoughts going on from the PRC in this regard, and especially in Oceania and off the coast of Chile. They are using all kinds of maritime militia, fishing fleets to do their bidding at this level below the threat of force.

However, what is really scary is what Sergeant Spadaro mentioned yesterday, and that is how technology is being used in an economically unfair manner to gain access to countries infrastructure systems so that they can gain a network effect, get deeply embedded in that country and backdoor everything regarding what that country knows and doesn't know, and that's why we need to come up with alternative methods instead of allowing Huawei to get in and control other countries infrastructures. This picture on the right that is just called a

panopticon and this theory of a panopticon is in prison, if you do this in the middle, they can see what every single prisoner is doing. One of the indirect goals of Huawei is to serve as a panopticon and be able to look everywhere, pull all kinds of information and use that data to manipulate almost every single aspect of national power.

So, we need to be aware of that. And then moving on to information and narratives. That information panopticon: there is already a great firewall in China, and you cannot even publish little jokes like this on the left. No, you cannot post a Winnie the Pooh. You cannot say nice little rhymes like Xi sells Xishells by the Xishore. But they can in turn publish images of Australian soldiers killing babies and then making a comment. And so, what you have here is you have a divergence in how they want information to be used. They do not want you saying anything that can be disparaging towards them, but they can absolutely disparage you and discredit you. No. And this point leads me to the issue of influence operations.

This is a sign of the United Front. President Xi has said this is the secret weapon that the CCP has, and this is its linkage to Confucian institutes, to Chinese diaspora overseas to help them learn about and message messages and narratives that are beneficial to the CCP. So, case in point, I am in Cambridge, going to Harvard, going to MIT. We have Wiggers here, we have Tibetans, you name it. Every single time there is an event with any one of those minority communities, there is a huge rally against them, all coordinated from the United Front. The whole goal of this is to influence governments to be beneficial towards them and to drive a wedge between other governments, especially US allies. The PRC has recreated this narrative of it being a victim. It used to pronounce [sic] that it was a victor, but 1991 it shifted to a victim mentality and now they are espousing the centre of humiliation and the Japanese atrocities.

So, in World War II, Japan did kill somewhere between three to ten million Chinese and the Chinese absolutely make sure that everybody around the world knows that. And they will go around, telling Korea, and all the nations in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam. The Japanese are horrible. They killed a lot of people. They killed a lot of Chinese. Bad. We should band together, and they have no moral right to lead Asia. But the PRC and the CCP will not

acknowledge that Mao Zedong, their great leader, killed more than forty million people during the Great Leap Forward.

So, we need to uncover these messages and the underlying attempt to diverge and divide our allies. We need to strengthen our alliance so that we can become better. And they are also using these coercive activities, as evidenced by Australia's request. Let us take a look into where COVID came from. And then immediately China hit back and hit back hard. But as we look forward into the future, as Australia and other countries Palau, South Korea, Japan, the United States suffer economic consequences from speaking up. This is what is going to happen in the future.

This is actually really good for many countries, including China, but also for the region. We want countries to develop. Definitely, we need to take advantage of it. But what I would argue is that we need to use our own approach to give another alternative and or to make this better, such as the Blue Dot initiative, which is what the US and Japan, a potentially Australia are contemplating to do. But what is really interesting about this is its hedging its bets via the heartland or the continent and via the rimland or the maritime route. But it completely bypasses traditional US allies and US partners, strategic partners. So just be aware that there is definitely a well thought out plan here which you need to be aware of.

So, what is this deal? Hopefully, you are getting agitated with these threats. If you are getting agitated, it means we are in a good place, we are ready to go. So now we're like "eh you know what? These threats definitely exceed my capacity to do what I need to do". But the good thing is not everything that we face must be changed. However, the bottom line is we must acknowledge it. And that is what we just did. We literally acknowledged that there is a lot of threats out there. And then we say, what do we do? How are we going to get over this? And that is where we just need to take a step back and we need to start looking at capability development. As we start looking at capability development, I always want people to approach every single opportunity to be neutral and unbiased as they go in to try to help governments. Literally just go and say, hey, where are your interests? How do you want to get there? Because if we can do that, we can understand that we have shared different and conflicting interests and how we can help each other out. What is supercool for every single country present now and

in the next century is middle powers and minor powers are going to be the countries that tip the balance of the rules-based international order towards the direction that they want to go.

What does this mean? It means that the big countries, the U.S. and China, will not dictate how the structural order emerges. Will they have a voice? Absolutely, they are going to have a voice now. But the beautiful thing is the major, the minor and the middle powers will be able to band together and decide to vote how they want those rules to be. And that is what leads us to capability development. And we talk about capability development. It is all about developing the ability or capacity to perform a specific function to achieve an objective. So, when we come to you, we are literally just going to ask you, what does your government need to do? So, within the Indo-Pacific region, there are thirty-six countries. The United States has twenty-five embassies. We have a couple more consulates. But if you are a country in the room in the Indo-PACOM right now or globally, what you need to know, is there somebody at the U.S. embassy that is there to help you. And if they cannot help you, they could direct you to U.S. allies and partners and or other civilian agencies to help you out. And we do it all the time.

Another thing - I absolutely hate bullies, I think that is one of the reasons why I really love my job, because I actually think violence actually does serve an effective purpose when it is required. So down here is just a little cartoon of a bully getting ready to beat a little kid up. I do not want you to be a bully. I do not want you to be a victim. So, every single country should have a "I will not be a victim" mentality. I will not let another country take my lunch. So, with this, within every single embassy, each embassy has a country team, and that country team is working with U.S. Department of State, United States Department of Defense and an allied nations coalition government. We are working with you at multiple levels.

Here are my suggestion and my recommendation to you. Seriously, we are super easy to work with we are super friendly. However, if you think that we are not friendly, just work together on human-to-human level, just meet up and grab a brew. If it is in the morning, you can grab a flat white. If it is in the afternoon, you can hit up some of that good New Zealand beer. There is an Aotearoa pale ale. It is delicious. And then once you meet up, I just want you to break bread and talk. You know, I really recommend you do not have to go to the embassy. Just say, hey, look, let us meet up and talk about things. Meet up, get together, go grab some food and talk. This is a picture at the back bench, I used to hit up the back bench from time to time. Does it matter where it is? Just go meet up, talk, you name it.

What are we going to do when we sit down with you? We are going to discuss a whole bunch of stuff. Seriously, what is your purpose? What are your interests? What is your vision? What is your mission? What do you want to do? But we are really going to focus on those three things that are in that big green circle. We are going to look at your national objectives, which we call your ends. We are going to look at how we can get there, which are those strategic concepts or ways. And then we are going to look at your different elements of national power. And as we talk about that, maybe over some fish and chips and some beer, then we are going to take a look at the risk assessment and just try to figure out what is an acceptable level of risk. We are going to look inside internal to the country, external to the country, and we are going to see if any of your domestic laws or U.S. domestic laws might negatively impact that.

Given that most of our nations - I do not know which countries are present - we all have laws that we have to abide by, so we have to be aware of those. So, we will look at whatever strategic documents you have or compare them with ours and then we will talk about your priorities. I think every single strategic document that I read throughout the region comes down to protecting the citizens, maintaining security, improving prosperity and having some form of values. I did not highlight democratic because that means different things to different people. However, we just need to at least be aware of it. You know, this is hot off the press.

Earlier this month, Secretary of Defence Austin posted these, you know, just so you are aware of it now, these are DOD's priorities. And seriously, it looks pretty good. Defend the nation, take care of the people and succeed through teamwork. So, what I see here is one of the things that I value most from my three and a half years in New Zealand. And in New Zealand, most people are very, very humble and they really praise good teamwork. And what you see here is you see the US being very humble with very good priorities, saying, hey, you know what? Does not matter how big we are, we need to work together as a team by, with and through each other. How do we do this? We fund ourselves well. We have almost three million people, and we are literally spread all throughout the world.

So wherever you are, you can get to us. This is what we do. We take words to actions locally and we have more than three hundred thousand people supporting security, stability, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. As we go into the capability development, this is PACOM's mission statement. We are going ahead and protect and defend the territory of the US. Its people, and interests. And its interests include allies and partners. So, by default, your interests are our interests.

So, at this recent seminar or strategic dialogue in Alaska, a lot of the things that the US brought up were not just its interests. It actually addressed a lot of things for other partners who don't have a voice or who might not be heard. So that is pretty cool. But it is by, with and through our allies and partners that US Indo-PACOM is committed to enhancing stability, promoting security, encouraging peaceful development. And that is where a lot of people step back. But at the end of the day, hey, look, somebody comes out, bullies you. You need to be ready to fight to protect yourself. And as such, we are fully prepared to fight and win when required. Do we want to fight? No, not really. We want peace. But if push comes to shove, we are ready. And this approach is based on a partnership presence and military readiness.

This slide kind of reminds me of being up in defense house when we used to have a big building, we go up on a seventh floor. But give a toss just means to ask for help. When you sit down with your embassy counterpart, just have a candid conversation and ask for help and we are going to say, hey, that is great, what do you need and why? And what we are going to do is we are going to talk about our common goals and objectives. And this is where I think the secret sauce really happens. It literally is about everybody coming together, figuring out where we need to go. And we will go back. We will see if it's legal. And then we go ahead and go through this whole strategic diagram we call the capability package planning model. And we are going to link your objective to what you want to do to our willingness to support within a risk framework. And we are going to see how much you can absorb because the US is big. But unfortunately, as a country, we get overwhelmed sometimes. So, we do not want to exceed your capacity. And also tell us, hey, look, you are doing too much. No, stop. Go back. Do it again. And we will do it. And within this, we will work with you and your country to develop what we call the full spectrum capability development. And our theory is, if we cannot create a capability that you are going to be able to maintain and sustain at an affordable level for a

long time, it is really not even worth doing. It seriously is just not worth your time. Not worth our time. There are other options out there now.

So, you need to be serious if you want to make sure that you can protect your people. If you want to make sure you can protect your economy, you want to make sure that nobody is going to come in and take your lunch money. We are all about it. We will help you out. If you need defense systems, we will help you out. If you need to get people trained, we will help you out. If you need enablers that you do not have, we will help you out. If we cannot do it, we will work with our allies and partners to do it. If you need strategy and doctrine, boom, you nailed it, we will help you out. Is it some kinds of institutional supports? You nailed it. We will help you out. I will not say it is a one stop shop, but literally we are there to help. And you will be surprised at sometimes when we sit down with you and will say, hey, you know what? We hear what you are saying. We know you are interested in this system, which is US, but it is not the best system out there. And it is not really the good choice for this.

You might look at this other nation's platform or training, because they are actually more cost affordable, and probably better for you in your specific scenario. We have done that. We do it all the time. Because we want something good for you. Those things that we help you develop will either be kinetic actions, non-kinetic actions, or just better ways to do things with your various elements of national power, because what we want you to do is we want you to get a great product at an affordable price that helps you achieve what your government needs you to do. And the cool thing is that we do it in a way where it is great for you, it is great for us, and it is great for the region. If it is something that will disrupt the power of balance in the region, we probably will have a discussion about that. We might not go through with it.

And then as we step back, as we go back, we will make sure that we are obeying our laws, you can make sure you are obeying your laws and then we are going to make sure that we go through this framework. Is what we are doing legal? Is it ethical? Is it moral? Is it philanthropic? You name it. And is it affordable? Do not worry about me, those are just things that we worry about and then we will go back, and as long as it is legal, ethical and economical and preferably philanthropic. We will go ahead and help you develop something that is going to be great for

you. This is what an example likes, hey, we came in, we assessed something. We looked at what you need. You told us what you need, what your government wants. We looked at what is available. We walked by with and through our allies and partners. This is what we propose. And now we will literally tailor whatever you want and or help you get what you need. And the end of the day is, you know, expand that pie, create a win-win situation where everybody gets more value. And there are less expensive options out there sometimes. But beware, on the back end, you are going to wish you did not go through with it. Now because those systems will compromise you, they will back door you, they are going to break down and they do not have a way to sustain it and or maintain it.

So, at the end of the day, this is what our capability package plan model looks like. And what you will see is it is very flowy. But the thing that is on this slide that I wanted to draw your attention to is all of that is great. However, if you cannot sustain it, it is useless. So, when we get it, we need to say, hey, look, how are we going to assess whether or not this is working and whether or not it is going to meet what their government needs. We will come in and will help you assess it, we will help you sequence it and prioritize it, and then we will help you sustain it. And at the end of the day, we do not want to work ourselves out of the job so we can focus our time, effort and forces elsewhere where they're critically needed to deter aggression, prevent state on state warfare.

What have been the effects of this approach in the last 80 years? You know, we have stopped large scale invasion of North Korea. We have helped Asia peacefully develop and avoid nation state warfare. This is Taipei 101, great dumplings, beautiful shot there. We prevented an invasion of Taiwan several times in response to lots of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations, and chased a lot of terrorists, you name it. So, I think all in all, I think you could see it. We really care about this. You know, we want to cherish blood and treasure, but at the end of the day, we are willing to pay the price it takes to maintain peace, prosperity, security and stability. We would ask and we would like you to support peace, prosperity, security, stability, too. But as we move forward, we need to remember that there are strains to the order. I think the priorities going forward, we need to recover from covid. We need to recover our economies. We need to counter economic coercion. And now we need to have people stop parking their boats in other people's EEZ's or EEZ's .

How do we do that, we need to name and shame, get media out there, take photos, post it. This is an example of a live fire exercise. Nothing really keeps me up at night now, but, you know, maybe coffee, but one of the things that frightens me are these large-scale exercises that are designed to impact the social cohesion within another country. And every year, really from like June to September, that is a time to watch out for this. So, we just need to stop nation state coercion. What has this led to? This has led to a lot of anti PRC sentiments throughout the region. And what also worries me is this concept of grey zone warfare, because I recently read an article that was translated from a Chinese academic. And the one thing that academics said is, hey, look, the Russians did it in Crimea, why can't we do it in Taiwan? And that is very problematic.

So, I would argue, and I would recommend everybody that present and every nation that are present - work by, with and through allies and partners to develop capabilities to protect yourself and work by, with and through partners to develop capabilities that can improve the collective defense, not only for you, but of the entire region so that we can maintain a peaceful Indo-Pacific region. And if something bad happens, so we can respond rapidly, so we can pull the region back into pieces rapidly as possible. As we move forward, we need to remember we are going to constantly have stress. But what I want you to do is this. I want you to be like bamboo or palm tree. Bend, but do not break. And remember that we could do this together. Mutual support is good. So, what are some options to improve deterrence? These are the ones that I wrote down. I do not think they are necessarily just the only right one, but I think you need to think like a porcupine, a BJJ leg locker. We need to improve our communications and ISR so we can all become more interoperable. We need more sensors. We need more shooters, especially for people and nations who are being coerced. We need to be able to impose costs on others. And that is largely through mobile missiles, multiple launch platforms, smart minds, anti-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, and so on. We also need special operations forces.

I would also recommend that if you are currently being coerced, you probably need a lot of decoys because when those missiles start flying. I am talking about a thousand missiles. We need to have those missiles directed at decoys instead of live targets so that we can improve the survivability of forces. And also, for that one nation who is facing this very serious threat,

VIP protection, because there's probably already people there trying to track and be prepared to target key leaders. And the last but not the least, you just need to be able to hurt somebody. I know a lot of people do not like to hear this. You seriously need to be able to hurt somebody. So, yeah, you know what? You might hurt me. You might kill me. But you know what? You are not going to walk away without a scar. I am a martial arts instructor, and I was talking to old lady in Detroit, you know, and she is like, what do you think I should do so I can be safe? I would say: well, you could stay inside your house and never go out. And she is like, yeah, well I need to go to the store. And I was like, well, do you have a son or a daughter or a family member who can pick you up? Yeah, but not always at the right time. And I was like, oh, can you order out? That is possible, but sometimes I need something late at night. So, I just want to walk down to the store. The distance is like two or three blocks away and it is sometimes dark. There are really no lights, it is kind of not safe. And she is like, yeah, I know, what do I do? And I was like, well, if you absolutely, positively want to go out, you need a gun, you need a handgun. Because if you do not, you are probably going to get mugged. And at the end of the day, you need to be able to deter threats.

So, in summary, we have looked at the aiming point. We need to investigate the future to determine what we want. I have shown you the four-step planning methodology, I have shown you four lines of effort or something that we can kind of steer ourselves towards in that security, stability, peace and prosperity on your own terms and in alignment with your own values. We looked at the starting point, which is our interests. We talked about the critical need to go ahead and try to understand, communicate and align our interests, and we talked a little bit about a capability development. So seriously, if you need help, go grab somebody from the embassy, ask for help, tell them what your government needs, and they will be able to help you out. Has this been done before? Absolutely. You know, hey, we could do a fellowship. It is worked before. You can be big, small, you have elf ears, whatever. We can make this work. So, I know you might feel small, you might be dirty, you might be looking in the future, wondering how you could do this, but you could do this. We could do this together. And we could come out on top. So, without any further ado, that concludes my brief on capabilities development, open to questions.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Human Trafficking

Don Lord Hagar

The focus of my discussion is about tackling human trafficking and understanding a little bit about slavery. So, just on that note, over 400 years of the trans-Atlantic trade... it was something like 12 million slaves have been bought and sold and shipped across to Europe and North America. And we know that slavery was supposedly abolished by the British Empire in 1833, and then French colonies followed in 1848, and the US in 1865. However, there are more slaves now than at any other time in history.

This has created an alternative world, really, for many. An alternative reality. There are vulnerable people who are forced, deceived and exploited by those who rule minds and bodies for personal gain. This is modern day slavery which can give devastating trauma, suffering and overwhelming challenges and which sometimes destroy the victims without remedy.

So, what does modern day slavery look like? Part of what I am going to discuss today is not so much science but putting a face to the problem. So, just before I go into that, let us take some case studies. So, a young boy in India, who at the age of 13 was manipulated - sorry, young girl - into being sold into a sex trafficking ring. Sometimes she could be forced to serve up to 20 customers a day. Then we have Esther in Ghana who was enslaved to work on a lake for hours on end when she was just six years old. For 10 years, all she knew was sweeping, cleaning and processing fish. Or Marco in the Philippines, who at the age of seven, his trafficker began to sexually exploit him in front of a live audience on the internet.

So, this young man that you have in front of you now, his name is Longdi. And in the first shot that was just before that, he came to New Zealand two years ago and spoke to audiences here. But this is his story. Let me put a face to the problem.

He was, in his early childhood, quite a sick little boy. When he was only six years old, he contracted polio and lost the use of his legs. Not long after that –it is common in Cambodia that if you have a disabled child, there is a feeling that that is going to bring bad luck and poverty for the rest of their lives. So, young children who are disabled in some cultures, they

are looked at as a real problem or a burden on the family. He was aware of that. He was ill a lot.

Eventually, his mother sold him to a broker because they lived on the border of Thailand and Cambodia in a place called Poipet. He was trafficked to some traffickers in Thailand where they used him to beg on the streets. He could beg for 12 to 14 hours, begging with a bowl and having to bring back money. If he did not bring back enough, he was beaten. Sometimes he was staked to the spot overnight, where he would be kicked by passers-by. He was attacked by dogs. He had a shocking upbringing.

Now, he was taken pity on by some people who made a little chair that could move like a wheelchair. But the traffickers quickly took that off him because they want more money out of someone like this. They want them to look sick. They want them to be thin and they want them to have some illness that people will take pity on them, in his case.

He ended up actually being apprehended by the police and sent home five times. His mother kept reselling him to the same broker in Thailand. For five years of his life, he had a shocking upbringing of abuse and just real hardship throughout his early life. He felt this incredible crushing weight of responsibility because he was the one that was sick and brought this problem on his family.

Roll the clock forward a bit. He ended up with IOM, an International Organisation of Migration. They referred him to Hagar. We spent probably 12 years on that recovery journey. This is him - you can see his legs up the top there. After these 12 years of recovery, the picture on the right shows him with some of the Hagar staff. He is now working for Hagar as a social worker. The bottom left one shows him with his wife and little baby.

I must tell you the story of how he met his wife, because it is an important part of his story. He was often finding it difficult to go and buy shoes. He saw this girl, Ani - the girl that he eventually married - at a little shoe shop. Like, a wee booth at the side of the road. He tried on a pair of shoes and this girl was unusually kind because most often he would be looked down on, given the short stick, and just told to move on. But in this case, she was patient, kind, and helped him put on the shoes and try them out. And he actually had an instant bond with her, and in the end bought quite a few shoes because he liked her so much. They ended up getting up together and married a couple of years ago. They have got a young son now. But Longdi just finished two degrees. He has got a psychology degree and an English degree. And he is doing his Master's and loves his work as a social worker where he can bring benefit to others.

A definition of slavery, really, is the illegal trade of humans against their will, for the purpose of exploitation. So, the illegal trade of humans against their will, for the purpose of exploitation. This defines it simply. Now, trafficking is one form of slavery. Slavery has many forms. And it is a very nefarious activity that is very dark.

So, if we look at the kind of price of a victim for sexual exploitation, we can see US\$10,000 or US\$15,000 would be an upper value in East Asia. But in many places around the world, a person can be bought or sold for about US\$90. That price also equals about three ivory tusks or meth to the amount of about 40 grams.

So, just before I go into that story... when I was in Cambodia doing some research around developing tools for counselling one of the things, I read through was the general value of human being declines as time goes on because generally, say, a young girl would be pushed into the sex industry or forced labour. If they go into the sex industry, they control them with drugs to make them more appealing to customers. They must serve up to 12 people a day. A trafficker can get up to or at least US\$2000 per week from one girl. They sustain their virginity cosmetically for as long as they can - up to six weeks - before their value drops. Once they burn them out in the sex industry, they often get pushed into forced labour or even forced marriage if they are older. They can end up selling organ parts. It leads to a steady decline unless they can escape.

Let me now just link Longdi's story - the first person we saw, who had to work seven days a week up to 14 hours a day for very, very little money. And he was promised he would get money and be able to send it home to his parents, but of course, it did not happen for long. And then he was getting nothing.

So, this man on your screen, Joseph Auga Matamata recently went through the New Zealand courts in about July last year. He was using about 13 Samoans illegally as slaves. He was not paying them. Some of them were having to work six/seven days a week and up to 14 hours per day. They were getting beaten. He was using his power and control and using fear to keep them as his slaves. Now, this is in New Zealand. This case is just as bad or similar to some of the cases overseas. So, it is not just developing countries that may have an issue like this. Trafficking/slavery is in just about every country around the world.

A little bit of science. There are about, according to the latest estimates, 40 million people living in slavery. The picture in the centre at the bottom indicates that out of those there are almost 24 million that are trafficked out of that 40 million. And then you see about 29 million

- or about 70% roughly - are women and girls living in slavery. And their children make up about 25% of the total - at the top there. And on our back doorstep in the Asia-Pacific region, there are about 61% of people that are living in slavery, which is the highest of the regions across the world. We know that up to 69% of women experience violence in the Asia-Pacific. In some of the countries that we are working in, it's up to 90% - like Afghanistan.

So, the most vulnerable are the ones we have just seen on the diagram. Women make up a big proportion of that - and children. And refugees - and of course with COVID and with all these conflict zones around the world, refugees have been growing in number. COVID is increasing those numbers that are being trafficked global.

I just want to explain a little bit about how Hagar works. We can see there that we work in what is called the whole journey. We take a person on that journey of recovery step-by-step. The first way is that they have a case manager who they work with to develop their future path to freedom, etc.

We find safe accommodation through foster families, through group homes - a safe place when they have had nothing, but experiences of abuse must be found. We work really hard on that area of training potential foster parents.

Counselling makes up a big portion of what we do because almost everyone that comes to Hagar has gone through some kind of severe or even extreme trauma through rape or abuse or trauma or trafficked for sex or labour or marriage, for example. Then they will need legal support. We have worked with them through the courts and help represent them and support them as they tackle the perpetrator of the crime.

Education. Following that through. Make sure that they can study. Make sure that they can finish high school and get the tools they need to see a brighter future.

Economic empowerment is a strong part of what Hagar's done right from the beginning in 1994 in Cambodia. The founder was a Swiss - he is an experienced social entrepreneur, and he was Swiss Counsel in Cambodia. A fine man who started a number of businesses then.

Then we reintegrate them back into their communities. Often the whole village takes that moment to welcome them back and to talk about vulnerability and how they got into trafficking or whatever. So, they share their experience to help prevent others going through the same thing.

We run this trauma informed care throughout our whole work, including our staff, because some staff are only one step away from problems in this realm as well.

This young lady is my personal inspiration. Her story was kind of a little bit similar to Longdi in a way, but she was a slave. She wasn't trafficked. Her father took her to another woman's place - her mother was quite cruel to her all her young life. When she got to the age of 4, she was taken to another home where she was treated worse than what her mother was treating her, and she suffered abuse for the next 10 years of her life.

By the time she got through all that, she was severely traumatised. She was referred to Hagar. Well, she actually escaped the family on a bike and came to Hagar, where she went through a 12-year recovery period. I am telling you this in real brief here. Then she studied to become a social worker, as so many of our people want to do - to turn around and help others when they have struggled themselves.

She became a social worker and currently she works for Hagar. But the beautiful capstone of her story is that the Australian government was looking at bringing in a Modern Slave Act and they heard about her particular story - that she was a slave and that she could speak a little English and tell her story. So, she was flown from Cambodia to Canberra where she spoke to the Parliamentary Inquiry about her story. It was very powerful, and the parliamentarians told her that it had an impact on them. They are sure that that story has helped bring in changes to their legislation.

So, her story actually went out to 50 million people. From the background of shocking abuse - she was called the ugly one, she had to sell cakes every day in the market, if she did not sell them all, she was beaten. She actually told us - and I heard her story first-hand from her with about six others - she told us that, basically, she was beaten every day. Never allowed to play or be a child. She struggled, of course, with that. But has come through an incredible journey of recovery. Went through all the trauma counselling. Went through the training. And has got educated and is a shining beacon of hope now working to help others as a social worker.

We are just so incredibly proud of her. And I do not tell her details to look at the dark side. I tell them because her story is one of hope and dignity and courage.

That journey is with survivors, it is with migrants, it is mainly with women and girls. But a lot of what we do is to try and prevent trafficking and abuse from happening in the first case. We do that through the justice setting and some of our other ways of capacity building and training

other organisations around trauma. We work in those countries. Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore and Myanmar

Right now, New Zealand is looking at bringing in a Modern-Day Slavery Act. And you can actually take action and sign to encourage the government to bring in this act, which will address global supply chains in New Zealand and businesses that have to become more transparent. They say if you own a smartphone, wear cotton and eat chocolate, you probably have 23 slaves working for you.

I will end the discussion here.

CHAPTER NINE

Strategic Challenges in the South China Sea

Hunter Stires

I'll be speaking much more about the low end of the end competition continuum, namely the vital strategic challenge facing all of our countries in the Western Pacific - the Chinese threat to the freedom of the seas and the rule of international law in the South China Sea.

The concept I'll be presenting to you today is that of maritime insurgency and maritime counterinsurgency in the South China Sea. It seeks to reframe the Chinese challenge in that important part of the world and re-orient US and allied strategy to defeat it. I'm gratified that this is gaining increasing traction in US and allied capitals and had a successful prototype implementation by elements of the Pacific Fleet last year.

By way of a brief outline, we'll start with a brisk overview of why the Chinese challenge in the South China Sea constitutes an insurgency, how it operates, and why we should care. We'll then look at a couple of historical case studies that I think can guide our actions as we seek to formulate a response. And from there we'll move into what a strategy of maritime counterinsurgency really ought to look like - ends, ways and means that should guide the implementation of such a strategy, along with a brief look at that prototype I mentioned from last year. From there I hope we'll be able to transition to what I hope will be a robust discussion, and I look forward to benefiting from your perspectives.

So, when we think about the Chinese challenge, generally speaking the things that get the most attention are the big things. So, we hear a lot about China's development of anti-access and area denial capabilities. We hear a lot about the expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy and specifically in the realm of capital ships like carriers, cruisers and destroyers. And in Washington, we still hear a lot about island building, even though that horse has really bolted, frankly. The islands are completely built - they're done. The building is done, the fortification is pretty much complete too. They've started deployment to these platforms.

And really the focus has really turned to what has historically grabbed a lot of attention. And that is China's forcible coercion of local civilian mariners in South East Asia. Half the world's

fishing fleet operates in the South China Sea, and 3.7 million people that we know about depend on access to the South China Sea for their daily livelihoods. And these civilians are subjected to a concerted campaign of intimidation and harassment.

Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies interfere with the lawful operations of these local civilian mariners. In boarding operations, Chinese maritime law enforcement and maritime militia forces will steal a fisherman's catch. They will confiscate navigational and radio equipment. For at least ten years that we know about, Chinese forces would kidnap Vietnamese fishermen for ransom. And a Vietnamese scholar tells me that Chinese boarding parties would pour gasoline into the supplies of drinking water of Vietnamese fishermen to force them to go back to shore.

When you look at these actions, it's really hard not to come to the conclusion that this is not a campaign of state piracy. And as if that's not enough, we know very well that Chinese forces will ram and sink anybody who gets in their way. And they've done this on multiple occasions. They've done this with a vessel from the Philippines in June 2019. It's happened numerous times in the case of Vietnam, including as recently as April 2020. In total contravention of the fundamental law of the sea, Chinese forces will leave these civilian mariners whose vessel they have just sunk. They will leave them in the water to drown. In the case of the Filipino vessel, the Chinese maritime warship vessel backed over in the middle of the night, left it to sink, and drove away. The only reason everybody survived was because there was a Vietnamese vessel in the area that honoured its international commitments and came to the rescue.

So, what is going on here? What do we call this? I think it's important as we're analysing conflict to really break it down into its fundamental components - what I refer to as the prime factorisation of the conflict. And at its core, what we're seeing is a competition between two fundamentally different legal regimes and visions of maritime sovereignty.

One the one hand, you have the free and open vision that is espoused in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea known as UNCLOS. It's the vision of the freedom of the sea. It's the idea that the seas are open to everyone. And what national sovereignty there is, is based on possession of land. The other vision is China's notion that they characterise and capture in the phrase "blue national soil" which is the notion that you can claim maritime areas

like land. You can basically fence off a patch of ocean, stick a flag in it, even though it's nowhere near you.

And I think this map from the Economist really illustrates this conflict very well. In the dotted blue lines, you see the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones that would be in existence if the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were applied. It is 200 nautical miles from everyone's well established land territory. The South China Sea is roughly evenly divided based on those coastal holdings on land. And in red, you see China's nine dash line, where it claims indisputable sovereignty over 90% of the South China Sea. And it seeks to disenfranchise, as you can see, all of their coastal neighbours from their rightful claims. So, it advances this idea that you can fence off a patch of ocean, stick a flag in it, even if it's nowhere near you.

So, essentially, this structure I think is a helpful framework to analyse what really is going on here. If you're having this competition between these two legal regimes, we're really talking about who governs in a particular space or polity. When we talk about governance, the next step there is: well, how do we govern? Generally speaking, we translate political will into actionable law. When we're having a disagreement about who governs in a space or polity, we are really having a disagreement about whose laws are in force. And for a law to be enforced, it has to be generally accepted and, more importantly, adhered to in practice by the civilian population that it seeks to govern. So, if you're having a fight about who governs, you're really having a fight about whose laws are enforced, and at the end of the day what that comes down to is whose laws do the civilians follow. That is the metric of success and a mechanism of victory.

Generally speaking, there are two main approaches to waging one of these battles of legal regimes over whose laws do people follow. The first one is a sequential approach which we characterise as conventional warfare. You have your two belligerents and the civilian population they're fighting over. The belligerents get their militaries out, one side wins, the other side loses - they're destroyed or pushed back - and the winner of that confrontation - the military confrontation - sequentially, after the fight, imposes their laws on the civilian population.

The alternative is an indirect method, where if one belligerent knows “Okay, there is no way that I can possibly win a stand-up shooting fight with the other guy”, they have the option of declining battle. They can say, “I’m going to ignore the other guy’s conventional forces, and I’m actually going to focus all my efforts in imposing my laws on the civilian population we’re fighting over right now.” We generally characterise this as an insurgency.

I like to explain this dynamic with an allegory which is... imagine that you are living in a neighbourhood or on a street. You’re minding your own business. Life is fine. And then these guys show up. And they decide they really like your neighbourhood. They like it so much that they have decided it’s going to be their neighbourhood. And by the way, these guys - it doesn’t really matter who these guys are. It can be a drug cartel, it can be organised crime, it can be an insurgency like the Taliban or the Viet Cong... it can be Al Qaeda. It really does not matter. The insurgency is the same. They decide they like your street. They decide it’s going to be their street. And they decide that nobody gets to walk down the street. Nobody gets to patronise a business. Nobody gets to operate a business without acknowledging the authority of the gang - you know, very often by paying some form of taxes or protection money or otherwise.

Now, the law nominally says you can do any of those things and you don’t have to acknowledge their authority. But ultimately, if you are a civilian and you are trying to make decisions as to how you survive in this suddenly very problematic and contested environment... if the law says you can do what you want and it’s a free country and these guys say something different, what is really going to be the driver of your action is whether or not you can count on the local police and security forces to protect you from the reprisal of the gang should you choose to defy their will. Which means that if the police are really overburdened and all they send through your neighbourhood is one police cruiser for 10 minutes a day... yeah, the gang’s going to run away when they see the police cruiser coming. But if they’re only there 10 minutes a day, whose laws do you follow?

So, what ultimately gets at is China’s actions in the South China Sea are really, at their core, the definition of an insurgency. The Viet Cong followed this same rubric in Vietnam in terms of imposing rice taxes on South Vietnamese locals. And it’s what you see the Taliban doing in Afghanistan today, particularly with respect to women’s rights and the education of women.

So, a couple of key dynamics to think about. For starters, really, the name of the game is “Whose laws do the civilians follow?” The implication of that is the civilian behaviour is decisive. It is the civilians who decide which side wins. By extension, this means that the actions of the belligerent focused towards the civilians are going to be much more important than the actions they take against each other. If you think about it as... if the belligerent thinks about it as going toe to toe with the other guy, that is actually not necessarily the best approach. And the Chinese, more than anybody, they really recognise this. And that is why they have been spending so much of their time building up the largest coast guard in the world - the largest maritime militia in the world - and then turning those two very substantial forces against the 3.7 million people who are incredibly vulnerable, they depend on access to this critical body of water that the Chinese want, and they spend the most time - and more time than anyone, simply by virtue of sheer numbers, more than any navy and more than any transitory merchant traffic that is going point to point through the shipping lines - in the South China Sea.

And I think this picture really illustrates the predicament of these civilian mariners very well. Because when this is your reality day in and day out - you can see the rigging of the traditional Filipino fishing vessel in the foreground and the scary modern China Coast Guard vessel turning its water cannon on them in the background - when this your reality, and I like to point out note the empty horizon - no one is coming to save you - when this is your reality, whose laws do you follow?

And from the Chinese standpoint, this is very much in keeping with the Chinese strategic canon. The two major figures of that canon are Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong. Sun Tzu's number one precept is that when possible, winning without fighting is the height of strategy. Mao Zedong is the greatest insurgent in history. He talks about in terms gaining the support of the people, which a lot of Americans tend to misinterpret as “Oh, you need to get the people on your side. They need to like you.” That's not what he's talking about. That support can be co-opted, it can be coerced. It's really getting at whose laws do they follow and getting them to follow your laws and give you their resources and so forth. Really, the Chinese approach here is synthesizing these two thinkers and applying it to the maritime environment.

Now, why does this matter? Why should we care? For starters, the United States are our maritimes allies, we are the key stakeholders in a maritime order. Our security depends on the freedom of the sea to ensure our access across the economic domain, the political domain and,

yes, the military domain, to the overwhelming majority of the world's population, that leaves certainly outside the US homeland and what is effectively the island continent of North America, as well as a number of our key maritime partners to include Japan, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia... the list goes on. We depend on access to the sea for our security.

And fundamentally, the freedom of the sea is the foundational pillar of the post-WWII liberal rules based international order. When we talk about globalisation and that free and open order, what we are really talking about is this maritime order that is dependent on the freedom of the sea. And the freedom of the sea is a vital US international interest that the United States has gone to war over no less than six times since its founding - seven if you include the American Revolution. And I like to note that the principles of the freedom of the sea are referenced no less than three times in the Declaration of Independence itself.

So, if China is successful in undoing the freedom of the sea and if they are then successful in shifting trade ashore to the continental trade quarters they are building in the interior Belt and Road, the United States and our maritime partners will be left on the outside looking into what essentially constitutes a Eurasian continental system which is dominated by China. This is what Napoleon tried to achieve against Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. Of course, it didn't work because Britain had an overseas empire that they could continue to trade with. But imagine if there were no such other option for the United States and our allies. Essentially, we would be left with the unenviable options - in the face of threat to survival we could sail to war. We could submit to Chinese dictates. Or we could be left to wither on the world's economic and geopolitical periphery.

We must address this challenge. We must do it now. Because this is China's decisive line of effort. It is actively underway. And right now, the Department of Defence is really focused on preparing for the prospect of a large scale and high intensity war with China in about 10 to 15 years. If we do not solve this problem now of China's maritime insurgency to undo the freedom of the sea, which is seriously advanced, if we don't figure out this problem, we don't have to worry about a war. Because they will have won and we will have lost without so much as a shot being fired.

So, operationally, a couple quick notes as to how exactly the Chinese are putting this into action. So, for starters, the essential tenets of their strategy is that of a Cabbage Strategy - concentric rings of progressively stronger forces. You start in and amongst the civilian population - the lowest end, least expensive, most plentiful forces they have, their maritime militia, which they use specialised hulls that are either fishing vessels or converted vessels or designs derived from fishing vessels meant to look like fishing vessels... even though most of the time, they do not do a lot of fishing. Great example is Mischief Reef, the occupation of 220 maritime militia vessels which is going on right now. All these vessels are rafted up. They're not doing any fishing.

So, maritime militia is closest. They are supported over the horizon by the higher end coast guard assets of the China Coast Guard. And then over the horizon again are the military force of the People's Liberation Army.

In the event someone tries to intervene against the Chinese maritime militia or against genuine civilian Chinese fishing vessels, the Chinese have deployed a number of systems by these satellite navigation communication systems that integrates their maritime and fishing militia forces into the People's Liberation Army and China Coast Guard chains of command and control networks. So, if you have an intervention against a maritime militia or a fishing vessel, they can very quickly call it into a command centre in Hainan. They can vector in a China Coast Guard asset. Because let's face it, the China Coast Guard - yeah, they're big and numerically plentiful, but they're not everywhere. This allows them to be much more efficient in their deployment structure.

Then if you were to intervene kinetically, that's where the People's Liberation Army comes in. They've got service combatants along with those island bases that they've built up that position them to intervene decisively from over the horizon to prevail in any local kinetic engagement, should one develop.

The primary US challenge to this has been through the Freedom of Navigation Operations, where we will take a large service combatant - we will drive through - a path of disputed feature with whatever operational profile that we choose based on what legal claim we're trying to make. We drive through. They take one of their service combatants, they follow us through. They'll maybe send out a couple of radio warnings and tell us to leave. And then we leave.

And what essentially happens is the Chinese wave at us as we go by, and then as soon as we're once again over the horizon, they turn back to the civilians who have also watched us, and they say, "Okay. Back to business. We coerce you. We're in charge."

I like to explain one of the challenges that we run into here - not that FONOPs are bad - it's just that FONOPs alone are not going to act on the decisive mechanism of civilian behaviour. And I like to show this screenshot from *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance* - you know, the John Wayne and Lee Marvin and Jimmy Stewart movie from the Old West. Essentially, the US posture where we drive through and then we leave... when it comes to influencing civilian behaviour, it can almost be counter-productive. Because if you think about it, if John Wayne - the good guy - walks into the saloon to Lee Marvin - the guy in the black hat, the bad guy, naturally - and he says, "I really don't like what you're doing, how you're coercing poor old Jimmy Stewart down here. I think you ought to leave." Lee Marvin just looks at him and he says, "Well, I think you ought to leave." It's really not the best posture for John Wayne to go, "You know what? I was just leaving."

So, what do we do about this? Well, now, getting into some of those historical case studies. First one, I think that we can use to influence how we should be looking to think about this is the US Asiatic Fleet and its highly successful gray-zone deterrence campaign against the forces of Imperial Japan during the Japanese invasion of China between 1937 and 1940.

We know plenty about and there has been plenty of study done about China's invasion of Japan which was a full scale conventional war. What has received less attention is their sub-kinetic - their gray-zone campaign that they were pursuing simultaneously. So, below the threshold of armed conflict against the United States and western interests in China at the same time that they're prosecuting the kinetic campaign.

What winds up happening is this very savvy sailor diplomat named Harry Yarnell - he was only a four star admiral at the time - he's in charge of the Asiatic Fleet. And even though they are incredibly small, completely outmatched militarily, quantitatively and qualitatively in every possible respect... They are able to successfully deter Imperial Japanese aggression below the threshold of conflict by taking a remarkable forward leaning posture. He gives mission-type orders to tell them, "Listen, protect American interests." And from there, these forces are able to take potentially more assertive local action to protect American interests.

It is essentially a risk limiting strategy, such that if an incident does develop, Yarnell can say, “Listen, this was a local guy that messed up” or something like that. Essentially, the local commander can gain gains that Yarnell can pocket, and if something bad happens, he can say this was a local guy - this is not necessarily an act of national policy. Essentially, by sending forces to the point of gray-zone attack, he is able to really put enough steel in front of the Japanese to keep them from pushing - I’m reminded of that Leninist phrase about when you meet push, push, when you meet steel, stop. He put just enough steel in front of it that they can’t get what they want without actually killing somebody.

For the period that this campaign is being implemented, it is highly successful. It does require, of course, that this local gray-zone force be backed up with something really militarily credible so that they don’t just get run over. In this case, that was provided by the US Pacific Fleet in San Diego and later in Hawaii. Ultimately, this campaign has to stop for reasons that are not under their control. Namely, the fall of France in 1940 which convinces the Asiatic Fleet Commander that a real war is going to come and it’s going to be beyond the power of a gray-zone campaign to stop, so he pulls his fleet out to support a real war. But really, that is the result of conditions that are beyond the Asiatic Fleet’s direct influence.

The second case study that I would point to - and these are discussed, by the way, in ‘The South China Sea Needs a COIN Toss’ in the Naval Institute Proceedings, and they are discussed in even more detail in the article, ‘They Were Playing Chicken’, the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in the traditional land war counterinsurgency program in the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1971.

Essentially, a remarkable illustration of how an economy force - how working with local partners and allies can really raise your effectiveness and - similar to the Asiatic Fleet - really operating forward with relatively smaller forces can actually deliver outside gain. Essentially what the marines do in order to protect these local civilian populations in South Vietnam, they put a small group - a squad of marines - together with a larger group of a local defence militia. And together, these forces are much more effective than either would be individually. Because the United States brings all of our cool toys - all our common enablers like artillery, air support, logistics, supply chains, all those good things and related kinds of capabilities - whereas the popular forces bring the local knowledge and the determination to defend home.

What this allows the Americans to create is a sense of credible permanence in the eyes of the civilian population. This stands in contrast to the large scale operations and was largely successful in defining US operations through - the main state of US operations - where essentially you take a bunch of guys and we sweep through a village and spend maybe eight hours a month in a given village. Now, of course, the threat is like 12 guys with guns. So, as we were talking about earlier, those 12 guys with guns know that they can't possibly win a gun fight against a battalion of 800 soldiers. No way. So, when the battalion comes through, they skip town. And as soon as the battalion moves on not long later, they come back and continue coercing the civilian population. It's worse than if we had done nothing.

The Marine Corps Rifle Squad and the Combined Action Platoon - they live in these villages. Again, it's that credible permanence. And the effects really show. Where you not only have a maximum US economy of force - essentially an input of its height - it was 2200 marines, one rival battalion in the marines. They yield a combined force of 20 thousand riflemen, which is the same number of riflemen as an entire marine corps division. Using the immediately flawed statistics in use at the time, you had measurably higher degrees of civilian population security, proportionally you had half the casualty rate among the Combined Action Platoon as in the wide scale search and destroy operations, and proportionally twice the casualties inflicted on the insurgent.

Synthesizing these two cases into what a strategy of maritime counterinsurgency should look like for our current predicament. Briefly, ends, ways and means. For starters, in terms of some of the takeaways, as we synthesize this... first things first, drive from the Asiatic Fleet case. We think about, "Okay, what if the Chinese decide to make a move in some local military engagement or something like that?" Well, the thing is right now, as long as we're able to maintain a credible deterrence posture as Mr Roberts was discussing just now - as long as we can maintain that credible deterrence posture - as long as the Chinese decide that their interests are best pursued short of war, they're going to be similarly constrained as we are.

Which means that if we focus all of our energy on preparing for that great power war and essentially adopt a deterrence by punishment model, that's not necessarily going to be very successful. You have to have a combination of deterrence by denial with deterrence by punishment. At the same time, in order to achieve the credible permanence, you have to achieve

essentially an economy of force. If you work with local partners, you're going to be a lot more effective than if you work by yourself.

Ends - you have to protect the local civilian mariners from Chinese depredations on their international legal rights. Really focus in on that credible permanence in the eyes of the civilians and their governments in turn. To do that, you have to use maximum US economies of force. That means you have to really try to avoid constraining the capital ship fleet which is over working as it is. At the same time, you have to maintain a militarily credible warfighting posture to deter any attacks on that full deterrence force.

In terms of ways, that means that how we plan a fight - that deterrence by punishment strategy - needs to be influenced by how we're going to be postured short of war, what we're now calling the competition phase. This notion that we just sit back and shoot long range missiles at the Chinese is not an option. You've got to fight forward. Conversely, you have to make sure that how you're postured short of war is positioning yourself for success in the event of kinetic exchange. That means you need to be able to with that forward force to rapidly transition from the gray-zone to the offensive - in that competition stage to the conflict stage - very quickly and inflict disproportionate damage early on in a fight. And then your associated logistics and basing - that needs to be a way of preparing the ground for your big war fighting force to come in and ultimately carry the day.

So, means. You have to essentially - right now, the US force with that Freedom of Navigation Operations model, that's really focused on essentially periodic high end presence. What we need is to add persistent low end presence as a complement to the current model. That means you've got small risk worthy units, agile logistics to support and maintain them. There's been plenty of other gray-zone maritime confrontations. The Cod Wars is a really good example, where essentially a critical thing that you need to be thinking about in terms of ship design, you're probably going to want a strong hull. Because bumper boats are where a lot of these gray-zone confrontations go out. And likewise, you're going to want a strong gun armament because a lot of these encounters are going to be happening within missile range and within gun range. You want to be able to fight and win in that very short range of exchange. Then in order to be able to transition rapidly to a counterattack in the event that they decide to attack you, that's where you want a lot of offensive high end ships and missiles.

Likewise, you want some kind of covering force to protect those guys. That's where those capital ships, if you happen to have a carrier group rotating through - an expeditionary strike group - destroyers, frigates, etc. Then perhaps one of the best options would be to implement the marine corps concept of expedition against base operations and have forces able to join in from key maritime terrain nearby.

In terms of ships that could be used for this... things like the Japanese Hayabusa class or the Korean KPG class. The Koreans have a very good design philosophy of putting the biggest gun that will fit on the smallest ship that will take it because they got into a couple of gun fights about 20 years ago - they didn't like the outcome because their ships did not have a large enough gun. The current ship as we'll see in a moment has already proven itself very viable in a maritime counter insurgency operation. And the Mark VI patrol boat - those kinds of smaller assets are very useful especially closer to shore, in amongst a lot of fishing boats - that would be a good addition to the mix as well, especially within that 200 nautical mile range - exclusive economic zone range from its main operating base.

So, a very clear overview of the prototype implementation from last year. A number of you probably heard about the West Capella incident where the Malaysians had contracted a hydrocarbon survey ship to do a survey of the exclusive economic zone. The Chinese decided in about April of 2020 to start harassing these guys with their maritime militia, and the China Coast Guard harassed the main ship as well as its supply vessels as well as bring in a survey ship to do their own survey inside the Malaysian EEZ in complete transgression of international law.

The first thing that we did - essentially Task Force 76 - its strike group centered on USS America which is capable of carrying the F35 and, as you can see, had F35s embarked, supported by a cruiser and a destroyer as well as an Australian frigate, as you can see on the left. They essentially came south and they sort of established an initial US presence. Again, these are high end assets. These are capital ships. Initially, they can only stay a relatively short period of time. The [unclear 1.24.02] navy sends a force of similar size and capability to shadow them. And eventually these capital ships - they're busy, they've got a schedule to keep, they've got Freedom of Navigation Operations to conduct - there's the Taiwan Strait transit to do - and they actually have to go home. So, eventually they move north after a couple of days.

Initially, the reaction is “Oh no, here we go again with the high end model” of essentially the John Wayne and Lee Marvin model of “We were just leaving anyway.” But then we do something a little different. Task Force 76 starts bringing in its combat ships - which we happened to have two based in Singapore at that time. I really love this picture of USS Montgomery, as you can see, on the way to rescue of the Malaysia charter ship in the background there. The Pacific Fleet Commander and the Striker Commander all put out excellent public statements saying that we are committed to the freedom of the sea, millions of people depend on access to these bodies of water for their livelihoods. We’re saying the right things and - more importantly - we continue to come back. We send in the other combat ship, USS Gabrielle Giffords armed at the naval strike missile. Very much a high end combat capability right there.

And the Chinese noticeably back down. Their public statements are very demure, they really aren’t about picking a fight. They say the situation is improving. They do not counter escalate. And ultimately, the survey ship is able to conclude its operations as previously scheduled despite this build up of Chinese pressure.

Then there is a subsequent - just very briefly - one more incident later on in the summer, where a Chinese survey ship. They essentially try to run the same playbook on the Vietnamese EEZ, where they sent in an illegal survey ship of their own to do a hydro-carbon survey of the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone. The Vietnamese Coast Guard mobilises a response, and then here’s the USS Gabrielle Giffords that comes in once again. And we put up the helicopters - you can see them - and we take a bunch of pictures and put them online that’s showing the Gabrielle Giffords circling the Chinese vessel at very close range. And what’s really remarkable is the Chinese ship in a couple of days goes home without conducting the survey.

It shows that this concept is workable - it shows success. That if you adopt that kind of forward posture backed up by that higher end combat capability over the horizon, you can do it. So now, the question that we’re starting to work through is how do we do this at greater scale, more systematically, and with that, I will conclude and turn it over to questions.

Concluding Remarks

Dr Barnaby Pace

It is my honour and privilege to do the closing remarks for the conference today. I thought that would be easy at the end of the day and see how we go. As the day was progressing, I started realizing that this is actually going to be more and more difficult for me to do. So, before I get started, I will just make a few disclaimers just in case you have any trouble that may occur later.

My first disclaimer is that I am not a military person. I am a psychologist. The evidence of this fact will manifest through some of the comments in these closing remarks. My second disclaimer is that I am an academic. I made multiple notes over the course of the day. My third disclaimer is that I am a PhD holder and I have organized all that I have written during the day. So, we will see how it goes. And my final disclaimer is that I am a father of five children.

. What I tend to do, with all the topics we have covered is to distil what are the key factors that we have talked about today. The first thing that I want to do is to rethink the type of [inaudible] national security and the global arena. I would like to change it to national security in a global arena. I think a lot of the topics that we have covered have been of an international nature, not just the national. I would like to read from an academic point of view. I think from topics that we have covered today; three things stand out. The first thing that stands out for me is that a lot of what we have been talking about comes back to the people. And it comes back to the relationships we have with other people and how we understand those people. Everyone here has got their own psychological system. This drives your behaviour your mode of thinking. So, what do we need to do from this point of view of addressing some of the security issues? t We need to understand that we hold many beliefs about people all the time that are not appropriate.

So, I have got my tuxedo on. I wear it every day. So, I am going to walk you in the direction pointing at the mode of behaviour and culture of other people. Now, in order to do that, I have

got a story to tell you. Like I said, I am a dad of five, I am really good at stories. And it is just about story time for my three-year-old. But this time, it is the story of the cave. Now, this is one of Plato's stories that some of you might be familiar with. I would like all of you to close your eyes for a moment and imagine the following scenario. I want you to imagine that you are sitting in a cave, and you can only look at the back wall of that cave. You cannot look at elsewhere because your whole world is that one wall. But behind you, there is a wall and behind the wall there are some people walking with puppets. But all you can see on the wall are the tall shadows of these puppets. Your world is black and white, and your world is two dimensional.

Now, imagine that you managed to free yourself from this environment, you escape from the cave, and you emerge and come out into a three-dimensional coloured environment. And this is different from the previous world you know. Would you be able to accept the world that you have just been exposed to and go about challenging the beliefs and values that you previously held and cherished as sacrosanct. More importantly, if you are able to accept this new environment, will you be able to go back to your fellow captives and explain it to them that their beliefs in the cave are all wrong? So, imagine you are in this situation. You have found yourself a new environment. All of a sudden, you have new beliefs and new values. More importantly, you need to take those new beliefs and instil them in your fellow captives who have not had the experience of this environment outside the cave.

You can think about this situation and link it up with your position in the world. For instance, when you come in contact with new people and their different cultures, this is what you are doing. You are taking on new values, you are taking on new beliefs. And I think this is critically important for us. when we are addressing issues of a security nature, as we have been doing today. You can open your eyes now, for those that have not done so already. The lessons that this imaginary situation bring up relates with a lot of what we have talked about today. The first of these is uncertainty. And I have got that cliché written down here, that the only certainty in the world is uncertainty. But the pertinent questions are: how are we going to address this problem of uncertainty? How are we going to manage it? The other issue that has arisen today is change. Change is all around us, and again, another cliché; the only constant in the world is change. Again, how do we manage and how do we address this?

And this brings me to my next story. And this is a story of a maze. And again, some of you may have heard this. There is a maze, and in the maze, there are two mice. And the mice are called Sniff and Scratch. Also in the maze, there are two small, tiny people. And they are called Hem and Haw. Anyone heard the story? No? Great. Sniff and Scratch and Hem and Haw live in the maze. They have big houses, and they have a supply of food, (i.e., cheese). Every day, they need to go from their houses through the maze, have the cheese and then go home, rest and repeat the following day. Sniff and Scratch are keen, eager, agile. And every day, they explore the maze. They find their food and then go back home. Hem and Haw have decided they know where the cheese is. They know where the food is, they take a more relaxed approach, so they do not have to get out early, they do not bother putting on their running shoes. They wander off to find the cheese at some point during the day, but they are not very aware of the environment around them.

However, one day, Hem and Haw realized that the stockpile of cheese they relied on is gone. Suddenly, they do not know what to do. Their world has changed but they did not see it coming. They were unaware of the signs around them, they were unaware of uncertainty that characterized the world they lived. They could have used their time, and their agile nature for getting better awareness of the world around them and possibly could have found another source of cheese. So, it ended in a disaster for them. So, what does this story tell us? It tells us that we need to be aware of our environment, we need to be aware of uncertainty surrounding our world and we need to be aware of the inevitability of change and how to get prepared for it.

Now we have also talked about some models that we could use around us. One of the ones that stand out for me, was the 3D model, which according to my notes, that is if I get it right, is diplomacy, development and defense. Now I got a little niggles in my ear when I heard this because I have come across something very similar before. We are in New Zealand, we are in a bicultural community, and we have a lovely document which I am going to take the principles of because I do not want [inaudible] about the implementation of it. But we have a document called the Treaty of Waitangi. Within that document, we have some foundational principles. Those principles are participation, protection, and partnership. And I think we can use those

principles in our work, in our relationship building and in the work we do here. And we could use those principles to make sure that the relationships we have and the relationships we develop and the work we do adheres to them. And I think it is reasonably steady for now if we did that. Thanks very much.

PART II

Strategic Thinking and Leadership, and Strengthening Security Resiliency Through Partnerships and Alliances

CHAPTER TEN

MGen Karsten Stoye

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Strengthening Security Resiliency Through Partnerships and Alliances

General Paolo Ruggiero

Ladies and gentlemen, ambassadors, generals and my dear colleagues. Good morning. I am General Paolo Ruggiero from the Italian Army. It is a great privilege for me to be here today, even though I cannot be physically present. And thanks to the Asia Pacific Security Innovation Forum for these opportunities. And allow me to thank you, in particular, Dr. Anita Abbott, the committee chair of the APSIS Forum for their kind gestures.

After the first day of this forum focused on the impact of emerging risks to national security, today's discussion will be about how we can better cope with these new challenges by strengthening security networks through partners and allies. With this presentation, my intent is to tell you why it is important to count on a stronger and wider network of partners for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and how we can strengthen the relationship in the future.

First, I would like to start by giving you some insights about Bekerman's transformation in the north of Virginia. Then, I will briefly describe the main issues of the current international security scenario from a legal standpoint. Subsequently, I will explain why partnerships are important in security, resilience and how our alliances are formed through this relationship.

Finally, before concluding, I will briefly focus on the Asia-Pacific region, its growing strategic interests and the existing relationship with it. If NATO has been successful for more than seven years, it is because the alliance constantly transforms and adapts itself in response to a changing world and to its new security challenges. The capacity to transform and to adapt perfectly sums up the mission essence of the transformation.

I am glad to have this opportunity to inform you about ACT rules and the added value it brings to the alliance. ACT leads the adaptation of the alliance military, coordinating nation efforts to

ensure coherence, interoperability and standardization among the forces. ACT has a complementary role with a lack of [inaudible], best known as SHAPE, which is the second strategic command of our alliance. While SHAPE has the war fighting command, it identifies the military operational requirements. ACT has the warfare development demands, transforms these requirements into capabilities through a developmental process, from the general concept to the project definition, the experimentation and finally the acquisition.

A complementary role between SHAPE and ACT ensures that the alliance is always relevant, credible and ready with its forces in order to maintain its advantage over any potential adversaries. Let me just sum up some of ACT's main tasks to contribute to this effort. In ACT we regularly investigate any global situation, understand the shape, the future security environment, analysing strategic horizons, identifying trends, risks and challenges. We assess threats and develop opportunities to support our political leaders in their decisions with strategic military advice to better shape our response. We deliver entirely tangible outputs in terms of capabilities, equipment, training and doctrine for the war fighters.

We are living entities for innovation by introducing new ways of research and experimentation of new technologies such as artificial intelligence. In the support of the development of new military capabilities, we set standards and ensured interoperability and readiness of location and training of military and civilian personnel to organize the alliance's military culture. We are the leading NATO's defense planning forces, and we support SHAPE in its operations with two training centres. GWC in Norway and JFTC in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon. We connect and implement the ideas and suggestions from our thirty allied nations and from our partners, from the military to the civilian sectors, including different organizations, start-ups, academia, research and development centers in order to ensure maximum exchange and confrontation.

Finally, we coordinate the unique network of 29 NATO-accredited Centers of Excellence, and we are connected to 33 partner training and education centers. Let me really say that in all these areas of interest, cooperation with partners is extremely important. Sharing information, principles and approaches such as the application of the use of new technologies on military

efforts. As you will know, NATO is a political and military alliance that guarantees the security and freedom of 30 countries, their territories and then one million citizens sharing the same values of democracy, individual liberty, human rights and the rule of law.

Unity, solidarity, information sharing, are the centre of gravity for this organization. For almost 70 years, NATO has succeeded in preventing conflict and preserving peace. However, including the last two decades, NATO external security environment has radically changed. The alliance must be able to fulfil its mission: the defense of unifying the area in a world of increased geopolitical competitions and growing challenges to international law. And our states, increasing their global influence both economically and militarily to states and non-state actors. Uncertainties and instabilities are growing beyond our borders. Regional conflicts, global peace, terrorism and criminal organizations continue to increase the regular flow of immigration, refugees and illegal smuggling.

Lastly, persistent transnational challenges such as organized crime, economic instability, climate change, social disparities, natural disasters and pandemic diseases have increased the uncertainty and complexity of our security environment. These recurring activities will change the linear understanding of peace, crises and conflict spectrums. The operating environment is becoming boundless and demanding that we think more broadly. The result is that today, the notion of an error operation and error responsibility is less clear. Given the complexity of these scenarios in such a fast-changing world, no individual country or organization can single-handedly master or risk or build the tools to do so.

To improve our security resilience, we need to think globally, and we need to draw on our core and greatest threat. We must do it together as an alliance and with our like-minded partners. It is why after collective defense and deterrence and crisis management, comparative security is NATO's third essential task. Within NATO governmental security activities, partnership programs are crucial instruments of knowledge and information, shared military cooperation and capacity building. As stated by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's secretary general; when we work together, we are stronger and more capable of managing the difficulties we face together. This cooperation essentially contributes to the success of NATO in many operations.

However, it is also important to address their security problems and improve their resilience. The importance of reaching out to countries and organizations across the globe was underlined in the NATO strategic concept adopted in November 2010, at Lisbon summit. Since then, NATO has constantly revised its policy of engagement with partners. These include other international actors and organizations, such as the UN, European Union, the OSCE and the African Union.

The strategic objectives of NATO partnership policies are an answer to international security, peace and stability, promote regional security and cooperation. Facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation of issues of common interest. Bring back an interest in eligible nations for NATO membership; promote democratic values and institutional reform, especially in the defense and security sector. And then provide support for NATO-led operation and mission, enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning to prevent the crisis, build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding. In addition to NATO's role and activities, enhancing public diplomacy is a priority.

Cooperation with partners remains for NATO of utmost importance in order to strengthen common resilience against any kind of new security challenge, from anticipating future scenarios to exploding new trends and new technologies, from education to training, it will always be extremely important to work together. With each partner nation that has access to the full range of activities offered through the NATO individual partnership cooperation program, it is possible to choose the areas, the scope and intensity where partners wish to engage with NATO in a spirit of mutual benefit and reciprocity. For instance, education and training are key pillars of these programs, helping to improve the ability of NATO's partner countries, so as to be able to work together at all levels through the military training and exercise program.

NATO builds and maintains readiness and interoperability with partners choosing events that are appropriate with individual training and education needs, allows partners to get familiar with NATO standards and procedures and to prepare for future cooperation in operations.

Together, we can build up a better understanding of the increasingly complex security environment. Together, we can use all our tools to build security resilience. Going back to the strategic security environment that I described before, it is evident that the major political changes that are influencing the global geopolitical landscape are also affecting the Asia-Pacific region. The challenges related to the international rules-based order faced by the Atlantic region and, the Asia-Pacific are increasingly converging.

Because of the potential effects of growing geopolitical competition, this is raising its attention to this portion of the hemisphere. From a more assertive Russia with its continued investments in nuclear weapons and proactive military activities, to China, that is growing both in economic strength and military power projection, these dynamics call for enhanced cooperation and dialogue between NATO and the Asia-Pacific partners. In the recently published NATO 2030 strategic documents, the alliance worked through the challenges and opportunities presented by the Asia-Pacific region and focuses on how NATO can take a more global approach, including the increase in engagements with countries who share the same values of democratic freedom, rules of law and human rights.

In this regard, NATO continues its political dialogue with Asia-Pacific partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. For the first time, Australia participated in a NATO defense ministerial meeting last October. And in December, Australia, Japan and Korea participated in their first NATO foreign ministerial meeting. Australia-New Zealand also continue their valuable contributions to the NATO-led resolute support mission in Afghanistan. In addition, the Republic of Korea and Japan continue to be the major contributors to NATO-run Afghan National Army Trust fund.

As you can see, ladies and gentlemen, there is much to do to successfully operate in developing security environment. It is not just about forces and technologies alone. It is about how we think, organize and act in the face of persistent, simultaneous challenges. NATO has been the strongest and most successful political military alliance for more than 70 years. In order to improve our security decisions, we need to think globally, and we need to draw on our core and greatest strength, doing it together as an alliance and with our like-minded partners. NATO remains the idea of forum for alliance and partners, for political dialogue and practical

cooperation to share common values, discuss different approaches of specific topics relevant to the converging interests.

This would also include working together to support and enable broader discussions, joint assessments, exchange of information and best practices, exercises and common approaches to relevant issues such as defense, applications of emerging and disruptive technologies, space, global arms control, cyber and security of critical infrastructure and assets. Our potential opponents are not going to relent but they will continue to explore and exploit our weaknesses. If we are not ready together and defend our free and democratic institutions, our citizens, our way of life will be compromised. The reality is, ladies and gentlemen, Day Zero is every day. The COVID pandemic has shown that we need to be ready for the unthinkable and to be prepared for the worst. And as the Secretary General said, NATO's core mission continues preventing disease and deterring aggression on land, at sea, in the air and space in cyberspace, of pandemics to infodemics, cyber-attacks to climate change - our world keeps on changing and nature is changing with it. To manage these difficult challenges, there is no better way than working together. Thank you very much for your kind attention.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Implications of hybrid threats for the Australian Defence Force

Dr Andrew Dowse

Kia Ora to my Kiwi friends and summit participants. It is a pleasure to join you from an early morning here in Perth, Western Australia. Congratulations are needed for organizing another summit yet again. I am going to speak today on hybrid warfare and its implications for Australia. Now, hybrid warfare refers to the use of nonconventional methods, such as cyber warfare as part of a multi domain war fighting approach to disrupt and disable an opponent's actions. Russia's approach to Ukraine is an example of this form of warfare that involves a combination of activities, including disinformation, economic manipulation, use of properties and insurgencies, diplomatic pressure and military actions. Consistent and enduring definitions for hybrid warfare remain elusive, but typically involve a threat that transcends a blend of regular and irregular warfare. In 2007, Frank Hoffman, the leader in this field, defined a hybrid threat as an adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, catastrophic terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain desired political objectives. Hoffman noted that these threats can be created by a state actor using a proxy force with substantial potential for criminal and socially disruptive behaviour.

However, he emphasized that the key hybrid warfare is diffusion of advanced military capabilities with irregular forces and tactics. Robert Johnson from Oxford's Changing Character of War program, has suggested that the hybrid warfare concept is one in which norms in war, including the law of armed conflict, are circumvented. Since 2012, the US Department of Defense has recognized the limitation of a strategy that was biased towards conventional warfare. Even before that, key leaders in the US military recognized that limitation. For example, in 2005, the then Lieutenant General, Jim Mattis, wrote about the rise of hybrid wars. In 2019, Sascha Bachmann, Håkan Gunneriusson and I wrote about how China was learning from Russia's successes in hybrid warfare. Hoffman has noted the potential for Russia in turn to learn from China's activities in the South China Sea. Russia uses the terminology of non-

linear warfare, whereas China's doctrine is built upon the concept of unrestricted warfare. Ross Babbage has written extensively on China's hybrid warfare efforts.

So, what I was just about to talk about - Ross Babbage noted that in Western countries, hybrid warfare capabilities are rather rudimentary or do not exist. Now, that should ring alarm bells in the Australian Department of Defense, yet there is no mention of hybrid threats or hybrid warfare in the 2020 defense strategic update. Indeed, there is also no mention in any publicly accessible Australian defense documentation, except for the chief of Defense Force, Angus Campbell's speech in 2019 on the topic of war in 2025. In that speech, his reference to hybrid warfare was in relation to the need for Australia to do something about political warfare in the grey zone, suggesting that such labels as hybrid warfare were terrible, but not actually considering the substance or implications of hybrid threats. So, he, like many others, used these terms interchangeably, which perhaps detracts from the discourse and results in a focus on the labels rather than what we mean by them and why they are important. The grey zone, perhaps, is a simpler concept with a more universally agreed definition in terms of the conduct of activities below the threshold of physical violence.

Grey zones are operations that subvert, erode and undermine breaking international rules and norms, but ones that in the eyes of the targeted state falls short of requiring a war response. They include coercive actions, influence activities, foreign interference, theft of IP and cyber-attacks. So, the way that I like to think about the grey zone, essentially to flip the words of Clausewitz, that the grey zone is a continuation of warfare by other means. The grey zone is certainly something that has got the attention of Australia's Department of Defense with substantial focus in its 2020 strategic update. Significantly, that update highlighted national critical infrastructure as priority targets of grey zone threats, as well as the potential for such activities to be a precursor to more conventional conflict. That is, grey zone activities may be undertaken not only to achieve outcomes without the need for conventional conflict but might be undertaken to unbalance and disable our forces to reduce our ability to defend an attack.

Now, this is a critical point in relation to both hybrid warfare and the grey zone to reflect upon. Hybrid warfare is a deliberate strategy that extends across the continuum of conflict. This helps to explain Australia's strategic update that drew attention not only to the conduct of grey zone activities at one end of the continuum, but at the other end the increasing risk of high intensity conflict. Indeed, the risk of high-end conflict is considered so great that the update explicitly

acknowledged that strategic warning is no longer an appropriate basis for defense planning. Australia has traditionally relied upon a ten-year warning time for major conflict, which has implications of where we have garrison forces, how they are trained and equipped, stockholding and preparedness and so on. So, in this way, the new reality of our deteriorated strategic environment has a lot of implications for our defense forces. To me, the feature of hybrid warfare is the coordination of different ways and means towards a convergence end or outcome. It presents a challenge to our defense force in four ways.

Firstly, as opposed to conventional wars, sequential progression of a planned strategy by opposing sides, the aptly differentiated non-linear warfare or hybrid warfare features the simultaneous deployment of multiple complementary military and nonmilitary warfare tactics. The threat of conventional warfare in conjunction with psychological, economic, political and cyber assaults creates tension between dealing with the grey zone while also preparing for conflict. This represents a substantial test in our attention. However, the prospect of multiple simultaneous attacks represents a concurrency challenge. And one that, if we are not careful, would result in confusion, disorder and an impact on our prospects for mission success.

Second, the shift from linear to non-linear may complicate typical planning methods. The surprise and asymmetry associated with hybrid warfare might give the adversary the initiative, putting friendly forces into a defensive reactive mode. In such a mode, a lack of anticipation may make friendly decision cycles slow, especially as we attempt to identify suitable responses. For example, whether to respond kinetically to a non-kinetic attack and associated considerations of proportionality and necessity.

Thirdly, hybrid threats will take the indirect approach, as per the strategy described by Basil Liddell Hart. The breadth of targets, including the impact on critical services and public opinion, raised the prospect of our defense forces being distracted, outflanked and affected by these threats. The targeting of such non-military targets within a military campaign is certainly not unprecedented, but it is going to raise questions about responsibilities for protecting and responding to such attacks. Additionally, one might consider the lure of requisite variety and the advantages that would be conferred both by having defensive mechanisms with as much variety as the threats themselves, as well as importantly, by employing effective coordination of such defensive efforts.

Fourthly, what really makes hybrid warfare and the grey zone different and of greater concern than any other form of warfare throughout history is the rise of the dominance of the information environment. Modern technologies integrate systems across the information, cognitive and physical domains. This integration creates the duality of value as well as vulnerability that can be exploited. The increasing dominance of the information environment is driven by hyper-connectivity in the fourth industrial revolution, with cyber physical systems allowing information systems to control actions in the physical world. At the same time, we are seeing advances in information technology, the ability to manipulate information and the broad adoption of social media. That means that cognition is readily controlled by the information environment.

Therefore, information warfare has been empowered with control of the information environment, conferring absolute control over all domains. This influence and centrality of the information environment in warfare as it is in broader society, shifts IW from an enabling component of traditional warfare with physical activity and kinetic effects having primacy to one in which gaining an information advantage, in itself, can be singularly decisive. Superiority in the information environment creates an advantage and awareness but can also create military advantage by disabling or misguiding physical systems or by influencing the condition of warriors, leaders and citizens. The power of IW is amplified through its ability to achieve objectives at minimum risk and cost, making cyber operations and disinformation the key weapons in grey zone hybrid warfare. The increased reach of its effects, as well as the ambiguity of laws and ability to attribute makes defending against information warfare a difficult challenge that we are not prepared for.

Increased autonomy supporting cyber-attacks and influenced activities means that they can achieve mass destruction in their impact, whether that be on the systems we rely upon or on global and domestic opinion. It can also make it difficult for us to detect such attacks, let alone defend against them. So, we have a problem in which other nations are developing ways to pursue objectives outside of conventional conflict. David Kilcullen, in his excellent recent work entitled *The Dragons and the Snakes*, describes efforts over the past two decades by state and non-state adversaries to develop asymmetric strategies to confound, surprise, frustrate and ultimately to defeat the West's conventional technology advantage. He suggested that overconfidence and lack of insight could mark the decline of Western dominance unless Western militaries adapt to the changing nature of warfare. Similarly, Robert Johnson believes

that hybrid methods exploit the contradictions and fissures of Western society in order to counter Western dominance. State and non-state armed actors will develop more clandestine, unconventional and illegal methods such as the ones currently described as hybrid or unrestricted.

So, how shall we counter hybrid warfare? Hoffman states that hybrid warfare necessitates more than traditional military strategy responses and a focus on special forces. He suggested a broader framework for conflict short of violent warfare that incorporates a wider range of tools. For example, think about how we counter manipulation of elections. How do we deal with cyber-attacks and deliberate use of false information to sow discord? Robert Johnson said that the discussion of hybrid threats has created a sense of disorientation and a desire for urgent remedies. This has led to a focus on technical solutions and an escalation of existing techniques, existing techniques such as more air power, more special forces, and the recruitment of local forces en-masse. He said these may or may not prove effective at the tactical level.

In essence, he said they merely produce more of this type of warfare that characterizes the present. So, Johnson and Hoffman both agree that we need to get beyond the operational and tactical perspective and concentrate on the strategic domain. Nations that breach peremptory norms might best be compelled to desist through strategic penalties from sanctions, diplomatic condemnation, isolation and posturing, including in conjunction with allies and like-minded partners. At the operational level, little has changed, it remains necessary to identify through analysis the critical centres of gravities. It remains vital to initiate shaping operations to manoeuvre, including interference with enemy communications and to deploy fires including against information targets, the possibility of non-kinetic force and the need to protect one's own forces. Indeed, centre of gravity analysis, arguably, is more important than ever before, as the complexity and immediacy of this broader array of threats demand a more considered approach to the protection of one's own equities and the options for retrieving effects. Appeal also from military planners and commanders is to embrace the fact that adversaries will act with asymmetry. They will employ actions to unbalance and surprise. Our military forces need to shift from a bias towards the system of use and a focus on probable events based upon recent experiences towards an anticipation of adversarial acts based upon motivation, plausibility and risk.

As I wrote in the most recent issue of the Journal of Indo Pacific Affairs, a reinvigorated approach to scenario planning is needed to develop organizational adaptability and resilience in the face of these diverse threats. Hoffman identifies four ways in which we can counter hybrid threats. First, he suggests that we must consider the political dynamics of conflict. That is, what are the political aims of an adversary? What are the ends, not just the ways and means by which the adversary will employ violence? Critically, we need to shift our thinking from how the adversary employs violence to also consider the why, which is more important to countering hybrid strategies. Secondly, he recommends better intelligence of the doctrine of major competitors, evaluating their history, their culture and the ways in which the adversary might employ power against our seams and gaps. Thirdly, once we have a better understanding of the threat, it is important to review organizational responsibilities for intelligence, analysis, coordination and response. And fourthly, Hoffman suggests a greater focus on multidimensional partnerships.

Complex contingencies require effective cooperation between agencies within the private sector and with international partners. Complex problems will require more than just military might. As per my previous comment on requisite variety, they will be best addressed through equally inventive solutions, drawing upon the full spectrum of stakeholders and expertise. So, whereas most of the commentaries so far are focused on the "so what" of hybrid threats, particularly to the US, it also applies to other nations. Now, I would like to focus on the "so what" of hybrid threats to Australia. For the past two decades, the Australian Defense Force (ADF), like many other nations, has maintained a high commitment to operations, particularly counterinsurgency operations. Over such a long period, a generation, it would be understandable to some extent for the force structure to incrementally adapt to that prevailing activity. After all, high end weapons systems are expensive and difficult to justify when the adversary is not sophisticated. The strategic environment is relatively stable, and you live in a country that is relatively isolated from immediate threats.

However, over this period, the ADF has increased its capability to align with a high intensity threat. The Australian defense budget has been increasing over this time, increasing to over two percent of a growing GDP. And because of that growing GDP, by the time the coalition government has been in power for a decade, which will be in 2023, our defense budget will have doubled over that time. The Royal Australian Air Force has become a more potent force, including fifth generation combat aircraft, as well as a force multiplier such as electronic

warfare, refuelling and early warning and control aircraft. It has also increasingly invested in uncrewed aircraft, including the new Loyal Wingman platform that will augment the combat force. Our Navy is expanding its service fleet with an intent to double the number of submarines and add a range of advanced guided missiles to protect projected force and to enhance strike options. Future investment into land forces will be directed to enhance mobility, firepower, protection and situational awareness to allow them to rapidly deploy where they are needed to achieve the ambitions and return home safely.

So, all that investment was essentially the acknowledgment of the emerging deterioration of the security environment. It provided deterrence against aggression and options for government in the event of a situation that involves high end conflict. With the acquisition of platforms such as additional C17 aircraft and the Canberra class LHD amphibious assault ships, the investment also recognized the growing incidence of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. However, I believe that may not have adequately considered the risk of hybrid threats. In the middle of 2019, a mobilization review was undertaken for the ADF, the outcome of which was reported by the ABC News in May last year under a Freedom of Information request. Review revealed deep concerns that Australia's planning for modern, unconventional warfare and crises was inadequate, it found out, in particular, that Australia was significantly vulnerable to cyber-attacks, finding that the targets would not just be computer systems, but a range of targets across the economy and society, including the potential for impacts on critical infrastructure and the beliefs of the population.

Not long after that story broke out, the prime minister announced the need for greater investment into cyber security following prolonged cyber-attacks by a sophisticated state actor. The following month, defense released its 2020 strategic update and new forward structure plan. In the strategic update, there were references to relevant elements of hybrid warfare, including more assertive state actors in the Indo-Pacific, more coercive activities, a rise in intrusive cyber activities, increasing evidence of grey zone activities being adopted and integrated into statecraft, global norms being put under strain with unpredictability as to the responses to grey zone activities, increased military modernization in the region and the use of disruptive technologies, increased likelihood of high intensity conflict. And as I mentioned earlier, a loss of strategic warning time. Accordingly, this seems like a strategic intent that aligns with the emergence of hybrid threats, but will this actually translate to action?

The force structure plan released at the same time as the strategic update says this: enhanced special forces capabilities, strengthened operational cyber integrated ISR and increased space tracking and sovereign satellite systems will better enable the ADF to respond to grey zone activities, including cyber and information operations. Now, to me, there is an element of more of the same approach as discussed by Robert Johnson in this response with a sprinkle of cyber warfare to make it look different. However, to be fair to the Department of Defense, there are some reasons that rationalize that approach. Firstly, the force structure plan is high level and does not provide the detail of necessary adjustments to deal with these new threats, potentially because a lot of that detail is sensitive or classified. Secondly, much of the response needed to deal with hybrid threats sits outside the Department of Defense. There is evidence that some work is being undertaken in this area.

For example, the long overdue remediation of critical infrastructure vulnerabilities by the Department of Home Affairs. However, there are areas that also need to be mitigated, such as the threat of mass influence and the threats to supply chains. Each of these have been raised as concerns within respective parliamentary inquiries in Australia. Firstly, the Select Committee on Foreign Influence through social media and secondly, the joint inquiry into the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. And the former review has not yet released its report. Whilst the latter has released a review with substantial recommendations about supply chains and coercion. However, it is not clear whether or how those recommendations will be implemented. Various mismatched strategies from the Commonwealth on defense, foreign policy, cyber counterterrorism and critical infrastructure provides a confused review of Australia's response to hybrid threats. And there is a growing call for a national security strategy in Australia to help address the problem of these coordinated hybrid threats against our interests. Such a strategy does not appear to be imminent.

But let me take my remaining time to highlight possible implications for the ADF and the broader security policies in Australia. Firstly, hybrid threats necessitate an effective whole-of-government approach. The Commonwealth of Australia has had in place for some years mechanisms for inter-agency cooperation articulated in the Australian government crisis management framework. Covid-19 has provided a greater emphasis and focus for this framework with ongoing engagement from working level to the highest levels of government, and this includes the new national cabinet that brings together the prime minister and the state premiers on a regular basis. While the framework provides an excellent structure of

accountabilities and processes, one concern may be that it tends to be relevant only after or to the right of a crisis event, rather than in preparing for and mitigating such an event.

One potential implication of hybrid threats may be that such interagency efforts also need to be left-of-event, including planning and war gaming against hybrid threats. Second, mass influence - the increasing use of disinformation and the decaying trust in traditional sources of truth are areas that will increasingly be exploited in hybrid warfare to pursue objectives. The Department of Defense and the government will need better ways to detect the malicious use of false information and to be able to do something about it. My university, as well as a handful of other Australian universities are currently doing work in this area, but it is embryonic. Winning hearts and minds is something that the ADF has practiced in person-to-person engagement. Increasingly, we will see this battle for influence on a global basis and will require not only technical competence, but strong awareness of cultures and the various causes and interests that segment a population. Third, hybrid threats have legal implications in respect to the threat itself, as well as the options to respond to the threat. Potential adversaries will use lawfare to their advantage in conducting their activities and will exploit the legal ambiguity that is a large part of the grey zone.

While in some cases, there will be time to consider the various factors that inform legal advice, in other cases, hybrid threats may be part of a rapidly unfolding scenario that demands expedient action. This might be best supported by pre-assessing situations in a similar way to the Tallinn Manual has informed the conduct of cyber warfare. Fourth, we have seen economic coercion as a key tool in hybrid war, especially with trade decisions to maximize economic impact and coerce nations to make decisions favourable to the instigator. While there is little direct implication for the military in this threat, it will be a consideration for national security and could impact the military directly if it affects supply chains. The immediate response to such situations, which we are experiencing currently with China, is to refer cases to the World Trade Organization.

However, if a state actor is behaving in such a way, they are unlikely to be concerned with global institutions and the rules-based order as we have seen in the South China Sea. I would also note that the Belt and Road Initiative may expose nations to subsequent coercion through debt-trap diplomacy. In this respect, the reported investment at the Port of Daru in Papua New Guinea is a security concern that will potentially affect our national security. A fifth

consideration is diplomacy. The best response to breaches by nations may be more strategic acts of national and international power, such as sanctions and collective acts by nations. While the military can support such work through collective efforts such as military-to-military engagement and activities such as freedom of navigation exercises, the overwhelming responsibility and diplomatic power in Australia should be the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. DFAT - their effectiveness in dealing with disputes with China has been underwhelming recently, and whilst the DFAT's Pacific step-up program is important, it coincides with a contraction of Australia's international aid program and criticism that the aid budget is incoherent.

The poor timing of the 2020 defense strategic update at the same month, same time as DFAT's budget was reduced, was an unfortunate signal that the government might not value diplomacy. Instead of reducing DFAT, there is an argument that they should be bolstered. And while Australia remains the greatest source of aid for our Southwest Pacific neighbours, we just need to keep in mind the important mutual benefit of supporting them and that this is more than just a matter of finances. Sixth, physical posturing and the threat of violent conflict is a key element of hybrid threats. We see it, for example, in the South China Sea, and we know that standing up for the rules-based order is just as important as the resources in and the maritime transport through that area. The implications include the maintenance of sufficient capability to deter aggression, as well as our ongoing engagement of like-minded nations to do the same.

Seventh is the prospect of incitement of non-state groups towards criminality and insurgency, and depending upon the context, this may be more a matter for the intelligence or law enforcement agencies. However, defense may have a role both domestically in the case of Defense Act Part IIIAAA as well as when deployed overseas. Key to that role will not only be the maintenance of security from physical acts, but in understanding motivation and interests and being able to engage accordingly. Now, the eighth implication for defense is cyber security. Defense has both a national cyber responsibility and a requirement to protect their own systems. The national responsibility is delivered by the Australian Signals Directorate, the equivalent of NSA. Which has security, intelligence and active defense responsibilities. Most of the government investment in cyber security has been directed to ASD.

There are existing mechanisms for coordination between ASD and other elements of government, including defense, on responding to cyber-attacks. And these include the

management of equities between intelligence and other priorities. The rise of hybrid threats would put even more importance on this coordination. This might include the consideration of the range of available options to make a cyber-attack desist. And this might not just be hacking back. The requirement to protect its own systems is becoming more important with the growth of digitization and the integration of its platforms. Information underlies the operation of the ADF, as it does increasingly for all society. The sensing, the C2 and the engagement grids of the force structure, as well as its support systems, will provide the ADF value.

This same value also represents a target for an adversary. Adversaries will seek to deny services or to deceive or to extract valuable intelligence. With the increasing cyber physical integration, they may also seek to disable systems. This is the reason why the 2020 strategic update raised concerns about cyber-attacks as a precursor to conventional conflict. Consider the impact of major platforms such as warships if they are disabled. The ADF cyber warfare doctrine is built upon three pillars: a cyber security discipline that protects the systems from attack, a cyber operations discipline that detects and responds to attack, and a general accountability for all personnel of the ADF to be cyber literate and reduce the incidence of breaches caused by human error. While the cyber security discipline is relatively mature in Australia's corporate and C2 networks, a key implication of hybrid warfare is that the targets will include a broader range of targets, including support, infrastructure and frontline weapons systems.

Maturation of cyber capability across the board is an urgent task for Australia, as with other countries. In 2017 this led to the ADF's establishment of a dedicated Head of Information Warfare. Now, planning and training should consider the need for redundancies and the ability to operate within a highly contested environment. And finally, critical infrastructure will certainly be targeted in escalating conflict. Our Department of Home Affairs has initiated a review of supply chains, used in an expanded list of critical services. This work, which started last year, will help to identify and hopefully mitigate risks. The focus of that work is exclusively on cyber threats. But hybrid threats may also involve other acts.

Also, as such a tax would likely to be in the context of a broader conflict, it is critical that defense is closely involved in the planning associated with remediating our national vulnerabilities and critical infrastructure. So, in conclusion, our deteriorated security environment over the past year has featured increased tension and opportunism and a realization that threats to our national security are more complex. Hybrid warfare is a term that

is not universally accepted. Yet, what is accepted is that the character of conflict is different, with the main difference being the changes associated with highly connected systems and populations. We need to adapt, and we need to prepare differently, or we will be confused, we will be disrupted, and we will lose. Thank you, ladies and gents.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Human Factors - the missing piece

Gillian Somerville

I am Gillian Somerville, and I am a human factor engineer. I will be talking about the Human factors. I will just give a quick recap on what human factors are. The human factors that I am talking about is a systems approach that came out of WWII. The Ministry of Defence in the UK gathered a diverse range of scientists and tasked them with creating the most efficient fighting man. At the same time, the US Navy brought in engineers and psychologists to review the cockpits of their aircrafts to see why navy pilots kept crashing. Out of these two exercises came a new discipline that -the scientists realised they have created, something that was applicable to industry. Time and motion studies, work environment, layouts, looking at the cognitive and physical impact of the environment, tools and procedures on people.

They needed a name for it. In Europe they called it ergonomics, and in North American they called it human factors. As time has gone by, ergonomics has become synonymous with physical systems - production lines - and human factors with socio-technical systems. But the world that I live in, they are the same. Although, being in the southern hemisphere, I tend to call myself a human factor engineer because if I say I am an ergonomist, people assume that I know how to sit properly. Today, human factors are a recognised component in high-risk industries such as in rail, aviation, marine, utilities, nuclear space, military and now cyber security.

The areas of focus... you have the person in the middle doing their task in their environment, and the things that impact them are anthropometry, workstation and workplace design, anatomy, biomechanics and physiology, engineering and systems, psychology and the environment which is characterised by noise, vibration, lighting and thermal conditions.

The objective of human factors is to improve efficiency by providing components such as technical interfaces, tools, equipment, environments, that fit the people rather than the people

having to fit the components. This is very evident in any manufacturing environment where you go into a production line and find out that the protective guards are always being removed or taped up. They are removed not because people want to hurt themselves or hurt others, but rather it is because the machinery does not allow them to do their job easily. The engineers have designed a piece of equipment and the people cut and paste to make it work for them.

HF identifies the level of impact upon these people. The cognitive and physical impact. It is to identify the potential for human error before the human error occurs. It is to develop solutions to reduce or remove inefficiencies and errors. Ultimately, it is to improve the resilience of people within a system.

Typically, on a large-scale project, the functional requirements and the business requirements are identified, and they drive the development of the product or the system. But it is actually the people's requirements that need to be defined. I got into this area many years ago. I was working for ICL, a computer company in the UK, doing a terrible administrative job of calling off contracts. I could not understand why the multi-million-pound IT systems were going out to the client, which was the government, and failing, when they passed their functional tests and met all the business requirements. I asked one of the sales people, 'Why do these fail? Don't you ask the people who are doing the job what they need to do the job with?' And I was told, 'No, we don't ask the frontline staff.' A computer would arrive at somebody's desk, and they would not know what to do with it. It would be put in a cupboard. I somehow ended up doing human factors.

The time has come to see people as a feature, not a bug in the system, and to focus on improved usability for solutions and to involve those on the frontline to have a say. I am not saying that you ask everybody on the frontline to put their two cents worth in, but you do get a representative end user group who will provide input.

A bad system will beat a good person every time. This is my favourite saying, and it is so true. People are often seen as the weakest link. And strengthening the system by focusing on the

people will create resilience of people and the system and the organisation. I just quite liked this picture of what resilience is - strength, persistence, growth, reaction and flexibility.

Doing a lot of research, I have come across 9 points that go towards contributing to create a resilient system. This was based on cyber security. Consult with staff on security procedures. If you make your security procedures too onerous or restrictive, then people will find a way of working around them. If they are too onerous and restrictive, they could potentially impact upon them doing their jobs. You want to get that balance of having security procedures that add security to the organisation but do not restrict people from doing their job.

It is important to seek clear boundaries for information sharing. Make it clear what people can share and what is in-house information. Again, if it is too strict, people will work around it. They will use social media or talk to people about things that should not be discussed outside the organisation.

I think it is very important to make employees aware of the scale of risk. We need to inform them about the scale and severity of actual and potential incidents and ensure that employees' knowledge remains current.

This is one for HR. Matching personality types to roles, particularly in security roles where people are considered to be very compliant with procedures. Those who show a high degree of social compliances would more likely and willingly share information. People with a high sense of duty are more likely to be good at complying with security procedures.

It is also important to create a secure culture. Managers need to reward good security behaviour and not just focus on productivity and performance, which makes people think that security is not important. This one I equate back to the example of people taking guarding off machinery. They have got productivity and performance levels they have to meet, so they remove or don't adhere to some safety or security measures.

Making sure that workloads do not undermine the individual's ability to carry out their role is also necessary. If people are overloaded, they are likely to miss that phishing email. Or if they are underloaded, they might get into mischief and poke around the system and find out stuff they should not know about.

It is important to make accessing equipment or systems easy but not too easy. With the move away from passwords, biometric measures are coming in. Fingerprints or facial recognition are the new trends. That is probably okay for military bases and high security industries, but I am not sure if the local post office needs fingerprint or facial recognition access.

It is necessary to be aware of the physical environment. This includes the space in which the people work in, the interfaces they interact with, the workstation design, and layout of the space, so that when you group people who interface a lot, you do not have one group on one side of the room and another group in another room. Rather you need to chunk the roles so that people are within a reasonable distance of each other. There is a need to challenge non-employees about their presence. I have worked in many offices around the world and saw some people who were not employees walking past my desk. Looking back, I never challenged anybody. Maybe I should have.

We need to make sure that human factors are part of an incident management analysis. Security breaches are often approached from a technology perspective. Where did the system break down? But you have got to ask: What role did a person play in it? A person could have applied a short cut and created a situation that breached security.

Where to from here? Review your situation against the nine previously mentioned points and develop a plan that integrates the points into your security process. Invite someone with HF experience to review your situation.

In summary, human factors came out of WWII to create the most efficient fighting man. Post-WWII, it was applied to industry. And today, it has still been applied to industry but also to new industries like cyber security. It is not looking at just the physical, but at the cognitive

aspects of HF as well. The areas of focus - the range of engineers and scientists from existing fields which were brought together to create efficiencies and identify errors where things can go wrong. The objective of human factors is not about safety. Safety is a welcome by-product of creating efficient and effective workplaces.

And the missing piece in projects that I have worked on - human factors were seen as a necessary evil rather than a core part of the project. The time has come to increase the involvement of the frontline staff, create usable solutions, and strengthen the security system by creating good systems. As I said, a bad system will win over a good person every time. And to create an environment that is resilient and can bounce back from cyber security leaks quickly. These were the nine points for creating a resilient environment and where to go from here.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Australia's pushback and the weaponization of COVID -19

Professor Sascha-Dominik Dov Bachmann

Thank you very much. I have to quickly give an advance warning - I do not know why but we are having some problems with our IT. If I do not come across clearly, please let me know. I do hope that we will not have such interference. Thank you very much for inviting me to this illustrious round of experts. It is always good to reach out to our cousins across the seas. It is a delight being here.

Today I will talk about covert information warfare from the Australian perspective. I basically focus on what my colleague Andrew Dowse has already elaborated on from the hybrid warfare side. Just before I go into media race, what I will do is combine a couple of publications which I call on from my esteemed colleagues - one is here, 'The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs', and that is on COVID misinformation warfare. It is very concise and to the point - just six pages. I will send it to the organisers of this summit, and they can disseminate it afterwards - that would be absolutely great.

I have been working on hybrid warfare since 2011. I was one of the subject matter experts back in 2011 when we met. We discussed the new capstone and how NATO's objective was to see the capstone, implement the capstone and work on it. As history has shown, NATO decided to shelve that in 2012, but NATO continued to encourage the nation states to continue working on hybrid threats. We were a little bit too optimistic because 2014 with Russia... during its stunt in the Crimea, hybrid warfare was in the forefront and that was highlighted quite nicely by the Secretary-General in 2015, addressing the Russian activities and labelling them exactly as hybrid warfare.

Since then, I have been working on this subject and the topic. I publish quite a lot on it. And moved slowly but surely into information warfare, cyber-enhanced warfare and law fare. This is a particular domain that I love, because being an international law scholar and also a law

studies professor, I really like the combination of using law for achieving political and other goals. Then I moved to beautiful Canberra, Australia in 2016. And since then, I have hit the ground running. That means I have moved my whole hybrid threat and hybrid warfare and basically applied it now to what we see in regarding our great adversary across the pond.

In 2020, I was mostly focusing on unrestricted warfare and sea warfare. Basically, the conceptualisation of the Chinese version of Great Power Competition and its influence here in Australia and New Zealand - a united front of activities, capturing state elites, academics, and the business sector. Then obviously came COVID. And with COVID-19, we have seen Russia and China basically upping their game and turning this crisis into their own strategic power play. If I am not mistaken, we actually see that China will rise from this COVID stronger than ever before.

What I want to quickly mention is context. It was a couple of months ago that I did research on COVID information warfare. I came across a NATO document. It was the Hybrid Centre from Finland. It was just a two-page summary on how western democratic societies are viewing COVID and how the impact is on the population. What I liked about this short two-page opinion piece was that the comparison was made to a wartime scenario. The conclusion was that COVID, from a European perspective, was seen in terms of the restrictions and limitations to personal freedoms, for example, but also in terms of [unclear 1.52.09] - this is a German word. Roughly translated to 'fear of living'. It is something that in our post-WWII society, we never experienced to this degree. And that COVID is being seen as a type of hybrid threat to societies as it stands. That was even before we have seen the CCP and Russia stepping up with disinformation and misinformation activities aimed at destabilising western societies.

This is what I think as a person, who is moving towards his fifties, having joined the German army as a young man in 1993, just at the end of the Cold War. It is actually a very good comparison to say this - that this COVID pandemic is for many German generations the closest you can get in terms of feeling threatened from an abstract danger but also seeing what it does to civil society and what it does to the economy. If you go into the history and you look at other COVID strains including the Chinese Flu in the late 19th century [unclear 1.53.52] including

one of the brothers of King George. And then go back into what we see during the Spanish Flu from 1918 to 1922 and you look at what it did in terms of destabilising - psychologically and economically.

It is instructive to think of the rise of totalitarian regimes in Europe, whether the version from the communists or those from the fascists and the Nazis - I think to a certain extent. So far as historians, we have seen it through the lens of WWI being concluded, monarchies being toppled and the infamous Lenin train episode of Germany doing an operation against South-East Russia. The impact of the Spanish Flu in terms of the economic etc. has not really been studied. There has been an American study on it which links it directly to the rise of totalitarianism. Whether that is an opportunistic take, I do not know.

However, my opinion is that, as I look at the news coming from Europe and the whole western world, COVID is going to be a game changer. That is obviously something that is good for totalitarian regimes.

Without too much ado, I am going to talk about COVID information warfare and the future of Great Power Competition, which is mostly based on this publication which I will send through so that you have it as a hard copy. The corona virus pandemic has ushered in a golden age of information warfare. Russia and China, the two most prominent totalitarian regimes, contraposing the liberal rules-based international order that the west has strived to build and promote during the current COVID crisis. COVID-19 or the corona virus has ushered us into this new era of heightened competition among the Great Powers.

The pandemic's impact has far exceeded national security and public health. In addition to COVID-19 as a global health emergency, we see increasing weaponization of the pandemic by both Trump and the CCP to achieve strategic goals. One of the key components of the CCP's strategy concerns operations in the information sphere. Below the threshold of armed conflict taking place in the grey zone, such information operations manifest in influence operations and strategic pre-conditioning.

The Great Power Competition of today is evident in our relations with both Trump and the CCP. The CCP appears determined to shape the world to their strategic vision where it can safeguard its economic and security interests in Asia, the Pacific, Europe and the two Arctics. I always tell people - I always go to books - and this is what I recommend to anyone to read. No, I do not get any royalties from Mr Xi. But it is really an eye-opener. If you read this - it is four volumes, but three volumes in English - and read about his strategy and how China is placed in the world. As a historian, it reminds me very much of Kaiser Wilhelm in 1914. Just putting that in context. Let me talk about China's position in a global domain. It is always fascinating to look at what has been communicated as official party policy since 2012. Everyone must read it. It is sometimes repetitive, but you will realise that this a global feat and a global problem.

Russia, and its strategic partners, aim to rebuild Russia as a Great Power. We know that Putin, since he came to power in 2000, he sees this injustice that has beholden Russia. He has the power and this mission as the new Tzar to restore the Great Power of Russia. As a Great Power and player on the international scene with a trim focus on Europe and where opportunities may arise. It is an opportunistic nature.

Both the Kremlin and the CCP are using concepts which we describe as either hybrid warfare or grey zone warfare. Examples of it are best provided by contemporary Russian warfare approaches. I could - but I will not - go into more detail of what hybrid warfare and what hybrid threats are. But I am aware that Andrew spoke about hybrid warfare and the Australia dimension. Not having seen his presentation, but I assume that he brought a couple of concepts or doctrines to your attention. The only thing that I want to say very briefly when it comes to hybrid warfare and hybrid threats - I use these terms interchangeably. I am fully aware of the history developed by the US Marines for potential threats that the marine force may face. And then NATO taking that up in 2010 with its own capstone on hybrid threats and hybrid warfare. Just to summarise - below the threshold, multimodal, across the whole spectrum, now more law fare, but also this nature of criminal and non-criminal. This is more or less hybrid warfare and hybrid threats. But the question is whether it fits into our two spectrums or if we need a fifth pillar - all these discussions we have. But in a sense, it is our western understanding of new threats and very often these new threats are taking place in the cyber domain, and we are

using cyber as a force. One important point that I need to add is that at the same time in 1998, we saw the development of the unrestricted warfare conceptualisation and then later the three-warfare doctrine being adopted in 2003 by China. For me, that is very much along the lines of hybrid warfare or hybrid threats - approaches by an actor that are much less limited than we are, because unlike us - we will follow the rule of law. That is the difference because both our adversaries do not follow the rule of law in that regard. They are actually rogue nations.

According to the use of irregular strategies employed by the CCP and the Kremlin, the United States has Great Power Competition in its National Security Strategy. The Great Power Competition and the distribution of relative gains and objectives - in this context, it is not hard to see how information warfare plays a particular role in shaping how the Great Powers are competing in key issues, areas, and major powers use weaponised narratives to sow internal discord and distrust rendering the adversaries unable to focus on external threats. In other words, the information environment has become one of the main battle domains of Great Power Competition.

If we are now looking at what is happening on the right-wing extremism front or if we go to what is happening on the left-wing extremism front, there is always a hidden hand behind. If you look at the Chinese and Russian information warfare approaches, we can see that this proposition of Great Power Competition is aimed to weaken our basic cohesion and our resilience. It can be used as a good case study. And at the same time, we have this very strong Russia nexus for anything right-wing and other Russian patriots always have their Russian underlings - useful sycophants serving, basically, the Kremlin's agenda.

We need to approach information warfare from a full spectrum perspective - this is more acute than ever. Both revisionist states - Russia and China - use digital media platforms and other information warfare capabilities not only to consolidate their authoritarian rule abroad and at home, but also to undermine and disrupt the international order that the United States and its allies stand for.

Authoritarian regimes seem determined to weaponize digital media and information technology from domestic population control mechanisms to foreign policy tools. Emulating the Kremlin, the CCP seems poised to weaponize the cyber domain as well as publicly available information as tools of disruption and coercion.

I think that is quite an important thing to note because if we look back at the last two years, the discussions about hybrid threats and hybrid warfare - these discussions took place in Australia from 2017 years. There was a little bit of a perception that this is how NATO labelled the Russia and its activities in conjunction with, for example, Estonia 2007 cyber, then Georgia cyber and combat operations, but also in terms of then 2014 the Little Green Man in the information sphere in order to allow western states to deny that there was a war raging in eastern Ukraine. It was a European-Russian problem. You can say a remnant of the Cold War. There was very little open discussion, but here in the Asia-Pacific, we have seen the Chinese implementing their own 1998-2003 approach to basically grey-zone in a very apt and assertive way. What was missing was this link - a link to look at the Chinese operations here in Australia and in New Zealand and say that this is exactly what we have seen during the Cold War. It was part of the Soviet approach - part of political warfare, but also since 2007 in eastern and south-eastern Europe.

Now, this question is very important. For me, it generates the biggest concern. What happens if China and Russia are actually working together? And here in conjunction with the COVID pandemic in terms of, for example, trying to spread misinformation and try to disrupt European democratic legacies, there you can see that both players are working hand in hand, so to speak. For example, the CCP has aggressively promoted patently false narratives about the origin of the corona virus. It is brilliant if you look at it. Now we have seen the release of the new WHO report, and it ignores that theory. But also in terms of how the whole thing was staged. For example, if you see a sign that says the 'global pandemic', it is moving away from where it comes from, moving away from Wuhan, and obviously that is then feeding nicely into a narrative that only China was able to contain it, only China with its public security and health emergency measures was successful in addition to the vaccine diplomacy which is seen on the spectrum as a full-on unrestricted warfare approach. I am happy to discuss that more in the questions and answers.

China has actively promoted the Party's public health leadership, using alternate accounts, bots and trolls despite numerous frauds and defects noticed in several countries. Similarly, the Kremlin has used the pandemic to highlight how the EU is failing in its mandate. Now, I had a look quickly at the CCP's information warfare doctrine. I am looking at my watch. One of the moderators can just tell me how long I have and how much question-and-answer time we will be allowing. Is there a moderator available?

Today the CCP is focusing on the cognitive domain of information operations and aims to pre-condition the political and strategic operations and in the tactical areas in the long term. It achieves its foreign policy goals with evolving strategies such as propaganda which is a very reliable and flexible apparatus for China outside, for example, the United States. It emphasises influence operations which are materialised in three warfare. In 2003, the CCP Central Military Commission approved the concept of three warfare consistently of public opinion as a target, intending to influence public opinions to put a good image of China and its interests, psychological warfare seeking to undermine an enemy's ability to conduct operations by deterring and demoralising military personnel as well as supporting civilian populations, and legal warfare using national and international law to plant China in the legal high ground.

The target is to pre-condition and change public opinion to the benefit of China's interest, most notably of course, in the failed attempt to claim the whole of the China Sea, and then losing in the National Tribunal case against the Philippines using the argument that artificial arguments qualified under the United Nations convention of the Law of the Sea. The legal argument was unsuccessful. So, the warfare of changing public opinion was thrown in. It is very unlikely that the Philippines will ask for enforcement.

This brings me to another issue. The capture of key international organisations. Out of 11 key international organisations, four have Chinese heads. And three more have heads that are basically Chinese candidates like the WHO Chairperson or President.

Applied to the current COVID crisis, the CCP has taken the opportunity to further its interests exploiting warfare. They have developed initiatives and eight programmes to develop other nations, especially in the Asia-Pacific. The CCP is also moving ahead to sure up long-term objectives including Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Taiwan. However, the crisis has demonstrated the limits of the three warfare, with widespread belief that China's propaganda offering alternative views of the corona virus origins has led to a Russian-inspired shift of China's disinformation from overt to covert operations. We have also witnessed an increasing tendency by the CCP to counter critical nations with information warfare operations augmented with economic coercion, notably with acts against Australia imports.

Some key characteristics of COVID information warfare. We define this information as a subset of misinformation as false and misleading information which is spread deliberately to deceive. It has three components. First, misinformation can be incidental. Second, this information requires mechanisms to propagate, intentionally designed disruptive and cannot achieve unless they reach wider audiences. Simply put, this information must spread to work. Third, unlike misinformation, disinformation has discernible objectives of note.

The trend of disinformation has not changed much. Its notion originates from the Russian word *dezinformatsiya* as a component of Soviet active measures against the west. However, the difference during the Covid pandemic is the pace of information propagation. This accelerated pace appears to have three broad characteristics.

Firstly, we notice an elevated notion of politicised content. This is the first global crisis in modern history where major powers are all messaging to promote and advance their own interests in terms of public health, stay at home, and the efficiency of a vaccine rather than, for example, the success of a political party. Are we enrolling our vaccine? Look at the Biden administration, trying to meet targets of 90% vaccination success. This is, at the moment, what we would refer to as this messaging on a political sphere. The advance of messaging, because of nationalism, arises from the pandemic because of the global competition. Each power believes it is critical to secure its interests. Just look at the recent European Union and British spaff. I used to be a remainer - there are various reasons why. I have now become a Brexiter

because of the way that European Union has [unclear 2.15.33] the vaccine roll out is disgusting. You do not do that to an ally, you do not do that to a partner, you do not do that to a former member state. That is just highlighting the importance of national interests in terms of the European Union. But we have these interests conflicting and each of the base nation states are using the cyber domain in order to message that they are on top of the game.

Second. We note elevated levels of amplification brought by the CCP and the Kremlin. Exploring the use of bots and trolls, they use outlets to propagate with much more haste than fact checkers can anticipate. We need to re-focus on the strategic context within which we see the rapid propagation of disinformation - this disinformation competition among major powers. We can also ask: how can we increase awareness of this competition in order to achieve resilience? Because this is how this hybrid warfare and hybrid threat counter-approaches - we always talk of the so-called comprehensive approach, but the comprehensive approach to counter hybrid warfare is, according to the old capstone of 2010, would basically require a multimodal and multi-stake holder approach. In other words, if you have a bioterrorism threat, then you roll in the civilian and other pharmaceutical companies together and national health organisations. Obviously then you have your social media companies. You can try to maintain the information superiority. That is the comprehensive approach.

But the first thing in order to get there - because in a rule of law based and market economy, you cannot just say ask - we have national defence policies available which make it mandatory for you to be part of this campaign. States, for example Sweden and Germany, during the Cold War built a very extensive civil defence approach towards the COVID threat. They have an advantage here because they basically have a concept where, for example, civilian transport capabilities used for commercial tracking operations and, in the case the Soviets would attack, for example, NATO or Germany, then these trucks were run for the national defence effort. Sweden is even better positioned because Sweden was always under Russian attack. If you go to Stockholm, you will see that Gustav Adolph, the king, is pointing to the east because that is where the enemy is. Sweden has an extensive civil defence approach as part of its hybrid threat response. It has civil defence capabilities. These capabilities play a role when it comes to countering the COVID threat, including the re-introduction of national services.

Having said that, in order to get there, we must talk about awareness in order to support this strength and resilience. I just want to talk about that in terms of the COVID information - what is the content our adversaries are promoting when talking about the pandemic? What are the key themes in this information? What are the failures and weaknesses of the democratic institutions and societies dealing with the pandemic? And what are its exploitations for strategic goals? We must treat this information as a full-spectrum problem. We must go beyond mitigation and become more proactive and from passive defence to active defence. We must promote public/private partnerships in the US, in the west, and among its partners to harbour and integrate the best systems and support of influence competition and strategic communication.

Here I would like to say if you see the Great Power Competition in the grey zone - the hybrid threats which attack us - that we are facing, we are in a sense facing a new type of total war. What we must do is that we need to inform the public. For example, if you sell out - for example, FDI - if you look at internet providers and you must find a provider that is not Beijing, basically. Then you realise that only 30% are not Beijing linked and that does not exclude a Singapore based partner. You will see that you have a problem. I would say that the public does not actually realise that we are in a power competition of conflict below the threshold which affects all our way of life.

When it comes to the pushback - and this where Andrew Dowse and I submitted something to parliament that was in conjunction with the enquiry into the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for Australia's foreign affairs. We must look a full lens here in Australia and we have to raise awareness. We must create awareness and awareness actors - academia, politicians, media, business. And try to inform them of the threat that we are facing. Then we must work towards resilience. That is where we come in with the proactive and pre-emptive cyber operations and counter-information. That is obviously wishful thinking, because we must discuss to what extent can we actually be pre-emptive and what rule of law should apply. Should we apply law when it comes to targeted disinformation or influence operations? Should we just say that this is something that we can tie to a truth-seeking approach? Or do we create a bot that counters this information and that first identifies the adversary? Are we trying to literally get out a counter-narrative?

A counter-narrative is basically a cyber enhanced warfare approach. If you lose that golden minute, then you might actually lose the information battle, despite actually having all the reasons to win the legal battle. A good example was the Crimea. In 2014, it was Lavrov. Lavrov came out to the press and [unclear 2.23.53] unification post-referendum. This is where NATO could have immediately brought in a counter-narrative of the violation of international and binational law. Like, for example, the Budapest example.

We are talking about two things. This requires many stakeholders to be involved in this awareness and fact-finding mission approach. Then, you need a counter-capability that is technology driven. But it is something that we have parameters on. Is it on the Twitter domain? How is it if we do a concerted approach using academics using think tanks and working on something for the government on a government narrative?

At the moment, the approach is not organised. There is no command or control. It is people doing things as they feel about it. As we speak now, we have a major demonstration in Adelaide in front of the Chinese consulate. That is run by expat groups which have been victimised or are victims of the CCP - persecution plus a couple of brave individuals. But there is obviously no government approach. The reason for this is that we do not want to expose ourselves. But if we see grey-zone and we see the Great Power Competition as 21st century total war, then the question is: when do we become more pro-active?

It is now 3:11pm. I would now be happy to take questions. I will send this text to you as well as the enquiry details because there is quite a lot of interesting reading in that. But before I conclude, in the context of [unclear 2.25.56] into COVID and its impact and how we can counter the CCP - I spoke of the so-called martial plan two. Because when we look at COVID and what COVID does to already strained economies - like the African Union context, for example. In the Asia-Pacific, what we need is economic care packages where we must come together as strategic partners and say that we identify states which are about to be captured by China and then do strategic economic investment. We in Australia try to do it with the military - think of Papua New Guinea - but we need this economic push and that is why we mentioned

this martial plan two. It is a concept that hasn't taken flight yet, but I hope that it will fly, and I will write on it. But apart from that, it is linked to classic supply chains and go into the more domestic route. We need such things. In the end, what we are looking at is global conflict - it is below the threshold on most occasions, but we have to respond to it in kind and that means we need a multi-domain and multi-tiered approach that includes the whole spectrum.

Thank you very much. I am open for questions.

MGen (Ret) Gert-Johannes Hagemann: Thank you very much indeed. That was a true pleasure to listen to you. I think you covered a broad spectrum of absolutely important aspects and issues of today. You mentioned it yourself - we are in a new era of war fighting. Now I address a little bit as a lawyer - I have a question that I mentioned a little bit earlier and yesterday as well. It is indeed a question where we have to define in a new context and a new meaning. When do we have war? When do we have peace time? What are the consequences?

I would like to underline the enormous pressure coming from the CCP - coming from China. An example of hybrid warfare from my point of view is the treatment of western companies right now like Adidas or H&M because they are no longer silent - they complain in an active way concerning the lack of human rights respect and child work. They are faced with enormous pressure - they are faced with the request of the Chinese authorities to their population - to Chinese citizens - to no longer buy stuff from Adidas or H&M and things like that.

Second example which I want to highlight here is political pressure - hybrid pressure - by finance. This is a tool which is used by China in an extraordinary way with lots of consequences. One example is the military base in Djibouti, which has originally been constructed to support the anti-piracy operation which China used to integrate a vessel or two. This is beyond any imagination. This base - I saw it personally - is too big just for the logistics of one or two anti-piracy vessels. Djibouti is the starting point of a railroad and which was originally constructed by the Germans a hundred years ago which has been in very bad

conditions. Within three years, the Chinese renovated it and now it is running, and it is financed by China.

Last example, political pressure. In Sri Lanka, there is a harbour which is more or less owned by China and has been for 99 years. It was the same construction as the UK or Hong Kong in earlier times. Sri Lanka had to accept the conditions and this treaty because everything over there was financed by China. They said, 'Okay, you follow my rules and my intentions. If not, I want my money back.' Of course, this was impossible for Sri Lanka.

This is the way that hybrid warfare works today. Including propaganda, disinformation, influence operations, artificial intelligence, and all that you mentioned earlier. Can you give us an idea of how to handle this? That is like opening Pandora's box. Maybe it is like a Russian doll. I think to a certain extent, we are lost in war. Maybe the COVID pandemic gave us some breathing space because we have realised for the first time how reliant we are on China, whether it comes to PPE or antibiotics or just medicines.

If we were to look at China, what is China? Is it a competitor? Fortunately, it has changed now. I still remember 2017 being in Brussels and giving presentations and there was Russia as an adversary. We have now moved a little bit further and are now saying that yes, China is actually more than just a competitor, it is an adversary.

That is what is happening in the domain of people who have an interest in either security or, for example, human rights. China is doing us a big favour with its wolf-warrior diplomacy. In Australia, the public sentiment against the CCP has completely deteriorated - it has turned from about 20-30% against the CCP to now 80% simply because of the wolf-warrior diplomacy - because of these obscene cartoons that were put out by a global news agency. That is good for us.

But everything – we humans are like a frog in a pot. You just slowly increase the temperature and you do feel very comfortable. The thing for me is... obviously, at the moment we have the

human rights example, and that has really brought - you can say the genocidal nature of the regime - into focus. Because we had forgotten that 1.6 million people have been killed. We had forgotten about them. It is now with the media and the fact that we have a political push back that we can say for the first time that it cannot be ignored. We have really abandoned our basic principles - 'never again' - especially from a European perspective. Now it is very heart-warming to see that we in Australia have people like Mr Pavlov who are making it a one-man mission to push back.

That brings me to the - not solution - but just one thought. Like a joint operation centre, where you have the different desks. We need that. We need such a basic set up. Like a national security cell. I am not talking about the COBRA arrangement now, for example, in the UK. But we need a national security centre where we have all the stakeholders across the political and other assets. Then we also need to include links to academia and the economy.

The other thing that we need at this moment is a national effort to compile reports which are then being read by these decision makers - links between decision makers and the respective fields - which then lead to action plans like NATO has an action plan. We need this. Because then, for example, you can influence policy making and politics and politicians. In Australia, one of the biggest victims of any Chinese extortion is academia. But if you do not own the minds of a generation, you lose the generation. That is what the Chinese know. But if we say to academia that you are all liberals and left and hate conservation policy - it is very often conservative in nature - if that means that you lose academia and you see staff being retrenched. The business model we use is that you must find your own support. This is not a problem, General Hagemann in Germany because there we have fully funded establishments. Here, in the British, Australian and American contexts, if I say, 'You are a business model' and you are not doing anything in the national mission to educate people and make them critical but also resilience - if we allow a foreign actor like China to hijack our universities, then we have a big problem.

If you look at this, we have come a little bit short. There is a whole grey zone and Great Power Competition situation-threat-scenario... it always omits where China is going in terms of its

connecting capabilities. Because of its unrestricted warfare approach to get IP. IP theft. At a level which is unheard of. Linking up with different universities and stealing the newest IP that you need for the next generation. My opinion is that, if grey zone and Great Power competition etc. does not succeed, then China will have the capabilities to do it in an old fashion way like, for example, going after Taiwan. At the moment, they can do it with hybrid warfare - misinformation, threats, policy, economics, and assassination of opposition people and leading voices against unification. That is a hybrid warfare approach. That is criminal. But they can do it and they will do. But if they lose the patience and if the economy goes down, then they will go in there and there is nothing that we can do.

They have dual system - the Soviet system of the Cold War and have morphed into the United States in terms of economic and fire power. That is where we must start talking. We need supply chains and strategic foreign power investment. We need India onboard. We must work here and extend security and economic arrangements that we all work towards containing China, telling China they are welcome as a China, but play by the rules.

One more thing. African Union. In the African Union they have seen now a couple of attempts to squash democratic elections because young Africans have had enough of China. It is the old elite - the old political corrupt - that is in bed with China. It is not the young African people. They have had enough. The United States, during the Cold War, did marvellous things. Just think of the 50s, how the Soviets came in and were driven out of Italy as part of the United States political warfare approach. Never done again. A little bit in Vietnam, but never as a weapon. You can say that the Americans, in the 50s, they did Great Power Competition and unrestricted warfare and grey zone. They succeeded. We must go back and look at how they did it. Yes, it was the CIA. But we need these men with a big stick so that we can sleep in peace.

CHAPTER FIFTHTEEN

Weaponised Narrative

Pamela Williamson

It is a great privilege and pleasure to deliver this presentation to you this afternoon - the Art of Science and Narrative: Strategic Weaponization and Security Resilience. The subtext of it is New Zealand and the Great Power Competition. I take on board the comments of Lieutenant Colonel John Black - that is all unacceptable - but my job is to suggest that there may be some elements of validity and certainly from the perception of New Zealanders tucked away down here on this little island.

My presentation really is a follow-on from the presentations on hybrid warfare. I am going to focus on the non-kinetic aspects of hybrid warfare - narrative influence and narrative influence operations. But firstly, I want to thank Dr Anita Abbott for organising tonight, for her team support and for the APSI Forum for its perseverance to get this summit going during this difficult COVID period. During the presentation, you may likely be thinking about questions at the end. We have about 20 minutes for those. I am curious to know your thoughts about whether there is currently at the correct level of priority given to narrative and narrative operations as well as collaboration and coordination amongst all stakeholders, including military and civil society, politicians, diplomats, intelligence agencies, and in particular the academics.

Firstly, I want to say that in terms of priorities, really only one of the Great Powers is giving it top priority right now. And that is China. Russia, of course, is the undisputable master of influence operations. However, China is getting better and better as it copies with increasing success, Russia's highly successful propaganda strategies and tactics that have been refined. An increasingly aggressive China is more direct than Russia, utilising [gunboat] diplomacy. Targeting western democracies is a key part of China's strategy to undermine and eventually replace the rules based international order. In its sight are, at the moment, Canada, Australia, and now the EU, apart from the usual suspects. But even New Zealand is a target. China uses its diasporas, direct infiltration, IP theft and knowledge transfer and cyber-attacks as well. The operations held by AI is China's biggest threat. The west is lagging well behind in its appreciation of the tangible power of words in the information environment.

Before I start - I just want to comment on something that [unclear 46.07] touched on. He talked about influence operations and the need to do something and what to do about it. My approach, which I want to describe to you, is about doing something.

You will see on the screen before you a couple of what I call memes in this context. I just want to play with your heads a little bit, and hopefully to keep you awake in the afternoon. You will all know the Superman on the right and from where he originates. On the left is a good example of knowledge transfer. This is Kenan Kong - a new Chinese Superman.

Here is what is arguably New Zealand's Superman - Gandalf from Lord of the Rings. He says, 'Some believe that it is only great power that can hold evil in check, but that is not what I've found. I've found it is the small things, everyday deeds by ordinary folk that keeps the darkness at bay'.

It is the duty of the government to safeguard not only the physical security of a nation, but also its cognitive security. [unclear 48.06] that are calibrated by how effectively they counter information and influence operations, whether by state or non-state actors. [unclear 48.17] have advantages. They can coordinate state-funded campaigns because they are authoritarian states. In setting out to prove that their model of the world and their world view is better, they mobilise, and they commit. But we are not, really. Not so far. We are not doing as good a job as we could and should be doing.

When we talk about these narratives, public education and critical thinking is the key to understanding this body of argument in Western societies that we are confusing (or mixing) together due to mass campaigns. This is especially with the Corona virus about vaccines, the virus itself, and its origins. What is also crucial is independent journalism - evidence, truth, facts and regulation, and the regulation of social media. Safeguarding the countries' infrastructure and intellectual property from adversary cyber-attacks has become well

understood as a critical part of our National Defence Strategy.

Yet, narrative warfare is not so appreciated, although we are exposed to it daily in public diplomacy, and less visibly by campaigns across states that target vulnerabilities in our societies and create division, confusion and disruption by machine driven innovation. This is what I call 10 Ds - deception, disruption, division, deformation, demonization, denial, deflection, distraction, disputation, and dismissiveness.

Most people have about five, but I worked hard and came up with 10. These techniques have been refined and weaponised since the Soviet Era. Russia's skill is to massively attack the centre of gravity that is most vulnerable. It is a democratic openness that leads to the ability to target public opinion. A classic example of this occurred in 2015 at the University of Missouri. Russian bots created false impressions about some threats against that institution. They used tweets to broadcast hoax hashtags that created fear that duplicated real hashtags. It had serious real-life consequences that reverberate in that university today.

This is where modern militaries intersect with other bodies like think tanks, NGOs, companies and academia. There is an unwavering need for vigilance for our human rights protection. The recent coming together of nations to profess the human rights abuse in Xinjiang province and Myanmar are a product of this. Modern warfare involves the recognition by democratic states that there is hybrid war already underway. And urgent needs for answer exist as to where our best interests lie as societies with common interests in democracy and the rule of law. Right now, in New Zealand and the US, anti-vaxxers who start at yoga mums - there is a wonderful research paper on anti-vaxxers that is written by a US sociologist at the US Military, and she has studied the anti-vaxxer campaigns in the US which migrate across issues. It is very difficult to know the source of the memes that might be sent out or these hashtags that create division. They get latched onto by people - possibly well-meaning people - and then there are others who tend to migrate across issues. It becomes a very complex environment where the distortions and the confusions are at large.

Counterparts in political democracies already know all this. They feed, and frankly at times, on our greed.

First of all, I want to talk a little bit about my topic - weaponized narrative. What is that? Narratives are not stories. You can leave that aside. They can be stories if they are structured correction in terms of correct narrative structure. But normally they are not stories as such. They are used for attack or defence - they create effects and mobilise behaviour. They can be executed by state or non-state actors, military or civil society. They can be involved in the radicalisation of individuals - collective identity building, which leads to violence. They can be utilised in the information environment by way of information warfare and influence operations. And narratives need to meet narrative criteria - more on that later. I am going to talk about narrative warfare in due course.

I will continue with these definitions. The reason is that I think it is important to deal first with definitions and terminology. There is a lot of confusion, as I said earlier. They can mean different things to different people. This is what it means to me. Narrative is non-linear. It can be words, pictures, video, film, internet, social media, coordinated networks across multiple issues. But a very common element is emotional manipulation of the primary emotions which are joy, anger, surprise, contempt, fear, sadness and disgust. These are what are triggered.

A key thing to be aware of is that they resonate outside of the conscious awareness against the narrative 'soil' of identity - in that we have personal, social, political, cultural, national and religious. You may think of others. But they activate assumptions. Psychologists call this 'scripts of self' or 'self-talk' or 'life scripts. But we all have them. They arise out of our cultural identity, our upbringing, national identity, and they can be triggered, manipulated and guided to create certain effects, behaviours and outcomes. But a reminder, they are not stories and actually they are not propaganda or strategic narrative, which I will tell you about later. Their fundamental goal is to polarise, promote distrust, mis- and disinformation.

Dr Waltzman has done me the courtesy of providing me with some key slides that he has authorised me to talk about. 'Democratization of weapons of mass disruption. Techniques for modern influence operations in the information environment are the basis for the democratization of weapons of mass disruption. Fundamental to this is the ability to perform dynamic audience segmentation on a massive scale together with mass customization of messaging that will resonate with each audience segment identified. The barrier to entry is now negligible.'

This is just a little quote from Mr Carl von Clausewitz. "When it comes to influence and information operation it is time to turn this quote around - policy is a mere continuation of war with other means - it is time to recognise that we are in a continuous and never-ending state of warfare."

This is where I do my little plug. I write resilience narratives with a New Zealand theme. It has given me a lot of fun over the last few years. But what they really aspire to do is make people laugh. They use humour. I call them geo-political satire. They are designed to mock authoritarian leaders and create a hero narrative of overcoming obstacles. My owl - he is a New Zealand more pork owl - he [unclear 58.49] in the New Zealand bush called 'O.W.L' which is Owl Woo-Woo unlimited. He goes on missions which are unofficial undercover espionage missions into the world-wide wood - www - and that is his job. If you are interested, you can find - I am onto season 9 now - it online on the website.

The season finale was 'in which O.W.L. avatars fight a horny, p-hootiy and ponzi owl insurrection in hell.' P-hootity is a mockery of Putin. Horny owl, I am afraid, was Mr Trump. These missions from New Zealand were no small effort. A little bit of narrative warfare against these war mongering leaders.

I am coming to the meat in the sandwich. In New Zealand, funnily enough - and the topic is timely - New Zealand is what I like to call in the middle of the Great Power Sandwich. It is a lamb sandwich, of course. In terms of Great Power Competition and New Zealand's narrative,

I would like to quickly refer to the [unclear 1.00.25], United States, Australia and New Zealand. The [unclear 1.00.30] was included in the new NDAA of 2021 that aims to establish a region-wide approach to Trump and China in its immediate area of influence with the secondary aim of deciding whether or not the united front [unclear 1.00.51] with China - the CCP - meets the criteria for sanctions.

In Australia, a recently published article illustrated the problem very well, I think, in regard to China. In the incoming years, any state that makes policy choices in adverse to what Beijing judges are its interests, risks the anger of China. Policies must be made in reference to Beijing's goals. Hard questions will be asked in national capitals across the region. Beijing is testing Australia with different sources of leverage. The long arm of the CCP is reaching even further. More tests for more countries are coming in the future. And that was written in July last year - the topic was 'Great Expectations: the Unravelling of the Australia-China Relationship.'

I also want to talk about some of the hard choices New Zealand might need to make in the coming years as narrative warfare escalates in the Indo-Pacific, Asia-Pacific and Oceania as it is bound to do. New Zealand is currently navigating the Great Power Competition. Australia is a key power and ally, with a long history of working constructively with New Zealand and the Pacific, despite not always seeing eye to eye. What has gone awry recently is the diplomatic relationship, which has played into China's hands. However, no Great Power should underestimate the deep-seated emotional bond that Aussies have with Kiwis, and vice-versa.

Here is a rather interesting picture of the New Zealand rugby team in New South Wales, Australia in 1884. All this sporting rivalry - what is it about, really? It is not a simple case of sibling rivalry. It is really about reinforcing the narratives of national identity and keeping each other as interdependent populations, testing and probing for vulnerabilities, exercising together, strengthening and building.

New Zealand may seem like an almost irrelevant little country with some strategic usefulness, but narrative has brought New Zealand to the world stage as arguably the world's greatest star

right now due mainly to - not only our PM - but also our strategic narratives from the earthquakes, the terrorist attacks in Christchurch and COVID-19. The team of 5 million, united against COVID-19. The theme of all of these strategic narratives and messaging is unity. I pick up on what Major General Hagemann was saying earlier, that it is about unity that is so critical in terms of standing up to adversaries. No single country can do it alone.

What we do need to do is identify the successful elements of the national narrative strategy of the team of 5 million, and unity is that. There has been a study on that which is very interesting. These elements are: foster a shared purpose, minimise harm to lives and livelihoods, be led by expertise, mobilise collective effort, and enable coping.

The bi-partisan and visceral nature of these narratives show that if everyone pulls together, they drive together tropes of national pride and competence. We are a nation of winners who are used to winning, not being dominated by powers. Notable is the statement of the new Foreign Minister that New Zealand has an independent foreign policy is not to be taken lightly. New Zealand may come under increasing pressure in the years ahead, but do not under-estimate the deep unconscious resistance that New Zealanders have shown in both World Wars.

Coming to one of the players of the Great Power sandwich. How do strategic narratives relate to New Zealand, a revisionist China and a reinvigorated United States? This is what we are contending with. It all started when Xi Jinping came to power and made the following statement in 2016 and when he abolished presidential term limits, allowing him to rule indefinitely in 2018. This statement was reported by Freedom House last year. Xi Jinping, February 2016. 'Where the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles.' And he said in March this year: 'The East is rising, and the West is in decline.'

These are significant samples of narrative warfare. Because when you look at the definition of tentacles - forget about the real thing and look at the figurative definition. An insidious reach or influence is what he meant. I am just going to tell you a very brief tentacle tale or the tales

of the tentacles. New Zealand has the giant squid, luckily. This is an Australian one - we have got the lion's mane jellyfish. And that's China's tentacles - we have got the Portuguese man of war jellyfish, also found in the United States. In terms of pushback, the West has its own power and toxicity when it is united. What is my point about tentacles? The words and the images they create in our minds matter. They create meaning, they reverberate as a subtext within our identities, they shape our emotions and behaviour outside of our conscious awareness. In one word, 'tentacles', Xi summed up China's strategy for world domination without a shot being fired.

How does tentacles create an effect? It evokes emotion. joy, anger, surprise, contempt, fear, sadness, disgust. It mobilises behaviour in different audiences. Fear, disgust and horrid fascination for us. Or joy and pride in the home audience. The effect is that it repels us who are risk averse and attracts and insights the patriotic China who listen very closely.

I want to talk about narrative ABC in the information environment. At the top, we have strategic narrative. Then, at a tier below, we have operational or weaponised narrative, as well. And then we have tactical and targeted narrative. By that I mean triggering the emotions and creating identifies by words and phrases that produce concepts, images, beliefs, memory and feelings that evoke deep emotion and neural connectivity. This is my very brief definition: narrative is the message, its subtext, or unconscious meaning, and the ground on which it is received (the cognitive or emotional domain).

The process creates meaning which mobilises and reinforces behaviour which needs incentives and numbers to keep going. Narrative is the subtext in communication that resonates against unconscious and conscious constructs of identity. Narrative influence frames new constructs and mobilises action.

Here is the work of Thomas Drohan. Drohan is a narrative strategist in the United States. He describes narratives as 'cultural contexts that underlie stories and provide meaning. Stories go on top of narratives and are obvious in social media. To spot a narrative as strategy, the question

‘what is meaning’ helps discern the goal. The goal often is to enhance consciousness of an identity or set of values.’

Dr AjitMaan, who is a seminal researcher in this area, describes narrative as the meaning of information, not the information itself. I call this strategic narrative. The calculated messaging tools of state and non-state actors designed to target international discourse and create certain cognitive and emotional effects and political outcomes. Strategic narratives tend to emulate at a government level. But they can also have directions down through military to be passed onto operational and weaponised narrative.

Making sense of the information environment. Perception and ideology are at the heart of narrative. You may wonder: how is that different from propaganda? Well, propaganda is more overt. Propaganda is what you can easily detect. When you look at WWII, propaganda was in its - not in its infancy, because it started probably in the late 19th century... it has gone on forever - but it was operationalised during WWII. You may consider the leaflet over populations saying that Nazis are bad, etc. It was primitive levels of propaganda. Propaganda now is still very overt, but it has become far more sophisticated.

But when I talk about narrative warfare, I am talking at a level that is more insidious. It is a lethal weapon. It can create disastrous effects and fatal effects because it can immobilise people against their own interests and put them in risk and in danger.

Ehiers and Blannin, in this case, looking at the core aspects of the information environment. ‘The United States Department of Defense and its Five Eyes counterparts (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) spend increasing time and effort trying to make sense of the information environment. While the information environment appears new as a reality and a concept, it is not.’

The core aspects of the information environment are using human beings - they use information to influence the direction and outcome of competition and conflict; information is the means

by which all parties to a conflict build understanding of one another and themselves. The IE is the medium through which this information flows as the various players use it to influence each other's decision calculus. The fundamental qualities are that it is ubiquitous, largely unbounded, relatively unregulated, hyper-connected, exists simultaneously, permeates all domains and problem sets.

The definition from Drohan, of the International Center for Security and Leadership, is 'narratives present advantages in any conflict because the influence resolve and if ignored can reverse operational victories.'

Clearly, DIMES has been extended. But for our purposes here, Dr Drohan is describing irreconcilable narratives as vulnerabilities in information-rich societies, enabling threat-actors to polarize communities at will. Mitigating that threat requires more than technologies that spot, flag or block information. Social strategies - the S in DIMES - can increase awareness of narratives and promote toleration of legitimate information.

We are not talking stories. If anybody is interested in reading sections of my slides, you are very welcome to contact me. This is the definition by AjitMaan, which I am not going to go into. But she does say that narrative warfare is not a struggle for information, it is a struggle over the meaning of the information. She also talks about cultural inheritance that determines us and how we identify ourselves and the meaning we assign to it and where it fits. It directly impacts the threat environment, whether in a physical conflict zone or in recruitment to radicalization or in the interference of foreign governments in domestic politics or in undermining or promoting the capacity for international cooperation.

Dominating the narrative space should be a national security priority; advanced hardware cannot create a win in the narrative space where enemies dominate. It is where non-state actors fight best and where foreign governments have proven effective in waging war without kinetic force.

How do they operate? On the level of assumption. And those assumptions leave our narratives vulnerable to manipulation. It hits our assumptions, not our rational thought.

Cognitive security requires that we turn our attention to that which we routinely assume; this is where our adversaries are hitting us hard. Our assumptions are not the results of rational processes nor should the challenge to them be.

The adversaries understand this. They have incorporated strategic narratives - and weaponised it - across their operations to effectively disseminate their brand and reinforce their ideologies through broad information and psychological operations to control the strategic narrative. They determine the meaning of information and the action that results. Influence will not be achieved by those with the most information or the most accurate information. Whoever determines the meaning of the information wins.

There is quite a lot of work to be discussed here. However, I am not sure I need to go into what influence operations are at this level. But you are welcome to have a read of that. This is one targeted at women. I was delighted to discover a few days ago when I listened to a podcast that women lead the charge in researching influence operations. Since I have been researching them since 2017, I was most delighted to listen to brilliant women who are, as they say, leading the charge. Maria Ressa, the co-founder of Rappler in the Philippines, says, 'Lies create alternate worlds; the lies over time become conspiracy theories, create world views like being infected with a virus of lies, contagion; repetition changes the way you view the world.'

I have got some examples of some recent campaigns. I think there are so many that I will not go into it. This is the OSCAR report from the Crime and Security Research Institute in the UK.

The nature of influence... a combination of three definitional components according to Ehiers and Drohan. A basic understanding of what comprises the global IE; information must be conceptualised, contextualised as knowledge, understood and delivered to target audiences

within a specific environment for a specific purpose; and causes them to act in ways advantageous to the influencer.

Here is a glossary of terms.

I am not sure how I am going for time at the moment. Have I got more? I think I do. I might just go into a little bit of them. I have got three slides on narrative weaponization by these wonderful researchers. They have got a paper that was published in the Small Wars Journal last year: 'From Jargon to Jointness: Understanding the Information Environment and Its Terminology.' Terminology is a critical issue across allies' militaries because everybody, according to Drohan, has their own definitions and they actually need to have some integrated look. He says that in the last five years, he has encountered so many new definitions of what information warfare is. Drohan and Ehiers admire the Australian Defence Force and consider that they have the best definitions. That is a plus for Oceania.

We are looking at a lot of connectivity, that is, information moving between and among players across local contexts. The physical world, at the quantum level, is highly entangled even at great distances. The global IE drives information flows, and competition exists from cooperative peace to existential conflict, with the vast majority occurring in the middle of the continuum - the grey zone.

In the competition continuum... it informs what an ICP encompasses and how those work it might gain advantage; failure to understand how an adversary views a problem will negatively impact efforts to achieve an end-state. Actors within ICPs often have highly differential levels of commitment and willingness to endure sacrifices. It is vital to design information focused activities accordingly.

The ADF has articulated the conceptual nuances of the contemporary IE and OE and their impact on national security, operational concepts, force design, and capability development. Its Information War: ADF manoeuvre in the information environment conceives of the battle

for influence taking place across a spectrum of contest - in other words, along the competition continuum. The contest is psychological and physical, preventive and causative, with conflict and violence at the far end of the spectrum.

The term Information Manoeuvre in the global IE is vitally important. Along with physical manoeuvre, information manoeuvre occurs in the global IE, ICPS and corresponding OEs. The term facilitates a better understanding of why, how and when to use information, and to coordinate its release with other activities. Synchronization of information delivery is an intrinsic characteristic of manoeuvre. The ADF is determining how to use information manoeuvre to gain positional advantage. Our competitors continue to do the same.

At this point, I would like to raise my counter-narrative meta model that I designed when I did my Master's degree in counterterrorism. This is a dissertation which I did on strategic narrative. I do have one whole slide that puts it all together, but I thought it would be more useful to just take you through a section of the slide at a time. I would say from the outset something about ethics. Due to the potent nature of the crafted weaponised narratives, it is crucial that the ethical use is monitored and supervised with accountability. They are weapons of war. The accountability exists in the military chain of command and within civil organisations who are working with narrative. I need to make a point that it is not political command that tends to win the war of strategic narrative. I am referring to what is really a military grade when I look at this.

In short, what it all means is that if you wish to sway or influence, you must target the identities of your audience and deliver a message and the subjects of that message at the same time, balancing reason and emotion. It is a high ask.

I built a counter-narrative meta model for use in the divergent contexts of terrorism and state-sponsored disinformation. It relates to both state and non-state actors as they both utilise disinformation and misinformation. It is a hybrid of models in the fields of psychology, narrative theory, military theory, social science, political science, research into terrorism,

research into alternative and counter-narrative models for use in terrorism, as well as communication theory and persuasion and propaganda models of information.

A quick aside - a US team and I are currently exploring opportunities to undertake qualitative and quantitative research of this model in divergent contexts. Its usage will speed up the process implementing counterterrorism and anti-disinformation campaigns. The targets will be the targets of the campaigns of hostile adversaries - neutralising toxic narrative that leads to radicalisation as well as immunising target populations against the pro-active narratives of resilience.

That is where we are heading to get us underway. You are really looking at - on both sides - state propaganda tends to be by influence operations, but military efforts tend to go through information warfare and influence operations at the same time. The goals are similar - to confront, compete and disrupt. And the resilience building is really the goal for - sorry, these are the models that I used, that I will talk about. But I will just go through the model first.

Tier one is what you would normally describe as strategic narrative, grand strategy or public diplomacy. You are looking at the top - long term objectives, meta or master narratives, and that is utilising hard and soft power. The key is the identity of the target audience, a thematic focus (e.g., COVID) and the tactics and mode of delivery.

Then, you are looking at operational narratives, which are the medium-term objectives - days or weeks. Influence operations are more effective, according to my research, with alternative narratives rather than confrontation narratives which tend to create defensiveness. Information warfare is a different kettle of fish. Your goal is to down an adversary using cyber warfare or artificial intelligence. Counter-narratives are very effective because if you can turn people away from the propaganda that they are immersed in, offering them alternatives is a very powerful method.

Then, you get down to the real operation level of tactical narratives. This is mass customisation, where you are dealing with - it starts with information warfare, because you are using mechanised delivery, bot-warfare, in other words, and other types of delivery.

My meta model is that you have got information warfare up there and your influence operations on the right, going through hard and soft power. Non-state and state, strategic narratives, terrorist narratives, propaganda, and then you've got the three tiers - the tactical or counterinsurgency or weaponised narratives - and in terms of counter-insurgency, you are really looking at community or resilience narratives as well.

Again, I would like to emphasise that it is the pro-active narratives that are dealing with the information and targeting identities in what can be a very constructive way that is key. Because weaponised narratives, despite its rather diabolical name, does not necessarily mean aggressive narratives. Big difference.

There is a lot more here. However, there is just not enough time. Rand has given me a couple more slides which are a lot of fun - this one of disinformation management systems. Rand is a data scientist - I am collecting data science at the moment for my project - and he is really the whiz of all data scientists. He is the Deputy Chief Technology Officer of RAND Corporation. They are the mecca of US scientific research for the purpose of the military, and he was a data programme manager and worked phenomenally. He is not a relative, by the way. He just happens to have the same name.

What he has got there is a number of systems - and he is happy that I pass that frame on to anybody. I do not want to get bogged down into it, but it is very interesting. Much of it has not been done yet. His key interests - as are mine, really - my dissertation was on the effectiveness of counter-narratives. I found that research paper after research paper and I would find that in the conclusion that everybody said, 'Needs more research into effectiveness.' I found this a little bit disheartening, so I promised that I would go back and look at the various models that I based my model on. I used the Alexander Ritzmann and MarijjeMeines model - Radicalisation

Awareness Network, a model about violent extremism. They have a conversation about returning foreign fighters. They say they have a really effective counter-narrative that they apply to the foreign fighters. You can find out about them at the RAN Centre of Excellence.

There are others that I have used - psychologists like Lewandowsky, who is very well thought of. Some of these I did not really rely on. But the key ones, apart from all the RAN stuff that are here - now, John Horgan on terrorism in the United States, and he has written 'Towards a Guide for Constructing Disseminating Counter-Narratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism.' They cite the spectrum analysis. I based my meta model on this. What I did was that I found all the key elements in each model that were similar, and I did a horizontal look. I made arbitrary decisions as to what I considered were effective models or at least claimed to be quite high-level models that were used by reputable organisations. I made the selection. I found out, to my surprise, that there were common elements. That was behind my decision for the meta model. I thought that people are not going to spend the time hunting down this stuff. They really need something unified that they can operationalise.

I also used other American models. Alex Schmid, who is a very experienced researcher into Al-Qaeda's ideology and narrative. He wrote about the ingredients of an effective narrative - articulate a clear, realistic and compelling mission purpose without getting entangled in sub-goals and details, but keeping focus on long-term, overarching goals that have to be related to cultural norms and values as well as interests; have legitimacy in that it matches cultural and public norms and values and is seen by relevant publics as justified; hold the prospect of success and provide a feeling of progress towards goals; presented in a consistent manner in order to be effective and withstand the attacks of counter-narratives that might cost public support; and must fit within an overall communication plan that reflects major themes of our own identity.

One of the last ones... from the Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) - they have a counter-narrative toolkit that I also used. This is the model of resilience narrative structure by the psychologist Lewandowsky et al. And RAND Corporation is based on models of Russian disinformation structure and response. There is another from Paul and Matthews 2016, what

they call the fire hose of disinformation model - the fire hose of falsehood, why it might work and opinions to counter it.

I also did my own analysis. So, I am not going to wave that around. But I did base it on my own models as well.

I did have a few additions; Ethics. Knowing an ethical story, fighting facts and truth is unimportant. Ethics is. Know your audience and what is meaningful for it - it is psychological age and identities, its biases and prejudices.

There is quite a look on the information environment. I have got quite a look on the targeting of New Zealand identities by China and China's narrative template and New Zealand's national identity. And various case studies as well as the influence operations operating within New Zealand. You are very welcome to have a look at my slides. At this point, I will take the hint and leave it at that. Thank you.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: Providing a path for peace and security in the region

Col Shigehiro Noshita

Good afternoon everyone. Thank you very much for the kind introduction. To begin with, I wish to thank the Asia Pacific Security Innovation Forum for giving me this great opportunity to speak to you. I am truly grateful to talk to you today about Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific vision.

First, I will introduce myself. I am now working as the Defence Attaché to Australia and Papua New Guinea, and also to Fiji, New Zealand and Tonga. My accreditation to Tonga was just confirmed last week. This clearly shows how Japan ranks the Pacific countries as important. Given the limited time I have today, allow me to go straight into my presentation. I will use slides to help your understanding. Before getting underway, I should say that I have used several slides. They are publicly provided by the Japanese government. The opinions expressed in the presentation are my own and do not represent those of the government of Japan.

In 2016, the Prime Minister Abe put the free and open Indo-Pacific concept in his keynote address. Japan's fundamental aim is to foster regional stability and propensity by improving connectivity between Asia and the rest of the world through a free and open Indo-Pacific region. There are two basic concepts to Japan's work. First, the Indo-Pacific is at the centre of the world's vitality of half the world's population. Developing the autonomy and stability of this region is crucial for the stability and prosperity of the world. Second, the goal of the open and free Indo-Pacific vision is to facilitate free and robust economic activity throughout the Indo-Pacific and to realise the prosperity of the entire region.

There are three pillars that support Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific vision. First, since Japan is one of the world's major trading countries, it understands that the fundamental principles of the international order should be maintained. Basic ideas such as the rules-based order, freedom

of navigation, and free trade are the foundation of peace and stability in the region. Second, in this region, improving connectivity between countries is quite important, as such investment of infrastructure such as ports, energy and ICT is something that we must think about seriously. Another is people to people links through friendship, education and training.

Moreover, we also require common rules through EPA and FTA to ensure harmonized and fruitful benefits from the trading system. Third, capacity building and the HA/DR activities are cornerstones for peace and stability in the region. Capacity building in areas such as maritime law enforcement, maritime awareness, and resource development are what Japan has been providing assistance with for many countries throughout the region. If something unexpected happens, a quick response and assistance to countries suffering from disaster is critical to ensure that that situation does not escalate further. PKO - Peacekeeping Operations - are also a great framework for assisting countries to try to recover from war devastation.

In addition to the remainder of the air force administered by Japan for foreign affairs and ministries and agencies, the Japan Minister of Defence and the Japan Armed Forces are enhancing their defence cooperation and exchanges with countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region. This enhanced engagement encompasses Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Pacific Islands, the Middle East and Africa, in which several key seas and lands are located which are important from the point of view of economic security including energy.

Japan's Centre for Defence and the Defence Force are actively working with Indo-Pacific countries such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India and also countries in Europe, all of which share values inherent to their vision and their ties to the region. The free and open Indo-Pacific is an inclusive vision that Japan is working with cooperating countries that share its values.

Pulling on former Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the TICAD VI in August 2016, the idea of the FOIP has been taken up by other countries and areas - the US, India, and ASEAN have all announced their own vision or initiatives which are consistent with Japan's FOIP vision. Some

European countries have also recently published their own commitments in the Indo-Pacific region in order to reinforce a vision of the FOIP. Japan will enhance its cooperation with all countries that share the values inherent in its FOIP vision.

Let me explain further about some of the activities that Japan and its Defence Forces are engaged in. There are three aspects to JFDF's approach. First, securing the stability of lands through the means of cooperation and exchange of activities. They have been working on piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. This is just one example of this. Japan has contributed to international operations in the area since March 2009.

Second, preventing a contingency through confidence building and mutual understanding. Military exercises in all domains can create mutual understanding based on common procedures, deterring illegal or malicious actions that are contrary to the idea of our global common interests or issues that all countries much address.

Third, contributing to peace and stability through active engagement in the region in cooperation with partner countries. The upper right most pictures show a dispatch to the Republic of South Sudan. That lower left most picture is from the UN Triangular Partnership Programme. This programme was launched in 2015 as a project to help conduct peacekeeping in East Africa and expanded to East Asia in 2019. Japan has been involved in this programme as a main training provider ever since its foundation. The lower middle picture shows a scene of training support for the Papua New Guinea Defence Force using music. Music is so important to the Pacific Island countries, that Japan initiated this training for the band ahead of their performance at APEC in Papua New Guinea in 2018. That lower right picture is of a building programme for rescue with the Sri Lankan Airforce. Japan invited several personnel from the Sri Lankan Air Force to Japan to observe some training exercises such as search, detection, and rescue. The JSDF is currently committed in exercise building activities in 15 countries. To sum up, Japan is striving to create a fully open Indo-Pacific to counter any other attempts to change the status quo by force, economic coercion, and other actions that undermine our shared values and the rules-based order, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free speech and free trade. They are all values that we want to prosper in the region. In order to realise a free and open - and also to increase a prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Thank you very much. I conclude my presentation.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Conflict and Resolution: CCP aggressive moves in Ladakh region of Jammu & Kashmir

MGen Ravi Arora

The topic I am covering is the strategic convergence between India and Japan, with reference to the Indo-Pacific region. In form of a review, I will discuss two epochs, the era before year 2000 and the era after 2000. I will conclude with a discussion about the prospects in the future.

The present phase of India-Japan relations started back in 2000 when the Senkaku Islands - developments took place in those areas and developments took place on the Himalayan border between India and China. Not only because of the recent COVID pandemic. Of course, relations between India and Japan have accelerated into a new phase since the last one and a half years. And I am going to cover a review of India-Japan security relations and their different priorities, the US situation, and what India and Japan should be doing ahead.

This paper starts by stating that whatever has happened in the last 20 years is because there has been a kind of power vacuum in the Indo-Pacific region, created by US withdrawal from the region. The Chinese have taken advantage of the of the situation. It is only recently that the Americans have changed their policy, and I will come to that a little later. But there is a background to it. When France withdrew from Vietnam in the 1950s, the Chinese occupied the Paracel Islands. And just after the Vietnam War ended in 1974, the Chinese occupied another part of the Paracel Islands. Even the Soviets, when they withdrew from their limited presence in Vietnam from the Cam Ranh Bay area, China attacked the Spratly Islands. That was in 1988. And when the Americans withdrew from the Philippines, China occupied the Mischief Islands. And it has been noted that whatever they have occupied, they have never left it alone.

The Chinese have since started and have accelerated their submarine building programme and their aircraft carriers. Even in the Indian Ocean region, China has been playing a bigger role in Myanmar, in Bangladesh, in Sri Lanka, the Maldives We can attribute all these developments to India's declining influence. This is the problem that the current Indian government is now trying to reset.

Still on the consequences of the afore-mentioned power vacuum, it is a fact that no big leader has emerged other than China in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, there is no collective security system in the region. Bilaterally with the US, many of the countries have security arrangements and alliances, be it the US-Japan Alliance, the US-Australian Alliance, the US-South Korean, the US-Philippines. However, between these allies of the US, there is no collective security system. This is a major flaw. And that has perhaps forced Japan to reach out to all the countries in the region and even in Africa to forge some kind of security relations. And in that, India's name comes out on top.

All we have reviewed so far were before year 2000. I will now undertake a review of Japan-India relations since 2000. There has been common concern in Japan and in India about Chinese policies in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and on the Himalayan border.

But in the last few years, starting in 2007 when the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke in the Indian Parliament. The title of his talk was 'Confluence of the Two Seas'. And by the two seas, he meant the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. And the point of his talk was that connecting the Pacific and the Indian oceans would be an alternative to China's BRI and enhance the bargaining power of the small countries with Beijing. It is also notable that that talk also paved way for the revival of the talks for the quadrilateral dialogue.

In 2008, a joint declaration by India and Japan on security cooperation was made, and they expressed in that their common interest in the safety of the sea lands of communications. In 2014, Japan asked India to forge a team to thwart Chinese expansionism in the East China Sea and the Himalayas. Japan had called for united opposition to Chinese activities and moved to impose the air defence identification zone in the East China Sea.

In 2015, again there was a joint statement by India and Japan and mutual agreement to work together for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world. The vision was for a deep and action-oriented partnership. And for a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-

based order in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2016, Abe announced the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy in Kenya and spoke about the two oceans - the two continents - and again a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

Now, very significantly, in 2017 when there was a standoff in Doklam on the India-Bhutan-China border, Japan supported India diplomatically by calling for a status quo. The Japanese ambassador in India said, “No country should try to change the status quo in Doklam. China should not insist on making a highway through Doklam area of Bhutan, claiming it to be its own territory.” And similarly, such statements and support have been given by Japan in the standoff which commenced last year in Ladakh in Cashmere between India and China.

Now, in November 2019 before the pandemic - and that is more significant - the first India-Japan two plus two ministerial meeting took place. The two plus two had the foreign and defence ministers of both countries. India and Japan already had a joint working group on defence and technology cooperation, and five meetings have been held so far.

Post Covid, with new Chinese aggressiveness, there have been more developments. In July last year, a new document was issued by Japan, and it is called the “Achieving the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision: The Japan Ministry of Defence’s Approach.” The document stresses the need to enhance defence cooperation and exchanges with countries in South-East Asia, South Asia, Pacific Islands, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Tokyo specifically listed India for strengthening its partnership. And in September last year, India and Japan signed the Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA). It is a logistics agreement for providing support to each other’s forces, mainly for their joint exercises. However, theoretically, it allows Japan to use any of India’s facilities and particularly the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for military power projection. Although, the Japanese have their limitations, but it is pertinent to mention how Japan is helping other countries militarily.

In October last year, The US, Japan, Australian and Indian ministers - that is the ministers of the Quad countries - met in Tokyo to establish and promote a free, open, secure and inclusive

Pacific. It should be noted that right from 2014, joint exercises have been held between India and Japan. Initially, Japan was only an observer. But from 2015, Japan has become a permanent participant in the [unclear 51.19] naval exercises, along with the Americans and lately the Australians have also joined these drills. Significantly, in June last year, Indian and Japanese ships have carried out joint bilateral exercises in the Ladakh Straits, and that's sending out a very strong signal.

Now, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have got special attention because of the Chinese activities in the Himalayas. After the bloody clashes with China, India has, without any doubt, declared China to be enemy number one. And with the Chinese flexing their muscles in the Indo-Pacific right from East China Sea to Djibouti, India is re-evaluating Andaman and Nicobar Islands' role as a critical military base and is ready to take Japan's help. And this is one way Japan can help militarily –to develop capabilities. With cooperation taking place on the Islands, there is a united front for monitoring and exercising surveillance of the world's most [unclear 52.46] Ladakh Straits. In addition, Japan is upgrading infrastructure in these islands. Discussions have already taken place for having a region-wide undersea sound surveillance sensors to detect Chinese submarines operating in the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. The Chinese are also laying optical fibre from the Indian mainland - from Chennai to the islands. There are several other infrastructure projects for developing these islands in discussion with the Japanese.

Now, India and Japan do have different priorities. For Japan, the alliance with the Americans is central to its foreign and security policy. And their primary geographic priorities are the East China Sea and then the South China Sea. And, of course, the sea lands in the Indo-Pacific. For India, strategic autonomy is the foundation of its foreign and security policy. And its primary geographic interests are the Pakistan and China border, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. India has expressed its intent to carry out navigation activities in the South China Sea with the Philippines. It has also carried out navigation patrols in the South China Sea. And India has lately increased its engagement with the ASEAN countries.

This point brings our review to the ASEAN countries as another important factor. The South-East Asian region is important because it is surrounded by China, Japan, India, with US presence, and Australia. It is a region that is very rich in resources. It is sitting on the key sea lands of communications. South-East Asia, in a way, joins the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It is a region which has developed very fast economically, and it also serves as a hub to expand towards either direction, particularly for China or for Japan.

However, there is no major military power in South-East Asia. Consequently, it cannot stop the Chinese advance. South-East Asian countries are also not keen to take sides with the Americans or the Chinese. As everybody knows, China is either the number one or the number two trading partner for everybody. They wish also to maintain ASEAN centrality. They are worried that the Quad grouping - the US, Australia, Japan and India - may supplant ASEAN's role in this region.

So, many of these countries are affected by the Chinese nine-dotted line claims. India has been accelerating engagement with the ASEAN countries. India has had a Look East policy and that has now metamorphosed into an Act East policy. India is engaging militarily with many of these nations. It has trained Thailand's aircraft carrier crew. It has trained Malaysia fighter pilots and ground crew. It is training Indonesia's fighter pilots and also providing maintenance of its fighter aircraft. The sale of the Brahmos cruise missile to the Philippines is in the final stages. India has a defence cooperation and agreement with Singapore and with extensive defence and security and intelligence sharing. Incidentally, India recently gifted an attack submarine to Myanmar. It has also promised to help in the modernisation of its armed forces. India and Myanmar are already carrying out closed counter insurgency cooperation.

It is important to mention Vietnam particularly. Vietnam is the gateway to South-East Asia. And it is a country willing to stand up against China. It has shown such an attitude against China in the past. India has set up a satellite tracking and imaging centre in Vietnam. It has donated for patrol [unclear 58.09]. It is exporting the Brahmos cruise missile - it is under negotiation. India has trained Vietnamese air force pilots. It has a civil nuclear agreement with Vietnam.

Now, the Japanese too have donated 10 patrol vehicles to Vietnam. Because Vietnam has shown that it can counter bullying by China through its coast guard ships. There have been several incidents. Japan supports Vietnam's cyber security and space programmes. It also has a civil nuclear agreement with Vietnam. And Japan and India can both together support Vietnam's military capabilities. And this is one area being examined by several countries. That Japan builds the infrastructure like airports, and India provides the hardware as well as training.

Now, talk on the Indo-Pacific is not complete without mentioning the roles of the United States. Fortunately, after years of going after global terrorism, the Americans announced a new defence posture called the Dynamic Force Employment in 2018. This new policy changed its national defence strategy and officially shifted their primary security priorities from the War Against International Terrorism to facing the challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region. However, it is notable that the US wants the partner countries to increase their defence budgets to buy American weapons and to adopt tough policies against China. Most are willing to do so. And there has been several deals on the purchase of advanced American equipment. For example, Japan has announced the purchase of many F45 heads. And after a 10-year interruption, the talks between the four Quad countries were revived in 2019. But the Quad is still not a military alliance. But is on its way to becoming one.

Moving ahead, I would like to see India and Japan coordinating with the Americans to ensure that US military commitment remains intact. There was a time when there was a doubt amongst many of the US alliance countries whether the Americans would live up to their commitments in the area against China. India and Japan should confirm that their respective free and open Indo-Pacific initiatives remain inclusive, but that the ASEAN centrality is not affected. And the Quad must offset Chinese gains and unilateral changes to the status quo should not be allowed.

Japan's free and open Indo-Pacific is development driven - infrastructure development driven. The Indians also - the Indian agenda as far as the free and open Indo-Pacific is concerned is limited to freedom of navigation in the area and does not have a specific military agenda. But

they should continue to support each other in wider areas than with direct military assistance as they have been doing so far. India. Japan should develop alternatives to prevent the ASEAN countries from becoming overly dependent on the BRI. And they should work for a collective security system in the Indo-Pacific with all like-minded countries which are lacking security.

Japan has its limitations. It can give development assistance but not military weapons. So, it has invested in anti-piracy, tsunami warning systems, cyber defence, building infrastructures - roads, airports and seaports - and donating patrol ships to some of the countries. And so, India and Japan can continue to collaborate to improve the security and infrastructure of South-East Asian countries.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Regional security and Indo-Pacific, Taiwan's Perspective

Bill Chen

I would like to expand a little bit so that you understand our situation in the face of China. Taiwan is a southern country. We celebrate our national day - January 10th every year. Last year we had a national reception in a hotel. It was during the highlight of the reception - cutting the cake to celebrate our birthday. Two political secretaries or counsellors from the Chinese Embassy interrupted without an invitation - of course, the reception was by invitation only - they entered the venue and shouted in the public to the guests that Taiwan is not a country, you should not be allowed to fly your flag, and you should not display it like that. Of course, my colleague asked them to leave. It is our reception, and you should not be here like that. Please go out. The two gentlemen refused to leave. That is what we face almost every day. That is our current situation, facing China's bullying all the time.

Okay. Let me start my ambassador's script. Bill Chen, Taiwan's Chief Representative in New Zealand. Dr Anita Abbott, Chair of the APSI Forum, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I would first like to thank Dr Anita for inviting me to speak at this important summit. International and regional security is experiencing challenges and threats of unprecedented complexity. I will focus on the challenges we are facing in the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan's role in the region's security.

COVID-19 is undoubtedly the most serious challenge that every country is facing right now. As for this week, there are over 140 million cases worldwide and 7 million deaths. While countries have been dealing with the COVID-19 aftermath, China has taken this opportunity to create a multi-layered security and military threat to the Indo-Pacific region. Hong Kong used to be a shining example of democracy in East Asia. Not anymore. The draconian national imports by the PRC could be the tragic demise of democracy in Hong Kong. Concentration camps have been set up, one after another, in Xinjiang and now in Tibet. Mongolian children are banned from learning their own language. Outside the border, Chinese maritime forces have intensified their activities in disputed waters in the East China Sea. Their official vessels now come every day and even chased Japanese fishing vessels. In the South China Sea, the Chinese

forces have been snatching up territories Beijing's plan to seek sovereignty over the whole of the South China Sea is an integrated government approach, including the use of abrasive military force. It has occupied several islands, despite promising never to do so. Moreover, China recently has a new coast guard law, giving the China Coast Guard more freedom to use force in Chinese claimed waters. This is not a threat, because China is already doing so. It is a threat because it shows China's assertiveness to achieve more control over disputed waters.

Apart from the above-mentioned threats, China has also intensified its disinformation campaign or hybrid warfare during COVID. Such attacks are designed to push democracies into chaos in order to show that authoritarianism is a better model of governance. The CCP is employing a unique set of economic and political tactics to undermine countries' democracies and threaten the future of their property as their dependence on China increases. China aims to be an economic, political and military power as well as the global trend setter and rule maker. If China achieves its goal, the global order may fall, and authoritarianism will prevail.

What are the Taiwan's roles in the Indo-Pacific? Before the international community recognised threats posed by China, Taiwan has faced tremendous challenges and threats from China. Particularly over the past few years - the past two years. China has stepped up its rhetoric, assault and military intimidation against Taiwan by sending military ships and aircraft to circle Taiwan, luring away our diplomatic alliance. As well as interfering in our relations with other countries and our participation in international organisations. Last year, the China's People Liberation Army increased flights into Taiwan's air defence zone, crossing the median line for the first time. And just last week, 20 Chinese bombers and jets entered Taiwan's air zone in reaction to Taiwan and US signing an understanding to bolster marine cooperation.

Taiwan has never and will never succumb to China. Instead, Taiwan stands firm and safeguards democracy, freedom and human rights. Taiwan bears the ultimate responsibility for our own defence. We have worked to accelerate the development of our capabilities to strengthen our national defence. Our government has increased our defence budget in proportion to the military challenge we face. We have also procured necessary equipment from the US including missile and ammunition. Over the past year, we have invested more than US \$18 million in engaging a regular process for arms sales, including our defence priorities. At the same time, we have been committed to enhancing our domestic production and capabilities. We are engaged in aircraft production because we believe that our defence posture can be better

supported by a more competitive industry. As a result, our jets just flew, and it is one of the most advanced jets of its generation.

Apart from traditional security issues, Taiwan has also worked with the US under the global cooperation and training framework this year. Now Japan and Australia will join in later to host more workshops on cyber security and various topics on new technology. This cooperation has transformed Taiwan into a hub of management of non-traditional security issues. Taiwan is working hard to play a more proactive role to strengthen regional peace and stability.

Security and economic development are the next critical focus. In December 2016, Taiwan launched a diverse regional strategy that seeks to expand and deepen cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific across a wide range of areas including the ability to strengthen our bonds of friendship. The policy is to deepen the country's agricultural business, education, tourism and trade ties with ASEAN member states. We are working with mechanisms to improve engagement with countries across the region. We will continue to monitor relative developments and opportunities to cultivate relationships with partner nations. The challenges we face during this COVID era go beyond public health and security. The pandemic has severely disrupted national economics and international trade. One lesson that Taiwan has learnt during this pandemic is that global supply chains and the trade we heavily rely on are subject to coercive actions by aggressive actors. It is time to restructure the global supply chain to bring them closer to home or locate them in like-minded nations. Most importantly, to ensure that the global supply chain is secure and free from political coercion.

Now, the conclusion. The pandemic has shown China's hegemonic abrasive action. It has also clarified what actors like China want - it wants to undermine our shared values and the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and around the globe. To recognise China's threat is the first step. The next step is to improve the resilience of our alliance of democracy to prevail against the challenges China presents and even get China to cease action that are antagonistic to the democratic community. The call for the international security dialogue, comprising of the US, Australia, and Japan shows the like-minded countries are not only aware of the threats posed by China, but also are working together to safeguard a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. COVID-19 is a reminder that disease knows no border and that global populations and public health is crucial. During this pandemic, Taiwan has already donated 15 million face masks and other medical supplies and equipment to more than 80 countries to help contain

COVID-19. This was an effort to support the global community in combating the pandemic. It is because we truly believe that when we help others, others will help us. This is also an important link to maintain as we all face security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. Taiwan is working very hard to defend its democracy and way of life, because we know that this is not just about ourselves, but about safeguarding the world's democracy as a whole. However, it is an impossible task to deal with China's threat alone. I would hope that like-minded partners would come together and speak out for Taiwan as an open and vibrant democracy. There is need to show the world that this is a better path. We have faith in democracy, and we know that democracy will prevail in this long battle. In the face of difficulties, we must choose solidarity. Taiwan has stood in solidarity with like-minded partners, but we are stronger together. Thank you.

This paper starts by noting that, today, the international and regional security is experiencing challenges and threats of unprecedented complexity. I will focus on some peculiar challenges we are facing in Indo-Pacific, and Taiwan's role in the regional security.

Challenges and Threats: COVID-19 and China

COVID-19 is undoubtedly the most serious challenge every country is facing right now. As of this week, there are over 124 million confirmed cases worldwide, with 2.7 million deaths.

While most of the countries are busy dealing with the aftermath of COVID 19, China has taken this opportunity to create a multi-layered security, economic, and military threat to the Indo-Pacific region.

Hong Kong used to be a shining example of freedom and open economy in East Asia. This is not anymore. The draconian National Security Law, imposed by PRC, precluded the tragic demise of democracy in Hong Kong. Concentration camps have been set up one after the other in Xinjian and now also in Tibet. Mongolian children are banned from learning their own language.

Outside its border, the Chinese maritime forces have intensified their activities in the disputed waters in the East China Sea. Their official vessels now come every day and would even chase any Japanese fishing vessels.

In the South China Sea, the Chinese armed forces have been setting up territorial water and ADIZ. Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the whole South China Sea manifests in its integrated, whole-of-government approach, including the use of aggressive diplomacy and military force. It has militarized several islands it has occupied, despite promising never to do so.

Moreover, China recently passed a new coastguard law that gives its coast guards more freedom to use force in Chinese-claimed waters. The new law is a mere formality because the use of force is already in existence. However, it legalized China's assertiveness to achieve full control of the disputed waters.

Apart from the above-mentioned threats, China has also intensified its dis-information campaign, or hybrid warfare, during COVID. Such attacks were designed to put democracies in chaos in order to prove that authoritarianism is a better model of governance.

Chinese Communist Party is employing a unique set of economic and information tactics to undermine many countries' democracies and threaten their future prosperity as their dependence on China increases.

China aims to be the dominant economic, political, and military power, as well as the global agenda-setter and rule-maker. If China achieves its goal, the global order will be grossly undermined and authoritarian systems will prevail.

Taiwan's role- How Taiwan can be part of a free, prosperous and peaceful Indo-Pacific region

Before the international community fully recognized threats posed by China, Taiwan has long faced and fought against tremendous challenges and threats from China. Particularly, over the past few years, China has stepped up its rhetorical assault and military intimidation against Taiwan. One of these tactics is the practice of repeatedly sending military ships and aircraft to circle Taiwan. The targets include scaring away our diplomatic allies, as well as interfering in our relations with other countries and our participation in international organizations.

Last year, China's People's Liberation Army increased drills and flights into Taiwan's air defense zone, crossing the median line for the first time in decades. On consecutive days in January, more than a dozen PLA planes buzzed towards Taiwan. On the 26 of March in 2021, a total of 20 Chinese military aircrafts entered Taiwan's air defense identification zone. These include bombers and fighter jets. In a swift and apparent reaction, Taipei and Washington signed a memorandum of understanding to bolster maritime cooperation.

However, Taiwan has never and will never succumb to China's coercion. Instead, Taiwan stands firm and safeguards democracy, freedom and human rights with great determination just like the biblical averagely built David fighting with a gigantic Goliath.

Self-defense capabilities

Taiwan bears the ultimate responsibility for the Défense of its territory and citizens. A lot of work has been done to further accelerate the development of its asymmetrical capabilities for strengthening national defense.

Taiwan government has increased its defence budget in proportion to the military challenges it is facing. It has also procured necessary equipment from the United States, including new F-16Vs, as well as missiles and other additions to its asymmetric capabilities. Over the past four years, it has invested more than 18 billion USD in engaging a regular process for arms sales, fulfilling its defence priorities. At the same time, the government is committed to enhancing domestic production capabilities. It has engaged in new aircraft and naval vessel production. This focus is based on the belief that a robust defense posture can be better supported by a more competitive defense industry. As a result, Taiwan's T-5 Brave Eagle first took flight in June 2020 and notably is one of the most advanced Fifth-Generation Advanced Jet Trainers in the world.

Apart from traditional security issues, Taiwan has also worked at the international levels with the United States under the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF), with Japan and Australia joining later, to co-host workshops on cyber-security and various topics on new technology. GCTF has made Taiwan become a hub for management on non-traditional security

issues. Taiwan is working hard to play a more proactive role to strengthen regional peace and stability.

Economic collaboration- New Southbound policy

Security and economic development are inextricably linked. Therefore in 2016, Taiwan launched the New Southbound Policy. This is a people-centric and diverse regional strategy that seeks to strategically expand and deepen cooperation with countries in the Indo-Pacific. Its focus cuts across a wide range of areas, including the economy, and generally to strengthen bonds of friendship among several nations. The policy seeks to deepen the country's agriculture, business, cultural, education, tourism and trade ties with 10 ASEAN member states, 6 South Asian countries, Australia and New Zealand.

Taiwan is working through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms to improve engagements with countries across the region. It will continue to monitor related developments and expand opportunities to cooperate with nations who are in partnership under the New Southbound Policy.

The challenges the Taiwanese are facing during this COVID-era go beyond public health and security. The pandemic has severely disrupted national economies and international trade. One of the most important lessons both Taiwan and New Zealand have learnt during the pandemic is that the global supply chains and trade mechanisms we heavily rely on are highly fragile and are often subject to coercive measures by aggressive actors. It is time to restructure the global supply chains to bring them closer to home or locate them in like-minded economies. The purpose is to ensure that these global supply chains are secure and free from political coercion.

Conclusion

The pandemic has exposed China's hegemonic ambitions and aggressive actions to the whole world. It has also clarified the kind of authoritarian world order that China wants. It wants to

undermine our shared values and the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific in particular, and around the globe.

To recognize China's threat is a first step forward. The next step is to improve the resilience made available through alliances formed by democratic nations. This is to prevail against the challenges China is posing, and even to compel China to cease actions that are harmful to the individual and collective interests of democratic nations.

COVID-19 is a fresh reminder that disease knows no borders and that global cooperation on public health is crucial. During this pandemic, Taiwan has already donated more than 50 million face masks and other medical supplies and equipment to more than 80 countries to help contain COVID-19. "Taiwan can help" was the motto for our efforts to support the global community in combatting the pandemic. It is because we truly believe that "when we help ourselves, others will help us." This is also an important belief to maintain, as we all face daunting security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.

Taiwan stands on the frontline of the fight against China's sharp power and coercion. Taiwan is working very hard to defend its democracy and democratic way of life. This is because Taiwanese know that this is not just about Taiwan alone, but about safeguarding the world's democracy as a whole.

However, it is an impossible task to deal with the China threat alone. The hope is that like-minded partners would come together or collectively speak out when any nation is targeted for attacks.

As a vibrant and open democracy, Taiwan will stand in stark contrast to the authoritarian model across the Taiwan Strait, showing the world that there is a better path. We have faith in democracy, and we know that democracy must and will prevail in this long battle.

In times of difficulties, we must choose solidarity. Taiwan has stood in solidarity with like-minded partners, believing that we will be stronger together.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

CONCLUSION

Lieutenant Colonel John Black

Can you see these? Are my slides showing? First and foremost, I want to thank the APSI family. Thank you for bringing everybody together and going over this. Just to hear these diverse views has been good. Without any further ado, we are going ahead and close this out. Once again, these are my views. They do not necessarily reflect the official government position.

Let us go forward. As we move forward, we have heard all these great views, we just need to stay aware of what is out there. What I want everybody to consider from a strategic context - I love this model - it is taught at Harvard Business School. It is called the Beacon and Architect Framework. On the left, we are always going to be thinking about our strategic context. But in that second box - the big rectangular one that says 'direction - as we move forward, just think about what we want our vision, purpose and strategy to be, and how we are going to link our resources to that. Then, most importantly, who do we want to be as people and as nations and as regions and as a globe? Let us use that to drive us forward so that we can be a beacon and constantly scan the environment for threats and opportunities. Once we identify something that is going to be a great opportunity or potential threat, let us diagnose it. Once we diagnose it, let us turn into the architect and design and create a better future. As we look forward into the future and we remember what our vision is, we can work with people, change cultures that we live in to make it better, and work on the hardware. The hardware is the system. What we can do together is design and create a system and a structure that is going to benefit all of us. We need to just go ahead and do it to create value and activities as we move forward. We can be inclusive, even with revisionist states. But it must start with nation states that share the same values.

As a beacon, understand that as you are scanning the environment the biggest thing that we will run into is instability. That is fine. Just deal with it. But then as we move and we get behind stability, remember to question ourselves: What is going on with this right now as we speak?

Just as I talked about the importance of understanding and communicating in a line, remember that a lot of the time these differences occur because we come from different cultures. It is not that we want to be mean or want to be stupid. It is just that we come from different cultures. By getting together and talking about things to understand things better and then align activities, we can make a better future not just for us but for our kids, family and nations.

That is where this architect model comes into view. We must remember where we are going. I think we need to go back and challenge everybody. We seriously need to challenge everybody to be better - to pursue a more difficult goal. That is what is going to make us better and create the structure that we need. The bottom line is that if we get this wrong, the future is going to be horrible for our grandkids. If we mess up the environment too much, we are all probably going to die within a couple of generations anyway.

As we look forward and try to plan this, what does this look like? On the far right, let us try to anchor our future to establishing better security, stability, prosperity and peace. Let us use those three things in the middle to help us get there.

The first thing we must fix is the structural architecture which we call the rules-based international order, which several revisionist states oppose and want to undermine and erode. This picture is from the state highway in Kaikoura after that 7.8 earthquake. It was horrible, but in life we are going to get punched in the face and react to things that we did not plan for, but we must move ahead and move on. That is our goal. We need to fix and strengthen that international order.

How are we going to get there? We have already touched on it. We need an inclusive order that includes everybody - that gives every nation a voice so that every nation is heard, seen, valued and appreciated. At some point, someone will have to vote - it will probably be a majority rules - but everybody needs a voice and to be in the party.

We also need to go ahead and use those thoughts that we already talked about. That is admitting that there will be differences, we will disagree, we will argue, and every once in a while, people might fight. But let us go ahead and try and work together and expand the pie so that we can create more value for each other.

This is the challenge that everyone has really been talking about. Not everybody, but a large percentage of the speakers have been talking about the PRC's effect on the international order. As we ask ourselves: How can we and other nation states benefit from the PRC's economic rise while protecting our interests? Just remember that we need China to succeed too. We need Russia to succeed too. We need every single country to succeed. That water that will lift us up is the economy and our values.

Who do we need to be and become to get there? This is where I want to go ahead and propose something new that you probably have not heard. But over on the far right, it looks like two people. They can be getting ready to fight or to dance. We do not need to fight. Let us go ahead and dance. It takes two to tango. We are in this together. I want to espouse this principle-based approach. It is just looking at things from a negotiation point of view. Treating everybody with dignity and respect. And as we sit down, and we talk to people saying: What is at stake? What is important to you? How do you prioritise your interests, needs and wants? What are your challenges, fears and risks? Tell me the truth. You go through all these things - constraints, restraints, deal breakers, red lines, blind spots, alternatives to walk away. What will you do if the other side does not agree with you? How do you objectively measure that criterion? What are your options when that happens? How can we make this better? What are the next steps? How are we going to assess that as we move forward?

I think if we do that and we seriously try to come together as people, nations, regions and a global structure, there are a lot of shared responsibilities. It all boils down to treating people and nations with dignity and respect and prestige. If we can try to understand the other views, respect the differences, and talk about it, we can go ahead and make better things happen and make a better difference in the world. With that, remember to always try to be legal, ethical, moral, economical and philanthropic.

Then we move into the best practices. This is difficult stuff. It will probably never be solved in our lifetime. But if we can anchor ourselves in our principles and values, work with partners who are like-minded, make sure we are present in the region because we need to be in the region, and then when it comes down to it you need to be able to stand up for yourself so that nobody takes your lunch money.

As we are doing this, you will see some wolf warrior diplomacy and some rudeness. Once in a blue moon you might get a weird POTUS. But try to reinforce civility, cooperation, and dialogue. If we can do that and we think in the strategic context and we keep our focus and our minds and actions aligned to our vision, purpose and strategy and link that to resources and identity, we can add value.

We talked about this. I will not mention it again. But we need to get better across all these elements of national power.

Then, for every single country and person, we have unique strengths that only you and your country have. New Zealand has great soft power. Good sports diplomacy. You name it. For us, our economy and our military. We are going to play to that. Whoever you are and wherever you come from, finding that one thing that no one else can do that you can do that makes you special.

As we move forward, you have heard some discussion about the QUADs. What this is on the left - this is not even real. This is just an idea. But what previously kept the Asia-Pacific largely peaceful for several years was a rising economy that improved the quality of life. That is not going to work anymore. What we need to do is as we move forward, try to reinforce that and expand upon it and improve upon it. This probably is not even the right model that is going to work. But I want to show you that things can evolve, and we can work with all kinds of power to make a better world.

These are just some things that we are going to deploy so that when soft power fails, hard power is there. Hopefully, we do not have to use it. Worst case scenario, that is why it is there. If for some reason, violence breaks out, we will try to work by, with and through our allies to restore order as soon as possible. We cannot do it alone. We need everybody to help out in whatever way they can.

Moving on. Getting close to the end here. When you see bad and prohibited activities and unprofessional conduct on a personal level or the state level, you need to call them out. Treat people with dignity. Try to prevent these stupid things from happening. Somebody mentioned earlier - be a good bystander. If you see something, say something. If you do not, something bad will happen and it will continue to occur. If that happens, let us go ahead and call for an

inquiry and an investigation to work with it. These are some of the things that prohibited activities are - I apply these to a personal level and elevate these to a state level - because I think they have a lot of value.

What are some areas of collaboration? These are some easy no brainers. I pulled these from the Biden administration's Interim Security Guidance. I think we can all agree that COVID is the biggest thing that we need to work on now. Then the economic crisis recovery, then strengthening allies and partners, then all these other things. If we do these things right, including the promotion of human rights, democratic values and norms, dealing with climate change and trying to stop unprofessional and revisionist activity, we are going to be good.

As we move forward, our recommendations - here are some of the things that I thought of. We need to tell people that competition is inevitable. We need to have multi-polarity in Indo-Pacom. We want to empower each and every one of you. We want everyone to be stronger and more powerful because we are stronger together. We want to openly discuss, prioritise and align things. We can achieve mutually beneficial interests in a much more efficient manner than we can do alone. When we talk about constraints and trying to fix this structural order, what is going on now is we have a little bully running around a playground isolating kids and beating them up when teachers are not around. We need to create a structure that does not allow that - a set of durable constraints that is not going to let the PRC get away with murder, particularly nation state murder or coercion. Because if no one stops them, they will. When that happens, put it in the media. Use that strategic narrative. Shine a light on it. *We do not want those things to happen. We do not want to use force if we can use soft power. Down on the bottom* - this is a big thing. We cannot message at all a desire for any form of change inside China. That is the equivalent of this battleship trying to drive up to the lighthouse and both telling the other to divert course. Whatever happens inside a nation is the responsibility of that nation. That is why it is called sovereignty. Do not mess with other countries on the inside. Let those people do what they want with the country because that is the way it is supposed to work.

If we can go ahead and message Asia first and ASEAN centrality, that will defeat this narrative of China's centrality in the next century. This will put them away and help to elevate the countries who need it the most, which are in Southeast and South Asia. Everyone else is going to benefit and get wealthy out of it. If we can do this and modernise and strengthen the rules-based international order in a way that the region views as legitimate with a goal of getting

80% plus of the world to obey the rules-based order, we are doing well. That is why you keep hearing about this free and open Indo-Pacific which Prime Minister Abe first mentioned in 2007 and it has caught on because it resonates with a lot of different people and different countries in the region. Lead with diplomacy and values. Have respect for sovereignty. Get access to markets - use free trade. Have freedom of transit. You name it. Abide by laws. We need to message that we want the PRC to grow in a responsible manner so that it is good for you, and it is good for your citizens, but in a way that does not come at the expense of other countries.

Take advantage of the offshore players. That is the US, the EU - and for European nations who have territories in the Indo-Pacific - NATO. The UK, France, and Canada. If we do this, all this graph shows that if we align our strategy with our purpose on the left side and we align our strategy with our organisational capabilities, we are going to have a very good chance of doing better than worse. I am not going to say winning, because what does winning look like? We just need to get better every single day.

In summary, stay aware, be that beacon, be that architect, maintain awareness of these two problems - those instabilities are going to be there and run into differences of values - and just think about the peace, prosperity and stability and bring it all back, anchor it on your values and principles, and work with those recommendations. By doing that, you are going to realise that you do not have to be the strongest or biggest. All you must do is be the most adaptable. If we do that, all we need to do is get in the game like Big Joe here when we visited New Zealand and got that rugby because he played fullback - was number 15 - back in the day. Get out there, give them that haka, and challenge everybody else so you can say, 'Are you a friend or a foe?' Let that other nation states' actions tell you if they are a friend or foe so that you can guide your actions appropriately. Based upon their actions, you will know if they are going to compete or if they do not want to. You can adjust your actions accordingly. But as someone starts pushing you, do not fight back. If someone pushes, you pull. If somebody pulls, you push. Off balance them by not doing what they want. We should never do what our opponent or our competitors want. Why is that? It is because we are stronger together. Individually, we can be broken. Together, we can survive and thrive and create a better future for our kids, nations and the world.

With that, please go forward, make a positive difference. If you can, everybody please give a big round of applause to the APSI team. Thank you very much. This concludes my conclusion.